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Abstract
For a long time economic theory argued that the level of economic development depends
on the allocation of production factors both between and within economies. However, it is
rarely underlined that allocation depends on organizational decisions and management, es-
pecially on organizational decisions within and across firms. Understanding such decisions
through both empirical studies and theory is highly important. It may enable us to understand
the microeconomic roots of macroeconomic patterns. This thesis conducts at the empirical
analysis of organizational decisions that may potentially influence aggregate performance. It
shows connection of the organizational decisions with both the economic environment and firm
characteristics.
The focus is on transition countries, after the massive privatization period. The reasons
are threefold: i) essential differences that emerged in performances of countries with similar
heritages and starting points ii) the need to quantify the impact of “complementary” reforms
after privatization iii) the mis-match between the expectations and the results of building a
market-oriented environment.
Following a first chapter overviewing the economic context, theoretical positioning and
empirical framework, the thesis contains four studies. The first two studies (Chapter 2 and
Chapter 3) are devoted to firm boundaries decisions as one of the key organizational decisions.
By using the cross-section data of the EBRD-World Bank Business Environment Enterprise
Survey (BEEPS III) and utilizing the predictions of Antra`s and Helpman’ global sourcing
modelling, I study the industry-level incidence of integration and firm-level decisions to redefine
firm boundaries. Both studies highlight the importance of both technological and institutional
factors. Moreover, the second study presents the firm-level perspective and highlights the
importance of firm propensity to change.
The third study (Chapter 4) is focused on changes of internal firm organization and their
connection with international trade liberalization. It provides preliminary answers to the fol-
lowing questions: (i) what drives flattening decisions, and (ii) whether flatter structures may
be associated with a higher degree of control. By using the Management, Organization and
Innovation (MOI) Survey, this study provides new evidence on the positive connection between
increased competition from imports and firm flattening in transition countries. It also suggests
that flattening may have more centralization features than is usually assumed.
The fourth study (Chapter 5) explores the connection between management quality and cor-
ruption. By using the BEEPS V cross-section data, I underline the general negative connection
between the management quality and different kinds of corruption over the period 2011-2014.
However, the results also indicate the existence of idiosyncratic links between corruption and
quality of management in some transition countries.
As a result, the thesis contributes to the literature by advancing the state-of-the-art knowl-
edge on firm organization in transition countries over the period 2005-2014.
First, it identifies significant differences between country groups, namely EU and non-EU
transition countries. The differences are persistent and characteristic for all the types of orga-
nizational change considered in the thesis, as well as the link between management and corrup-
tion. In particular, in non EU-transition countries, these differences are due to country-level
and firm-level idiosyncrasy.
Second, the thesis evidences that, regardless of numerous reforms of the business envi-
ronment, firms in transition countries are rarely subject to organizational changes. However, a
small number of firms subject to organizational changes significantly out-perform their counter-
parts. Consequently, it is important to understand what features of the economic environment
or characteristics of firms prevent such efficiency-enhancing changes.
Third, the thesis shows that firms in transition countries differ in their internal organiza-
tional structures, which they adjust to changes in product market competition. However, the
intensity of these adjustments is heterogeneous across countries and industries.
Fourth, a negative connection between management quality and corruption indicates that
further simplification of business regulations and anti-corruption measures would unquestion-
ably enhance the quality of management in EU transition countries both at the firm and at
the country level. However, similar measures are not equally efficient for non-EU transition
countries, because the link is idiosyncratic in these countries at the firm level.
This thesis provides new evidence on the significant role of contractual links, technology
complexity, product market competition and corruption in explaining the gap between micro-
behavior and macro-objectives. However, the results put forward the need for i) a bottom-up
approach, with firm behavior being analyzed and considered as an underlying force of ag-
gregate and international performance, and ii) theories that account for firm organizational
adjustments, because such adjustments may significantly alter our understanding of interna-
tional trade gains and the channels through which efficiency enhancing reforms act and affect
industrial reorganization.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Research Questions
For a long time economic theory argued that the level of economic development and ef-
ficiency of production depends on the allocation of production factors between and within
economies. This traditional approach attributes comparatively higher levels of development
to the prevalence of capital-intensive rather than labour-intensive industries in production sys-
tems. Thus, it gives greater importance to the allocation of capital and labour across industries
with different production technologies. However, in the past decade it has been widely high-
lighted that the allocation of resources does not only depend on the technology in industries,
but also on firm characteristics and their heterogeneity both within and across industries.
More recently, numerous studies have been devoted to evaluation of within-industry hetero-
geneity, in particular in terms of firm-level total factor productivity (TFP), and its effect on
international trade and world production patterns. While estimating total factor productivity
as the residual of the production function allows researchers to highlight the most efficient firms
and the redistribution of productivity, it is still comparatively rare for organizational decisions
defining this productivity to be taken into consideration. By merging organizational economics
with international trade, the economic literature may significantly advance our understanding
of the microeconomic roots of economic changes. However, such a merger is applied relatively
little, both in the theoretical and the empirical literature. This thesis conducts empirical anal-
ysis of organizational changes that may potentially affect productivity, and their connection
with both the economic environment and firm characteristics. In particular, the main research
question of the thesis is:
• To what extent do the economic environment and individual firm characteristics shape the
firm’s propensity to change its organization?
The importance of understanding firm behaviour and organization has been increasing since
the number of commercial giants and the scale of within-firm production started to grow sub-
stantially. A striking example of the firm’s growing importance in international economic
activities may be drawn from the share of intra-firm transactions by US multinational firms.
Such intra-firm transactions are estimated to account for around 30% of international trade in
goods and around 60% of international trade in services (Lafontaine and Slade, 2007). With
the revenues of some firms exceeding the GDP of a number of nations (Steger, 2009), not un-
derstanding the drivers of these firms’ decisions and organization would result in the economic
literature losing grip on national and international production patterns.
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The organization of a firm may be considered from different angles and by analysing different
features. One of the key organizational features is the definition of firm boundaries. Redefini-
tion of firm boundaries, and integration in particular, is one of the organizational changes that
may potentially be connected with higher performance, thus affecting the patterns of economic
growth and international trade. By redefining its boundaries, a firm optimizes the allocation
of resources with respect to the market and economic conditions. Firms may benefit from
integration in many respects, e.g. higher investment rates, productivity, growth and better
technology transfer (Schoar, 2002; Broedner et al., 2009; Seru, 2014). This illustrates that
the organizational decision to redefine firm boundaries affects the performance of firms. How-
ever, the prevalence of integrated firms may have implications for the economic performance of
countries. For instance, an economy may be more resilient to global crises or have particular
patterns of international trade participation. Moreover, a recent study by Alfaro et al. (2016)
shows that firm decisions to integrate are caused by, not the cause of, higher prices. This elimi-
nates one of the main arguments for integration’s negative influence on country-level economic
performance. More generally, the results of Alfaro et al. (2016) suggest that organizational
decisions, like integration, are caused by the changes in the firm’s economic environment.
A firm’s interaction with its economic environment may depend on numerous factors. A
number of important factors depends on the way a firm writes contracts, which are necessary
for production activity to take place. The theory of property-rights has recently proposed
contractual frictions as one of the main drivers of firm boundaries’ redefinition. The two key
factors that affect the degree of contractual frictions faced by a firm are the technological
complexity of production and the strength of contracting institutions. Consequently, one of the
sub-questions that this thesis seeks to answer is:
• To what extend does the firm’s tendency to redefine its boundaries reflect contractual
frictions either connected with technological complexity or associated with the institutional
environment’s weaknesses?
The thesis includes analysis aimed at answering this sub-question both at industry and firm
levels. While the industry-level analysis allows better comparability with the existing literature,
the firm-level analysis is an original contribution of this thesis to the empirical literature.
Another organizational factor that may affect how firm production resources are allocated is
the firm’s internal structure and control distribution. Several empirical studies have illustrated
that the firm’s internal structure becomes notably flatter in advanced countries. There may
be a number of reasons for this phenomenon. Some studies argue that it is connected with
technological progress that makes information flows more efficient. Others show that it is inter-
national trade liberalization that affects internal firm organization. Moreover, the most recent
studies on internal organizational change show that together with decreasing organizational
distance (flattening) more restrictive control may be observed. This thesis aims to answer the
two following sub-questions:
• What drives flattening decisions?
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• May flatter structures be associated with a higher degree of control?
While analysing the first of these sub-questions, the thesis mostly focuses on the link between
internal organizational change and international trade.
Furthermore, productivity enhancing organizational change (or its absence), may be largely
dependent not only on change in the economic environment, but also on the firm’s characteristics
and quality of management. In fact, according to the recent evidence (Bloom and Van Reenen,
2010) management quality is closely connected with better performance and higher produc-
tivity in most countries. However, the characteristics of the institutional environment may
reduce the quality of management, negatively affecting the productivity of firms. Such an in-
stitutional environment, therefore, may prevent productivity-enhancing national policies from
being efficient. One such institutional environment characteristic is corruption. Athanasouli
and Goujard (2015) show that corruption may deteriorate management quality at the regional
level. Moreover, it also affects the efficiency of business reforms (Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya,
2013) aimed at enhancing firm performance. Consequently, this thesis seeks to answer the
following two sub-questions:
• Is corruption always connected negatively with the quality of management?
• Are there country- and firm-level characteristics that define idiosyncrasy in the link be-
tween the quality of management and corruption?
In addressing all five of the above sub-questions, this thesis aims at revealing the intercon-
nection between the economic environment and firms in order to answer the main question of
the thesis: what defines firm propensity to organizational change?
Answering this question is especially important for understanding why reforms, such as
privatization, have failed in their promises in transition countries. It also gives insight on why
transition countries starting from comparatively similar levels of economic development have
achieved such different results in terms of both productivity and economic development.
1.2 Transition Countries: The Economic Context
1.2.1 Reforms in Transition Countries
The group of transition countries1 stands alone among most advanced and emerging economies
due to a set of important features. First of all, the economy in these countries may not be con-
sidered independently from their experience of planned economic systems and their transition
history. Second, although they have a high potential for economic growth and development, a
large amount of this potential has not yet been realized. Economic reforms in multiple areas
1Countries that experienced the transition from central planning to free market economies are considered as
transition countries in this thesis. In particular, for the purposes of this thesis such countries include countries
of the former Soviet Union, and the Eastern Bloc (non-Asian ex-soviet countries). Asian transition countries
like China and Vietnam are not considered in this thesis.
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failed to deliver on their promises in a significant number of these countries. The reforms en-
countered a set of unforeseen obstacles that still represent a puzzle for both policy makers and
the economic literature.
The reforms that took place in the transition countries and their results have significantly
influenced both firm organization and the economic environment of firms. The results of pri-
vatization affected the ownership structure of firms, while the liberalization of trade, both
domestic and foreign, and competition-enhancing reforms significantly affected the economic
environment. The major transformation increased the share of the private sector in GDP from
extremely low to the level of 60-90 percent (Estrin et al., 2009) and instituted new market-
oriented legal and institutional systems. All these changes could not but have an impact on
firm’s performance and organization.
The reforms in transition countries proceeded at different paces2. In almost all transition
economies, governments undertook what Svejnar (2002) calls “Type I” reforms, namely macro
stabilization, price liberalization and dismantling of the institutions of the communist system.
Liberalization of trade and prices was one of the most active reforms and took place in the
majority of countries. Most countries rapidly opened up to international trade and quickly
reduced direct subsidies to firms, thus inducing a more efficient allocation of resources. The
results of such opening, however, varied across countries. Import competition had a positive
effect on performance in CEB, but a negative effect in the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) (Djankov and Murrell, 2002). Macro stabilization was not an easy task, but by
the end of 1990s it had been mostly accomplished in all countries of the region (more detailed
discussion in the Appendix A.2) except for several Western Balkan countries.
Svejnar’s “Type II” reforms involved the development and enforcement of laws, regulations,
and institutions that would ensure the successful functioning of a market-oriented economy.
These reforms included privatization, establishment and enforcement of a market-oriented le-
gal system, and the creation of effective accompanying institutions. These institutions should
have enabled well-defined property rights, permitted the enforcement of contracts, and lim-
ited corruption. In the process of implementation, small-scale privatization did not encounter
major obstacles. Reforms in these areas are today complete in general in all countries except
Belarus. By contrast, institutional reforms related to competition policy, privatization of large
enterprises, labour system and enterprise restructuring encountered many more obstacles and
were much more asymmetrical among transition countries. These reforms met comparatively
less resistance in countries that are today a part of the European Union; much more resistance
was raised in non-European Union (EU) transition countries.3 Reforms regarding competition
2Table A.1 presents the membership of each country considered in this thesis in different country groups.
3With regard to the speed and efficiency of reforms, transition countries may be divided into several groups:
Central Europe and Baltics (CEB), which represents the biggest share of new European Union members and
the best performers in terms of reforms; South-Eastern Europe (SEE), which includes two new members of the
EU and usually performs as a second-best; and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries that
include countries of Eastern Europe and the Caucasus (EEC), Russia and Central Asia (except Mongolia). This
last group (CIS) usually lags behind in terms of the realization of a large number of reforms. For the purposes
of analysis these groups may also be organized in two sub-sets: the group of EU transition countries whose
efficient reforms allowed them to enter the European Union, and non-EU transition countries that still have
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and enterprise restructuring are still incomplete for multiple countries among the latter group.
According to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), progress in
establishing a functioning (market-supporting) legal framework and institutions was slow ev-
erywhere, although the pace was more rapid in Central Europe and the Baltic states than in
the Commonwealth of Independent States. An important impetus for implementing legal and
institutional reforms in most countries of CEB has been the need to develop a system that
conforms to that of the European Union as a prerequisite for accession.
Focusing upon “Type II” reforms, it is possible to differentiate the results associated with
i) privatization, ii) complementary reforms aimed at building up market economies, and iii)
business environment.
Privatizations results
Privatization was the major challenge in the early transition period. Large-scale privati-
zation was largely completed in Central Europe and the Baltics already in the first decade
of transition, but remains to be finished in many other countries, especially in the Western
Balkans and the CIS. One of the major attempt to survey the literature on privatization in
transition countries was the contribution by Djankov and Murrell (2002) that combined the
findings from a large number of early studies in a meta-analysis. Another contribution was
made by Estrin et al. (2009). The authors differentiated rather than combined the impact
of privatization on firm-level performance, including efficiency (both total factor productivity
(TFP) and labour productivity), profitability, scale of operations and wages. In both studies,
significant differences between the CIS and CEB countries were well summarized. In particular
effects of privatization is evidenced to differ significantly in these two groups in terms of TFP,
and wages. Moreover, general effects of privatization on firm performance are mostly positive
during both the early and later transition periods, but uneven between domestic and foreign
owners, groups of countries and greater in the later than earlier transition period.
Such significant differences in effects of privatization in terms of time, country groups and
types of owners highlight that the importance of privatization being complemented by institu-
tional reforms, and efficient business environment. Thus, building market economy and creating
the proper conditions for business activity were the most important challenges of the reforms in
transition countries. However, the way countries overcome these shared challenges conducted
to very different results.
Building market economic systems: far from complete
The building of market-supporting institutions has been much more difficult than many
expected at the beginning of the reforms. Generally, transition countries have made significant
progress in terms of reforms and advancement of the market system. A number of such countries
are now fully functioning market economies with stable macroeconomic performance, caught-
up income levels and comparatively efficient institutions. However, there is still a considerable
numerous reforms unfinished.
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number of transition countries that struggle to create both strong institutions and efficient
functioning of the market. The differential development of the countries in the region has
resulted in a great disparity of economic outcomes as well. Reform momentum has also tended
to slow over the years. All countries made notable progress in the 1990s, but in most cases many
fewer changes have occurred in the past decade, even in countries where there is still much to be
done. As a result, even in the countries with highly successful experience of reforms, the pace of
economic growth and development has slowed down. Moreover, multiple countries failed fully to
eliminate the link with the past in numerous aspects of economic and production organization.
Consequently, they still struggle with the extremely low competitiveness of industries.
Building a sound business environment: improved conditions
An essential element in the progress of reforms has been the creation of a sound business
environment that makes it possible to start a business, invest, expand, and, if necessary, close.
Creating such an environment required multiple legal, administrative, and institutional reforms
in transition countries where a free-market environment did not exist previously. After the long
way of reforms and transformations, it is the business environment that differentiates transition
countries from each other the most. Moreover, differences in the business environment has
significant implications for the growth of these countries. According to World Bank Ease of
Doing Business index, transition countries range from 17th to 131st place out of 189 countries
worldwide in terms of business environment. The range is just as broad in terms of corruption
as perceived by investors (Transparency International survey). Although improvement has
been notable, with the majority of transition countries climbing much higher in the rankings
and converging on more advanced countries, several transition countries (including Russia,
Ukraine, and Belarus) fell back notably in terms of corruption. This evidence shows that in
some countries of the region reforms in the business environment are still much needed.
Social costs: long-term effects
Building market economies and a business environment cannot be treated without consid-
ering the profound social impact of the transition. In the shift from a system of guaranteed
employment to labour markets governed by supply and demand, with the closure of firms unable
to adjust to new market conditions and degrading of industries not interesting for investors, un-
employment inevitably increased sharply at the start of transition. For most countries, labour
market reform and economic growth helped reduce unemployment, but they impacted strongly
on the population. The notable exceptions were the Western Balkan countries, which strug-
gled with extremely high unemployment throughout the transition period. Moreover, market
reforms impacted on the efficiency and organization of healthcare and educational systems, cre-
ating long-term consequences for social welfare. An indicator of the severe social costs of early
transition is life expectancy, which stagnated or fell for a number of years in many transition
countries. Most notably it affected CIS countries.
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Key lessons
The key lessons of the reforms in the past 25 years can be drawn from the two different
paths followed in the transition region: most Eastern Europe and Caucasus countries, and
Russia, are today in recession or near stagnation with real GDP growth expected to recover
only modestly in 2017, CEB and SEE countries seem to be stabilized with positive projections
for 2016 (no recession) and 2017 (3.3 percent growth). Transition seem to have created two
different sub-groups of countries with a similar heritage, but different growth prospects. The
latter, together with the experience of reforms discussed above, indicate that implementation
of wide-ranging market reforms is not on its own able to guarantee development: deep-rooted
structural and institutional reforms should be put in place.
For these reasons, the macroeconomic recommendations provided by international organiza-
tions should be supplemented with accelerating reforms aimed at the development of non-energy
sectors. In particular, the reorganization of industrial system and its potential impact should
be considered. Moreover, development of non-energy sectors requires to renew the reforms
aimed to strengthen contract enforcement, create the proper business environment and deepen
integration into Global Value Chains (GVC). But for understanding the most prominent policy
design of such reforms, bottom-up approach towards interaction between firms and environment
is highly required, especially for CIS countries.
The following sections discuss three structural characteristics that differentiate the most
successfully reformed countries of the transition region from their counterparts. First, tech-
nological backwardness has long been an issue in transition countries. Some countries have
successfully moved their economies to production of high- and medium-technology goods, but
others have failed to do so for many years.4 Second, the transition economies shared among
themselves and with many other developing countries numerous characteristics associated with
“weak” institutions, such as poorly conceived and/or ineffectively enforced property rights (see
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001). But there are significant differences among transi-
tion countries as well. Third, participation of transition countries in international trade and
GVC differs largely among countries in terms of both its intensity and characteristics. These
structural differences have been multiply shown to be connected with growth and development
rates, but the mechanisms whereby they affect firm’s behaviour and organization are poorly un-
derstood. Unless such mechanisms are understood, especially in CIS countries, further reforms
may encounter further obstacles.
4One example is the adoption of the Russian Federation president’s initiative in 2007 to develop nanotech-
nology and other highly technology-intensive industries. The initiative was widely publicized and large-scale
investment plans were made. However, the results were been doubtful. Dezhina (2011) estimates the efficiency
of the new infrastructure for highly technological activities and innovations (set up in 2005) at 10-40%. Despite
generous public spending on innovation, it is often hard to track how the money is spent and to determine the
outcomes of innovation initiatives.
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1.2.2 Technological Backwardness
One of the weaknesses that requires closest attention in transition countries is the tech-
nological complexity of production. In multiple countries of the region system of production,
inherited from the Soviet era, still has not been fully renovated, giving rise to one of the key
weaknesses of economic performance: the technological backwardness of production.
After the break-up of the Soviet Union, technology lagged significantly behind in all transi-
tion countries (Campos and Coricelli, 2002). This uniform lag may be explained by the policies
implemented in the Soviet Union long before the break-up. Most of the economic policies in the
Soviet Union were intended to stimulate economic growth through extensive industrialization,
unlike the growth policies in Western economies which fostered productivity growth. The Soviet
Union’s strategy resulted in higher accumulation at the cost of technological and organizational
changes (Ofer, 1987). When growth could no longer be maintained by increasing labour and
capital inputs, the leadership opted to develop military technology as the core of economic
growth, instead of promoting the diffusion of technological advances equally among all indus-
tries. This decision resulted in a lack of technological progress in the rest of the economy. In
the literature, this lack of progress is sometimes associated with the absence of organizational
innovation because there was no entry of new firms and no competition (Ofer, 1987; Campos
and Coricelli, 2002)
The results of this tendency toward extensive growth, unbalanced technological progress,
and scant experience in innovation may still be observed in many transition countries. While
on average all transition countries lag behind in terms of technological complexity, significant
disparities may be observed between more advanced CEB countries and the rest of the transition
region. This is true both in terms of the concentration of production in low value-added
industries and the lower diffusion of high-level innovations.
In terms of value added, the more developed of the transition countries, CEB, are among
the leaders of the region. Most of the CEB were shifting their production from low-tech (low
value-added) to medium-tech or high-tech (high value-added) industries already during the
first years of transition (Van den Bulcke et al., 2009). Although they are still far behind their
Western European counterparts and the degree of restructuring is not uniform (Table A.4), the
progress is considerable.
By contrast, the SEE countries specialize more on low value-added (low-tech) activities than
the CEB (Handjiski, 2009; Inotai, 2007) with only some exceptions. Lower value-added is also
reflected in the relatively lower capital and skill intensity of their exports.5 The skill intensity
5As often highlighted in the literature, the technological advancement and higher value added of industrial
production is often associated with the capital and skill-intensity of countries’ production and international
trade. Although as mentioned by Campos and Coricelli (2002), it is difficult to separate accumulation and real-
location from technological progress in transition countries, the pattern of capital-intensity distribution within
the those countries is similar to the above-described situation of different degrees of technological backwardness.
Recent data on capital-intensity for transition countries are not easily available in common data sources (World
Penn Table database, OECD or EBRD databases). However, the results of Izyumov and Vahaly (2006) show
that in 2003 average capital-intensity in the more advanced transition countries, the eight CEB countries (EU
members since 2004), was less than half of the EU-15 level. For the SEE countries, it was less than one fourth,
and for the CIS countries it was about one eighth, of the EU-15 average.
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showed little change between 1997 and 2007 (Mitra, 2008). This absence of change evidences
that there has been little development in terms of the restructuring of economic production
towards higher-technology and higher value-added products.
The private sector of some countries of Eastern Europe and the Caucasus and Central Asia
is heavily concentrated in low value-added industries (Shiells and Sattar, 2004). This pattern
is characteristic of the private sector of Russia as well. One of the main reasons for lower value-
added in such transition countries is the technology gap, with respect to their more developed
counterparts (Bastic, 2004). For countries rich with natural resources it is also strongly affected
by imbalances in the allocation of production resources to energy producing industries.
Not only is a small group of transition countries able to move towards higher value-added
industries, but transition countries also lag in terms of innovation activity. Most of them
are weakly connected with the world technological frontier (Mitra, 2008). Despite the growth
of internationally competitive high-technology firms in CEB countries, the average share of
innovations new to international markets in the region is equivalent to only around 0,4% (EBRD,
2014), the highest share being characteristic of CEB countries and much lower for the rest of
the region.
Another example of the technological gap may be drawn from patents granted. The dynamic
of internationally cited patents in transition countries also shows a comparatively low quality
of technological development. According to a report of the EBRD (EBRD, 2014), only around
14% of patents held by transition countries are cited at least once,6 being much lower than
in developed countries (33% in Germany, 44% in the United States). This low performance
highlights either backwardness or the incremental nature of the majority of the technologies
patented.
Furthermore, if one looks closer at the differences in technological development within the
region, both in terms of technologies patented and innovations of international scope, signifi-
cant systematic differences between both countries and country groups may be observed. In
particular, the CEB countries, followed by the SEE countries, are closer to the technological
frontier, while Eastern Europe and the Caucasus (EEC), Russia and Central Asia are a long
way behind.
This differences highlight not only how technological levels of production in transition coun-
tries are significantly lower than those in developed countries, but also how they vary across
country groups. Because the level of technological advancement has been widely accepted to
be connected with the organization of production, technology will be an important factor of
the empirical analysis presented in this thesis.
6The difference between more advanced countries, like Estonia and Slovenia, and CIS countries are obvious
with regard to the quality of patents obtained as well. The share is almost twice higher in Estonia than in
Russia, and four times higher than in Ukraine
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1.2.3 Contract Enforcement and Institutions
External Economic Institutions
Stronger external economic institutions7 are able to foster a better investment climate,
higher participation in international trade, and a more efficient use of physical and human
capital (North, 1990; Aron, 2000; Rodrik et al., 2004; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; EBRD,
2013; Acemoglu et al., 2014). The positive connection between better institutions and economic
performance is not in doubt. However, little is known about the connection between stronger
institutions and firms’ organizational choices.
Transition countries have been widely recognized as countries with comparatively low-
quality economic institutions in general, and contracting institutions in particular (Berglo¨f
et al., 2012; Svejnar and Commander, 2007; Dvoracek, 2009; Gelbuda et al., 2008; Mitra and
Schaffer, 2009). However, these countries not only differ from developed countries in terms of
their institutions, but also differ from each other in a large extent. As underlined in the EBRD
Transition Report (EBRD, 2013), there is a notable heterogeneity in the quality of institutions
within the group of transition countries. Consequently, large amount of research focuses on the
significant institutional differences among these countries with broadly similar starting points
of transition but different results.
One peculiarity of transition countries after the break-up of the Soviet Union was their
simultaneous economic transition and political democratization. This meant not only that an
economic framework had to be created but also that the rules of the political game had to
change. Thus, enforcement of the rules of the game remained difficult as long as the state was
redefining its role. Not only was it difficult during the early stages, but it is still an obstacle
today. Two decades after the beginning of transition only a small number of transition countries
have become relatively successful in terms of law enforcement. In fact, Figure 1.1 shows that
the efficiency of law enforcement (“rule of law” indicators) is significantly different amoung
country groups. In particular, it is evident that law enforcement is significantly better in the
Central European and Baltic countries than in the Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, Russia,
South Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The same tendency characterizes the other measures
for the economic institutions (EBRD, 2013).
This evidence highlights the difficulties of contract enforcement that firms may face in
countries with weak law enforcement. Moreover, not only do these figures show that firms in
the transition countries are still facing weak contract enforcement, they also highlight that firms
in different groups of countries face different degrees of contractual frictions (failure to have
fully enforceable contracts) due to the inefficient institutional setting. Contracting institutions
in countries that now belong to the European Union performs better, while other countries of
the region still have much to do to make their contract enforcement efficient.
Such differences in the institutional environment and contract frictions may trigger different
7Following the approach of Hendley et al. (1999) I consider external economic institutions as economic
institutions external to firms’ environment, such as contracting institutions depending on the efficiency of the
country law-enforcement system
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Figure 1.1: Rule of Law in 2015 (left) and 2000-2010 (right)
Source: The World Justice Project (WJP) Rule of Law Index and World Bank Estimates
Note: Each variable of the star plot (left) represents one of 44 indicators of rule-of-law performance (The World Justice Project)
calculated as the average of the country-level values in 2015. The indicators of the rule-of-law performance are listed in Table A.3
of the Appendix. The estimates of the World Bank (right) of the rule of law are the average of all country-level estimates in a
country group. The horizontal axis corresponds to the minimum estimate across country groups in 2000.
organizational reactions by firms in different regions of transition countries. Special production
relationships may be formed to adapt to the institutional environment, more so in the groups
of countries with weaker contract enforcement.
Internal Enforcement Mechanisms
In a situation in which external economic institutions have doubtful effectiveness, economic
agents must make an effort to compensate for inadequate legal enforcement. Economic agents
must build up supplementary insurance by creating their own mechanisms to enforce contracts.
Trust or the lack of it plays a central role in the design of such mechanisms. I consider two
such mechanisms, namely relational contracting based on trust, and prepayment designed to
overcome the lack of trust.
One way to enforce contracts without relying on the state (external) contracting institutions
is to base relationships on mutual trust. Mutual trust, however, requires a common history of
trading and willingness to build such trusting relationships. Business contracts that rely on
mutual trust are often referred to as relational contracts. In developed countries, long contract
relationships complement formal contracts in mitigating hold-up problems and facilitating more
efficient production (Board, 2011). In transition countries this enforcement mechanism is often
applied (Hendley et al., 1999). However, due to high information asymmetry in these countries,
relational contracting may not only reflect mutual trust, but also result in mutual dependence.
In particular, relational contracting is built on a self-commitment that is not based on
any form of private or state enforcement. Such a self-commitment may arise because a firm
anticipates future benefits from mutually trusted relationships. However, as time passes the
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firm may choose to trade with the trusted partner even if no further increase in benefits is
anticipated. In many transition countries with extreme information asymmetries, knowledge
about alternative trading partners is limited. Moreover, relatively lower levels of trust in
strangers may result in skepticism about favorable offers from unknown potential partners. As
a result, the partners, who have traded with one another for a long time, may stick to this
relationship not because it offers better conditions or opportunities, but because they fear that
they will be unable to find a decent replacement. The threat of one partner ceasing to trade is
effective in making the other partner stick to the contract, but may not be sufficient to motivate
efficient fulfillment of the contract.
When either time or willingness is insufficient to build trust, firms have to opt for other
internal mechanisms of contract enforcement. When trust is lacking, one way to enforce con-
tracts is to design the terms of the contract so that neither party has the incentive to break the
contract (Swinnen, 2007). This can be done, for instance, by increasing the costs of deviations
from the contract through “cash-in-advance” terms, or prepayment. The choice of prepayment
compensates for the difficulties of assessing the information on the partner in new relationships
and the lack of partners’ trust in the long-term ones (Raiser et al., 2008).
In transition countries, these two mechanisms - prepayment and relational contracting - to-
gether with acquiring property rights over partners serve as complements to the firms’ attempts
to overcome inefficient state contract enforcement. This may be illustrated by the historical
development of transition countries.
In many transition countries production relationships have been inherited from the era
of the planned economy, illustrating the prevalence of relational contracting. Although most
recent data on business contracts are rarely available, by 2000 in Russia, enterprises relied
first and foremost on business contacts established in the Soviet era. Among the enterprises
surveyed in 1999, almost half were still trading with the old partners. Furthermore, a survey
conducted by Johnson et al. (2002) on Russian, Ukrainian, Polish, and Romanian enterprises
showed that firms would stick to old trading partners even if new suppliers offered better
conditions. They would change a supplier only if courts, or external institutions in general,
were considered as credible means of contract enforcement. Such statements highlight the
role of relational contracting in transition countries as a mechanism to compensate for the
inefficiency of a state contract enforcement system. However, the prevalence of this mechanism
in countries with weak state contracting institutions has its trade-off, namely it results in high
rigidity of the procurement system. Relational contracts compensate for risk connected with
state contracting institution failure, but result in keeping old contracts even if new opportunities
arise. Considering the existence of this mechanism in the past, one could expect that in countries
with weakest contract enforcement more rigid production systems may be observed still today.
Especially, it should be the case for Russia and the countries of Eastern Europe, the Caucasus
and Central Asia.
Prepayment has also been widespread in transition countries as a mechanism to compensate
for the weakness of contracting institutions. At the beginning of the transition period one of the
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obstacles to firm entrance and creation of new production networks was the presence of general-
ized default on payments and barter trade. These phenomena have been often considered in the
literature as forms of dysfunctional institutions, reflecting an endemic lack of trust (Alesina and
La Ferrara, 2002). In an environment where trust is extremely low (Van Ees and Bachmann,
2006) and non-payment is widespread, firms were often forced to require prepayment. In the
most recent period the share of prepayment required in different transition countries reflects
the degree of institutional weakness (for more details see Appendix Section A.3), indicating the
lack of trust in these countries. In transition countries with higher law enforcement one can
see many more payments after delivery, indicating a higher degree of trust among firms. The
prepayment as the reflection of the opposite situation is higher in the countries with weaker
contract enforcement. In fact, the highest level of prepayment is observed in Russia, Central
Asia, and Eastern Europe and the Caucasus (Figure 1.2).
Figure 1.2: The share of prepayment in transition countries.
Source: Own calculations based on the BEEPS IV (2009)
The high incidence and intensity of internal enforcement mechanisms (relational contracting
and prepayment) in transition countries illustrates that external contracting institutions are not
considered by firms to be reliable mechanisms of contract enforcement. Moreover, the differences
of intensity of prepayment as an alternative mechanism highlight that contracting institutions’
weaknesses are converted into adjustments of microeconomic interactions and contracts between
firms, and perhaps organization of production as well. The differences are notable between
Central European and Baltic countries, and the rest of the transition countries. CEB countries
represent the majority of new entrants of the European Union and have the highest level of trust.
The ones closest to the best performers of CEB are the countries of South Eastern Europe,
while Russia, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe and the Caucasus are among the countries with
the lowest trust between firms and highest incidence of prepayment as an internal enforcement
mechanism.
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1.2.4 International trade, Openness and Participation in Global Value
Chains
The interactions of firms do not take place in the closed economies, as well as firm organi-
zation. As a result it is important to highlight the role of the international trade context in the
development of transition countries.
The reforms aimed at opening transition economies to international trade were among the
earliest reforms made at the beginning of transition. Some countries went even further and relied
heavily on international trade. However. some countries, although opening their economy to
trade, stay comparatively closed.
For a long time, trade liberalization has been argued to be one of the policies stimulating
economic growth, especially in transition countries. However, the evidence is not conclusive
on the mechanisms of the intuitively positive impact of trade on growth.8 Barlow (2006) gives
empirical estimates for the connection between international trade liberalization policies and
the increase in economic growth in transition countries (using EBRD indicators). He shows
that improvement in the EBRD trade liberalization index by 1 unit raises the GDP growth rate
by about 3 percentage points. However, there exists idiosyncrasy in the strength of the link,
typical of the transition region. Barlow (2006) argues that the impact of trade liberalization
policies is stronger for the countries closer to the European Union.
The dissimilarities between economies close to the EU and the rest also exist in the degree
of international trade openness (see Figure 1.3). The group of Central European and Baltic
countries are out-performing in terms of their participation in both international trade and
GVC. The countries of this group have been the core of the German-Central European supply
chain, gaining in terms of technology transfers and income convergence (IMF, 2013). However,
on average the participation of transition countries in the value-added chains is quite low in
comparison with the developed countries and a large share of the developing ones. It has been
rising impressively since the 90’s, but most of the increase has been due to the rise of raw
materials exports.
In general, the participation of transition countries in the GVC bears a high share of do-
mestic value added exported, but little foreign value added imported for the production of final
goods. Thus, although the share of total imports has increased significantly since the begin-
ning of the transition period (Figure A.5 of the Appendix), participation through the import of
intermediate inputs (sourcing) is still comparatively low. The share of the GVC participation
through sourcing is comparable with the shares of South America and Africa. Judging from
the transition countries’ participation in the GVC, the biggest suppliers of intermediate import
for transition economies are, for example, EU-15 countries and USA. Thus, strengthening par-
ticipation in GVC through the import of intermediate goods may also be beneficial for their
suppliers.
The imports of intermediate inputs (sourcing) is often seen as one of the stimuli for strength-
8See the debate in the literature on Frankel and Romer (1999) and the overview by Winters (2004). Alcala´
and Ciccone (Alcala´ and Ciccone) show that the effects work primarily through total factor productivity.
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ening a country’s comparative position within the GVC and for diversification of exports (Ben-
guria, 2015). The benefits of participation in international trade and GVC through imports
have been widely highlighted. Moreover, the combination of the domestic and foreign sourcing
is assumed to bring multiple benefits to firms and countries. One of the first advantages usually
mentioned is the economies of specialization that allow a firm to optimize input supply both,
in terms of quality and in terms of expenses due to cross-border complementarities (Sturgeon
and Memedovic, 2010). The importing of foreign inputs is also expected to cause spillovers of
higher productivity, technology and innovations due to the production connections with the
more advanced economies (Memedovic et al., 2008; Damijan et al., 2009).
Figure 1.3: The share of trade in GDP in transition countries
Source: The World Bank Estimates
Moving to the features of transition countries’ participation in GVC, the statistics shows
that transition countries are participating in the GVC mainly through supplying low- and
medium-technology inputs for other countries (UNCTAD, 2013). This indicates that, on av-
erage, these countries have comparatively low benefits from GVC participation. Especially
low long-term benefits are characteristic of downstream-oriented countries of the region, like
Russia and Central Asia. On the contrary, by targeting participation in GVC through more
upstream production, the group of Central European and Baltic countries have gained much
higher benefits from trade than their less advanced counterparts.9
However, moving higher in the GVC may require further reforms and policy actions. For
instance, Cheng et al. (2015) show that moving up the GVC is associated with higher economic
complexity and diversification, demonstrating that latter are driven by institutional quality,
macroeconomic stability and trade openness. This shows that, along with higher openness to
international trade, more structural reforms should be made in multiple transition countries
in order to gain from the GVC participation and stimulate growth. In fact, the only country
9It has long been argued that moving away from supplying mainly low-technology inputs to more technology-
intensive goods is essential for developing countries, like transition ones. Developing manufacturing and higher
technological production is a crucial factor, and may cause more sustainable development and economic growth.
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group in the transition region that has recently started to benefit from participation in GVC
is the group of the Central European and Baltic states that have been overperforming their
counterparts from the transition region in multiple areas. In particular, the tariffs and trade are
the lowest and trade freedom is the highest in these countries (see Figure 1.4), and positively
affect their possibility to move higher in the GVC. Moreover, the discussion in Sections 1.2.1
and 1.2.3 illustrated that these countries has been comparatively more successful in terms of
macroeconomic stability and institutional quality. Considering all these factors, countries of
the South Eastern Europe may have a strong potential for moving up the GVC, while such
countries as Russia and those in the Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, and Central Asia still
have a long way to go.
Figure 1.4: Tariffs (left) and the Index of Trade Freedom(right)
Source: EBRD estimates and The Heritage Foundation
Note: Tariffs (left) represent tariff revenues in per cent of imports
The participation and the features of GVC are helpful not only for measuring global network
of transition countries in a world changing trade landscape. It is well known that there are
two mappings of this landscape. The first one (top down) is based upon aggregate value added
data: international input-output tables now combine national accounts with trade statistics and
decompose gross trade into its foreign and domestic value added contents. The results show
a mapping of changing trade landscape by analysing country and sectoral value added data.
The second one (bottom-up) intensively uses highly disaggregated micro data at the firm level
in Melitz’s perspective or ad hoc surveys of the firm’s global supply links. In between the two,
analyses of trade in intermediates or in parts and components complete the picture of the trade
landscape. Integration between these approaches is difficult. But the bottom-up perspective on
firms’ behaviour in the international arena, especially in transition countries, could be crucial
for understanding the micro sources of differential GVC participation and features.10
10For example, the degree and features of a country’s participation in GVC may be defined by the positioning
of single firms along the GVC. Mainly positive and desirable features of higher participation in the GVC for
countries, from a firm perspective are also associated with the higher costs of failure and higher risk of the
economic shocks coming from the world interdependence (Altomonte et al., 2013). To decrease such risks, firms
may change their organizational form of participation in the GVC to obtain higher gains. For example, sourcing
through intra-firm trade has been shown to be more resistant to international economic downturns (Lanz and
Miroudot, 2011).
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1.3 The Theoretical Positioning
In order to understand how the highlighted features of economic development in transition
countries may have affected the firms’ organization and their ability to change it, I draw largely
on the combination of Organizational Economics with International Trade (Antra`s and Rossi-
Hansberg, 2009). This section presents theoretical motivations for studying the impact of the
country and business environment on firms’ organizational decisions and performance.
The performance and growth of economies is largely dependent on the allocation of re-
sources or factors of production within and across countries. Such allocation has long been
represented in economic models as the production function mapping the factors of production
and production output according to a chosen functional form. The determinants of such a
functional form have long been treated as a “black box”. In reality, the mapping between the
factors of production and output depends closely on the organizational decisions of producing
agents, firms in particular.
The growing field of Organizational Economics is devoted to the study of how these organi-
zational decisions form the mapping between factors of production and production output. On
the one hand, an understanding of these decisions may be intellectually interesting in its own
right: for instance, there is a vast literature trying to understand why certain transactions are
carried out within or across firms. On the other hand, studying these organizational decisions
provides valuable insights into the aggregate patterns and dynamics of the world economy.
Thus, the importance of organizational economics transcends the narrow nature of the ques-
tions that it seeks to answer and sheds light on the microeconomic roots of macroeconomic
performance.
For instance, production function Fc(K,L) for a country c is traditionally used to define
the output that can be produced using a set of capital (K) and labour (L) inputs in a certain
location c. The assumption is that the functional form of Fc(K,L) is given by the technology
and is independent from the economic environment and firm characteristics, assuming away
the organizational problem.
Now suppose that firms can decide how to combine the inputs, what kind of inputs to use,
and where to buy them. For example, they can decide to produce only a share of required
intermediate inputs and to buy the rest (outsourcing decision). The optimal decision on how
to produce will determine the characteristics of Fc(K,L) and will make these characteristics
the function of Θ, which represents all prices and properties of the market and economy.
Then the problem of organization transforms the traditional view of technology into a
reduced form specification given by Oc(K,L,Θ). Understanding how the production function
is connected with the characteristics of the market and economy, namely what is the connection
between Fc(K,L) and Oc(K,L,Θ), is the goal of organizational theories.
Only by uncovering the microfoundations of the organization of production can one fully
understand how and to what extend changes in the economic environment, such as falling trade,
communication costs or improvements in contract enforcement, will affect economic outcomes.
By introducing endogenous organizations, one can not only explain existing evidence but also
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affect, and even change notably, the predictions of standard macroeconomic models.
Melitz (2003) has become the ground-breaking work to understand how microeconomic
heterogeneity in productivity matters for theoretical and empirical models of trade, introducing
reallocations and new channels for productivity and welfare gains. However, the model still
treats the organizational problem as a “black box”
Motivated by various extensions of Melitz (2003) model, Antra`s and Helpman (2004) inte-
grated differences and dispersion of firm productivity into the analysis of organizational choices
by using the incomplete-contracts approach. They endogenized the firm’s organization by incor-
porating a multistage bargaining within production process, resulting in the trade-organizations
perspective where the focus is on the organization of production as a result of firm characteris-
tics, and international and contractual factors. They argue that in a context of heterogeneous
firms both, the fixed costs of alternative organizational choices (integration versus outsourc-
ing), and the sunk costs of alternative location of production (home versus abroad) explain
why productivity level and dispersion go hand in hand with organizational choices.11 This
perspective relies heavily on the firm theory. In particular, it is based on the path-breaking
study by Grossman and Hart (1986), and its two extensions, namely Grossman and Helpman
(2002) and Antra`s (2003). However, it is important to extend the discussion by introducing
fundamental concepts such as relationship-specific investments, incomplete contracts, hold-up
and quasi-rent.
Since the seminal work of Ronald H. Coase (1937), numerous theoretical models have been
proposed in order to understand the nature of the firm and firm boundaries within both trans-
action costs economics and the property-rights theory. Both theoretical approaches focus on
the complexity of inter-firm relationships, costs and benefits of bringing certain activities within
the firm (integration) when “the need to make unprogrammed adaptations” arises (Gibbons,
2005; Williamson, 1971).
Transaction cost economics has benefited largely from the significant contributions of Williamson
(1967, 1971, 1979) and Klein et al. (1978), which stated that integration allows economic agents
to avoid haggling over “appropriable quasi-rents” and provides a more efficient way to resolve
minor conflicts through fiat. The idea is that while the market gives the possibility for bar-
gaining, it also creates “appropriable quasi-rents” or the possibility for monetary gains that
neither party is ready to give up. This creates inefficiencies and additional costs, especially if
investments are involved, resulting in the hold-up problem.
The hold-up problem arises from the concern of participants that their profits will be smaller
due to the opportunistic behaviour of their partner. To resolve hold-up problems more effi-
ciently, agents may opt for integration. In this case, the ownership of the physical (not human)
capital of the partner gives the control rights to avoid the hold-up. The hold-up is the central
component of both the transaction cost and property rights approaches. The hold-up prob-
lem in transaction cost theory arises when a part of an agent’s relationship-specific investment
11The choice in this case is between integration and outsourcing and between domestic sourcing and foreign
sourcing. And the effects of industry and country characteristics can be studied in order to understand the
relative prevalence and location of organizational forms.
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can be expropriated ex-post. In the classical transaction cost theory this is represented by
“appropriable quasi-rents”, no matter whether these “quasi-rents” are contractible or not.
On the contrary, in the property-rights theory, mostly developed by Grossman and Hart
(1986), Hart and Moore (1990), and Hart (1995), the hold-up problem arises because of the
incompleteness of contracts12 and the relationship-specificity of the investments made by ei-
ther/both parties. Moreover, while rent-oriented transaction cost theory describes ex-post
inefficiency and hold-ups, property-rights theory assumes efficient ex-ante bargaining of bound-
edly rational agents that anticipate possible ex-post hold-ups. In particular, because all the
relationship contingencies cannot be fully written in the contract (incomplete contracts), they
cannot be enforced by a third-party, giving rise to the opportunistic behaviour. Thus, once
invested, the costs will be sunk if the partner violates the contract. Anticipating possible op-
portunism of the partner, a firm may underinvest. On the assumptions of the model, the share
of the surplus is defined by the share of firm assets. As a result, with the increasing importance
of investment incentives the desirability of integration (owning all assets) increases.
Summing-up, Grossman and Hart (1986) have given the tools with which to evaluate firm
organization, in particular its boundaries, both domestically and internationally. By applying
insights of the property-rights theory expounded by Grossman and Hart (1986), several studies
have attempted to answer the questions on the determinants of when and how much firms
integrate.
First, Grossman and Helpman (2002) presented an industry equilibrium model illustrating
how downstream firms (final good producers) endogenously define whether to integrate their
suppliers or trade with them at arm’s length. The model is based on the one-input general
equilibrium framework with equally productive firms within industries. The firms face frictions
due to incompleteness of contracts in the arm’s length trade, which they compare with the
benefits of the control over residual rights under integration. As a result, some sectors consist
of only integrated firms, while others include only disintegrated firms. Grossman and Helpman
(2002) identify sectoral characteristics that define the prevalence of either equilibrium structure.
Integration is assumed to be associated with higher governance costs, while its benefits includes
(i) escaping from contractual-driven inefficiencies inherent in the hold-up problem faced by firms
in market transactions, and (ii) saving on the search costs of finding a suitable independent
supplier.
Second, Antra`s (2003) further extended the framework of Grossman and Helpman (2002)
to the trade environment. Two new features were added to the model. First, it assumed that,
although integration provides well-defined residual property rights, it does not fully eliminate
frictions associated with incomplete contracts. Consequently, holding property rights may or
may not give integration an efficiency advantage over outsourcing. Second, the model assumes
the existence of two inputs, one of which is controlled by the final-good producer, while the
other is controlled by the supplier either inside or outside of firm. The relative intensity of these
12Another approach is taken in the more recent studies of Oliver Hart (2007) and Hart (2009) to the char-
acteristics that cause hold-up. Their new approach of contracts as reference points consists in the analysis of
payoff uncertainty, rather than contract incompleteness, as a source of hold-up.
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inputs in the production of a final good defines the choice between integration and outsourcing.
It is assumed that the final-good producer controls more technological or capital-intensive input,
while the supplier is focused on the production of comparatively more labour-intensive input.
The model considers more closely the relationship between a supplier and a firm within
the sourcing relationship describing it as a 4-stage bargaining process in the tradition of the
property rights theory. By embedding such a bargaining in the general-equilibrium framework
of international trade, the model explains the prevalence of a particular organization form
(vertical integration versus arm’s length trade) and the drivers of firm boundaries. As a result,
Antra`s (2003) predicts that the integration will be prevalent in the sector more intensive in
technology and capital (final-good producer’s input), while sectors with lower intensity in final-
good producer’s inputs will be characterized by the prevalence of outsourcing, or arm’s length
trade. This allows authors to explain large international trade flows that take place within
the same firm (intra-firm trade) between different countries and intra-firm trade predominance
over arm’s length trade (trade with an independent supplier) in some sectors. The model,
however, does not examine organizational responses to the liberalization of product and factor
markets, but it explains one important empirical feature: intra-firm trade is concentrated in
capital-intensive industries and between capital-intensive countries.
Such foundations for the modelling of the endogenous organization of production allowed
Antra`s and Helpman (2004) to create a framework for analysing international production orga-
nization. By incorporating productivity heterogeneity and different fixed costs for any organi-
zational form in the Antra`s (2003) model, the authors studied both organization and location
decisions regarding the transactions with their suppliers, either domestic or foreign. In the two-
country Ricardian framework, they predicted higher foreign integration in sectors intensive in
final-good producer’s input, when firms are characterized by higher productivity. Thus, foreign
location decisions have productivity advantages over domestic location decisions, while organi-
zational sorting (integration versus outsourcing) follows the same logic as in Antra`s (2003).
However, the Antra`s and Helpman (2004) model did not consider the differences in the
degree of contractual frictions caused by the different strengths of contracting institutions. Such
differences have been incorporated in the Antra`s and Helpman (2008) model, where countries
are allowed to differ with regard to the degree of contractual frictions. The model illustrates
that better contracting institutions in the country where the supplier is situated raise the
incentive of a firm to trade with this supplier at arm’s length. As a result, this may reduce
the prevalence of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), or international intra-firm trade, in this
country. As a result, the model predicts a negative connection between integration and the
quality of contracting institutions.
To sum up, the recent stream of property-rights theory, also referred to as Global Sourcing
theory and largely developed by Antra`s and Helpman, shows that organizational choices are
determined by contractual frictions. The contracting frictions, further, are represented through
technological complexity and the strength of contracting institutions, with the important in-
fluence of productivity heterogeneity. However, these models have several limitations.
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First, empirical applications of these models call for significant simplification due to several
factors. First of all, the assumptions about the contractual frictions are associated with the
complexity of contracts, which is mostly unobserved and hard to grasp with the direct empirical
measures. Second, development of these models requires introduction of multiple assumptions
about the model’s parameters values and distributions. Relaxing these assumptions makes
multiple equilibria possible theoretically, but impossible to test with real data. Third, in order to
calibrate and test these models, researchers often opt for the data on multinational corporations
MNC in advanced countries13 that allow them to be as close to the model’s assumptions as
possible in search of the determinants of intra-firm transactions. Moreover, such a choice is
often driven by the fact that data on international transactions are particularly accessible. The
application of these models to the data on firms in emerging countries requires a large degree
of adaptation and aggregation.14 This makes the testing of all model assumptions largely not
feasible, especially in the case of less developed countries, leaving, however, the possibility for
empirical work to be based on the conclusions and generalizations of such models.
Second, all of the theories discussed above are static in terms of firm environment. None
of them studies the dynamic changes of organization together with the changes in trade lib-
eralization. In particular, almost nothing is known about how increasing trade and market
competition have affected organizational choices over time. A property-rights model that may
shed more light on the influence of trade liberalization on organizational changes has been de-
veloped by McLaren (2000). In particular, it highlights that more internationally open markets
provide more options for the choice of potential buyers of a firm intermediate good. With the
addition of any number of non-integrated buyers on the market, the outside option of existing
suppliers increases. This means that it is easier for the supplier to find alternative uses for
its specialized good. This increases the bargaining position of the supplier and makes arm’s
length trade more attractive. The model, however, does not account for increasing competition
on the product market from magnified imports of goods. Such increasing competition pressure
may potentially have an opposite effect. As a result, the overall effect of trade liberalization on
industrial and firm organization is still largely unclear from a theoretical point of view.
Third, the theoretical studies on how contractual frictions interact with other organizational
choices have been relatively limited. For instance, the role of international trade liberalization
in changes of internal firm organization has been largely neglected by the theoretical literature.
Few studies have considered these issues. However, both approaches and the results that the
studies provide are not uniform and too fragmentary to give unified testable hypotheses.15
13Two main strands of the empirical literature can be identified that consider the relationships between multi-
national firms and their suppliers. The first one has an industry/product focus when examining the determinants
of import shares attributed to intra-firm trade (Nunn and Trefler, 2008); the second one exploits firm-level data
and documents productivity premia associated with differentiated sourcing strategies of multinationals (Kohler
and Smolka (2014) with Spanish data, Defever and Toubal (2013) with French data).
14In particular, with no data on firm-product level, the heterogeneity of within-firm technology may not be
explored.
15Grossman and Helpman (2004) provide preliminary answers on how trade liberalization affects the distri-
bution of workers incentive schemes within firms. From a different perspective the model of Aghion and Tirole
(1997), followed by its general-equilibrium extension of Puga and Trefler (2002) and Marin and Verdier (2008),
analyses the association between international trade and allocation of decision rights among employees.
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Bloom et al. (2014) try to draw some preliminary conclusions from existing literature and
business surveys on the possible effect of trade liberalization on firm’s internal organization.
However, much more theoretical work is required to understand and create a systematic view
on the adjustments of firm organization to increasing exposure to international dimensions.
To summarize, although numerous contributions sought to incorporate organizational de-
cisions into general- and partial-equilibrium models, there is still a wide space to fill. The
property-rights approach has made a valuable contribution to the understanding of how en-
dogenous organizational choices are formed by technology, productivity and institutions through
firm-level bargaining. Nevertheless, there are still issues to resolve: what about product market
competition? or what is the role of assumptions on the fixed and sunk costs when empirical
applications are to be performed? Are there differences for countries at different stage’s of
development? How does internal organizational structure change with trade liberalization?
In this thesis I rely on the conclusions of the theoretical literature presented in this section.
However, their precise testing would fall outside of the scope of this work because it requires
highly specific and extremely detailed data.
1.4 The Research Method
DATA AND DATA CONSTRAINTS
Finding appropriate firm-level data allowing analysis of firm organization and its changes
is limited by several factors. In order to analyse firm decision-making in terms of boundary
changes, internal restructuring and management quality the data with the following character-
istics were needed for this thesis: 1) the data should be at the firm-level to account for firm
heterogeneity, 2) it should contain information on firm organization and its changes to answer
the main questions of the thesis, 3) it should make it possible to account for the economic
environment and other firm-level characteristics (age, size, ownership, international trade par-
ticipation, etc.) in order to rule out their influence on firm decision-making 4) a representative
sample for the set of countries would have to be chosen. Such requirements to the data were
associated with relatively more constrained data options. While firm-level surveys are available
for the researchers’ use, census and administrative data are rarely available.
Administrative or other large-scale firm-level data, though used more often in the literature,
are still rather rare. This is partly due to the fact that firm-level data are subject to various
agreement protocols and legal requirements related to the protection of private information. As
a result, firm-level data are frequently only accessible to authorized individuals, while output
prepared for wider circulation has to be aggregated before being released.
Although firm organization is important in transition countries, few non-survey firm-level
data on firm organization are available for those countries. While EU new members have
increased the standards of data sharing and data availability, the problem of access to mi-
croeconomic data on individuals and firms is still severe in non-EU transition countries. The
concept of granting access to publicly collected microeconomic data for academics free of charge
22
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
(or at marginal cost) is only slowly penetrating the region. Moreover, although most statistical
offices collect regular data on enterprises in transition countries, confidentiality concerns make
such data hard for researchers to obtain. Census data in non-EU transition economies typically
contain too little information to be of much use to researchers. Comparable micro-level data
sets are even less frequent, and the issue of comparability is normally extremely severe.
However, there exist a number of survey datasets provided by diverse international orga-
nizations and research institutions. The possibility of merging the financial datasets with the
data on firm organization is always preferred and desired. However, such mergers often suffer
from differences in the survey frame.16 For example, the Amadeus database is strongly focused
on large and/or publicly listed firms, omitting in a large extent small and medium firms (SME).
Thus, merging this database with survey data on stratified samples results in a large amount
of missing information. This limitation of the merged financial data has determined my choice
to rely mostly on the survey data, with only some exceptions when financial was used to enrich
firm performance analysis.
Thus, due to the thematic and country requirements of the data, their quality and avail-
ability this thesis is based on the survey data provided by the EBRD and World Bank. In
particular, in this thesis I utilize various releases of the Business Environment and Enterprise
Performance Survey (BEEPS) and the Management, Organisation and Innovation (MOI) sur-
vey data provided by the EBRD. Apart from being publicly available and suitable for the
purposes of the research, they have also been internationally accepted as representative sam-
ples of firm characteristics and behaviour in transition countries. Moreover, the choice of these
data sets allowed comparability of the survey data from different countries of the region. These
data have been frequently used for firm-level analysis in the literature (Gorodnichenko et al.,
2014; Godart and Go¨rg, 2013; Commander and Svejnar, 2011)17, although no previous studies
have explored the information on organizational changes contained in these databases.
Although yielding multiple gains for the analysis, the choice of these datasets imposed some
limitations on my research. In particular, these datasets are either one-year or repeated cross-
sections. Panel components, although they exist, are too small to be utilized. In the case when
the data set is a repeated cross-section, it may be (as happened in my research) subject to
the methodological change and questionnaire revisions between releases. Such changes do not
allow comparison between the waves of the surveys and exploitation of the time dimension.
Consequently, the analysis relies on the cross-section dimension of the data to draw the
conclusions on the differences in organizational changes within and across countries. While
individual country studies can provide important insights into this issue considering different
performances of sectors or individual firms, another way to highlight the desired connections
is to link firm performance across countries that differ in their regulatory and policy settings.
A data set consisting of “stacked” micro-level data sets from different countries will contain
16The exceptions are the surveys conducted using the frame of the datasets containing financial information
(or vice versa).
17A more extensive list of publications based on the use of EBRD data may be found on the web-page
http://ebrd-beeps.com/research/
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the necessary information lacking in either single-country micro data sets or multiple-country
sectoral data sets.
However, the drawback to using such cross-sectional data is that the issues of causality
and possible reverse causality are difficult to grasp. In some cases the approach of using an
instrumental variable may be applied, but in our case possible instruments were extremely
weak or using them would have caused the loss of large part of data. However, in Chapter 4 I
attempt to deal with these issues. In particular, the import competition pressure in Chapter 4
is instrumented by the sector-level measures of import penetration rates constructed from Eora
input-output tables (Lenzen et al., 2012, 2013). This instrument also rules out the possibility
of inverse causality between the competitive pressure and firm organizational changes because
it is fully independent from the behaviour of a single firm. The results of the following chapters
are mainly intended to provide supporting evidence for the theoretical prediction. Therefore, I
rely on the theory to infer the causal links associated with the correlations highlighted by my
empirical results.
EMPIRICAL MODELS
In the thesis four main types of empirical models are utilized, namely fractional logit model,
binary and multinomial response models, and linear models.
The choice of fractional logit model is due to the type of dependent variable used in the
second chapter of the thesis. The aim of the analysis is to estimate the incidence of integration
in different industries of transition countries. To this end, a logical option would be the Poisson
model, which allows researchers to analyse count data. However, the industries in my sample are
represented by a different number of firms, making correction for it required. Correcting for the
total number of firms in an industry, which may not be higher than the incidence of integration,
results in the dependent variable being represented by the ratios of integrating firms, which are
latent variables truncated both on the left and on the right side of the distribution. Numerous
zero values for these ratios are also found, because multiple industries may be represented by
firms that did not opt for integration in the period observed. The use of a linear regression
model in this case would ignore the presence of zero values.
Most recently, the empirical research has relied heavily on the use of a Tobit model for such
cases, because it combines the probit likelihood that a zero value will be observed with the linear
regression likelihood to explain non-zero values. While the Tobit approach certainly improves
upon standard linear regression, some researchers (Papke and Wooldridge,1996) argue that the
Tobit model, a censored regression technique, is not suitable when values beyond the censoring
point are unfeasible. While the use of Tobit approach is usually motivated by the fact that an
underlying latent variable, for instance, expected utility from a purchase, is observed only in a
limited range, for instance, when the utility is positive, the ratio of integrating firms is difficult
to motivate in the same way as its values less than zero are definitely not feasible. Papke and
Wooldridge suggest that a generalized linear model (GLM) with a binomial distribution and a
logit link function, which is also called the fractional logit model, may be appropriate even in
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the case where the observed variable is continuous, but truncated in the way described above.
To model the ratio Y as a function of covariates X, the generalized linear model may be
written in the following way:
f(E(Y )) = Xβ, Y ∼ F (1.1)
where f(·) is the link function (function linking the actual Y to the estimated Y in an
econometric model) and F is the distributional family. In the case of a fractional logit model,
this becomes the following equation, which should be estimated with a robust standard errors.
logit(E(Y )) = Xβ, Y ∼ Bernoulli (1.2)
The choice of binary models is also dependent on the data used as the endogenous variable.
In particular, binary models are used to estimate the probability of a particular decision being
made. Consequently, the endogenous variable is binary (takes the value of either zero or one).
Different binary choice models are used in both the third and fourth chapters. Probit and logit
models represent a standard approach when the dependent variable is binary. Both of these
models are non-linear and the derivative of the probability with respect to covariates varies
with the level of the covariates themselves and the other variables in the model. The logit
model is derived from the distribution function that gave slightly thinner tails. In the probit
model it is assumed that the link function is normal, i.e. Pr(Y = 1 | X) = Φ(Xβ), while in
the logit model it is logit, i.e Pr(Y = 1 | X) = [1 + e−X′β]−1. The differences in the estimation
results of probit and logit models are usually rather minor; consequently the models will be
used interchangeably in the thesis.
The issue of heteroscedasticity in binary models like probit and logit is usually assumed to be
highly important because it is impossible to correct using the White (robust errors) estimation
procedure. However, unless the precise form of heteroscedasticity (let us call it g(X)) is known,
which is extremely rare, there is little a researcher can do about it even if he/she suspects
the existence of this issue. Moreover, as underlined by Johnson and Dinardo, until the aim of
the analysis is to understand the effect of covariates on the probability of a particular choice,
whether the effect works through the mean (regression function f(X)) or through the variance
(“scedastic” function g(X)) does not generally matter. The exception is when the object of the
analysis is to find the function f(X), which is not the case in this thesis.
The model that generates a binomial response probability generates readily to a system
in which a vector of latent variables, not a single variable, is determined by the explanatory
variables, and the link function maps the latent variable in a vector reflecting observed response.
In other words, when the endogenous variable is presented as a set of non-ordered mutually
exclusive and exhaustive possible choices, the standard approach is to use multinomial response
models. In these models the response probability may be interpreted as a proportion of agents,
firms in the case of this thesis, maximizing their utility at each alternative when faced with
decisions characterized by X1 and/or firms are characterized by X2. It is argued (Hausman
and McFadden, 1984) that functional forms of the models which allow similar patterns of inter-
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alternative substitution will give comparable fits to the same data sets. The models include
multinomial logit models, multinomial probit models and elimination models. The benefit
of using a multinomial logit model is connected with its comparatively higher computational
simplicity. It also explains why the most widely used model of multinomial response is the
multinomial logit (MNL) form. This model permits easy computation and interpretation,
but has a restrictive pattern of inter-alternative substitutions. In particular, it relies on the
Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property, which states that the probability of
i being chosen over j is independent of the availability or attributes of alternatives other than
i and j. However, aggregation of relatively homogeneous alternatives into a smaller number of
primary types may help partly to relax this restriction.
In the cases when homogeneous alternatives are grouped in nests, economists often use
nested models. For the case of multinomial logit, the nested versions exist as well. However,
apart from being computationally intensive, they also require the differentiation of choice- and
nest-specific variables. In the case of the research presented in this thesis (Chapter 3), most of
the variables are firm-specific and it is impossible to separate the firm features that characterize
nests from those connected only with alternatives without making strict assumptions. No theory
have been yet developed on which such assumptions may be based. Moreover, independent
variables in our case may affect both the “nest” decisions and the choice between homogeneous
alternatives, but in a different degree or different way. Consequently, a different approach is
applied.
In order to separate more homogeneous options from a significantly different option, two
models are estimated, one of which represents the choice of a stand-alone option over all the
rest, while the other represents the choice between homogeneous options. However, joint con-
sideration of all the options could introduce bias into such modelling due to self-selection into
a sub-population of agents choosing the stand-alone option. It is possible to represent self-
selection phenomena in a joint model by using the Heckman procedure. If the Heckman test
was significant, the two models would need to be considered jointly. In the case of the research
presented the Heckman test was found to be insignificant. As a result, the two models were
considered separately.
While discussing the results, average marginal effects are presented in the tables for non-
linear models (logit, probit multinomial logit) unless stated otherwise.
In order to analyse the quantitative differences in management quality, in Chapter 5, the
analysis relies on the linear models. In particular, a standard ordinary least squares model
with clustered standard errors was used, following the study of Bloom and Van Reenen (2010),
where similar data were used.
1.5 Structure of the thesis
This thesis contributes to an emerging literature on models with endogenous organizations,
and in particular to a recent stream of this literature which has examined firms’ organizational
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choices in a global economy.
Most papers have focused on how organizational design can explain the observed patterns
of intra-firm trade with a clear focus on MNC. Much less attention has been paid to how
firms’ boundaries and organization of production react to contractual and international links.
Even less attention has been devoted to internal reorganizations induced by increasing interna-
tional exposure and a changing business environment. Moreover, most papers have focused on
advanced countries and multinational firms, while much less attention has been dedicated to
emerging or less advanced transition countries. In particular, almost nothing is known about
the industrial organization that is emerging in transition countries after two decades of trans-
formation. Nor to my knowledge has the previous literature pointed out the effects that trade
liberalization may have had in transition countries on firms’ internal organization — through
its impact on the depth of the firms’ organizational hierarchies.
The contributions of this thesis are empirically-oriented, and are focused on organizational
changes at the firm level in transition countries. The main motivation was the need to under-
stand the mis-match between tools and expectations in transition economies. The tools were
massive privatization and opening to trade, while the expectations were that companies would
become successfully functioning drivers of sustainable growth, similar to western companies,
and provide profits and jobs.
The remainder of the thesis is composed of four chapters. Chapter 2 utilizes the theoretical
predictions of property-rights theory to analyse the industry-level prevalence of organizational
form changes in transition countries. In particular, it illustrates the connection of technological
and institutional factors with the occurrence of decisions to redefine firm boundaries, in par-
ticular to integrate. The chapter also highlights the link between the openness to international
trade and the incidence of integration choices.
Chapter 3 presents the empirical analysis of firm-level decisions to redefine firm boundaries
in transition countries. It shows the complexity of the choice options when a decision to
redefine firm boundaries is taken at the firm-level. This chapter also underlines the importance
of technological and institutional factors in overcoming the resistance to organizational changes
like redefinition of firm boundaries.
Chapter 4 focuses on the connection between trade liberalization and internal organizational
change. It draws some stylized facts on the internal organization of firms in transition countries.
Moreover, the chapter highlights the role of increased market competition due to increased
imports in the prevalence of firms’ decisions to make their internal organization flatter. It also
underlines the effect of firm characteristics on the choice of flattening decisions.
Chapter 5 discusses the connection between management quality and institutional failures,
such as corruption, in transition countries. It describes this connection at both country and
firm level. The chapter highlights the importance of firm-level characteristics and country-group
features in transition region.
A detailed description of the data used for the empirical analysis of this thesis is given in
Appendix A. The appendix also includes additional figures and tables for all five chapters of
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the thesis.
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Chapter 2
FIRM BOUNDARIES IN
TRANSITION COUNTRIES.
INDUSTRY-LEVEL ANALYSIS
2.1 Introduction
Firms are choosing to trade within their boundaries more and more often. Almost one-third
of the world trade of goods represents trade within the boundaries of the same firm(Antra`s,
2003). Most of the growth of intra-firm trade in developed countries is attributed to the
technological progress and higher complexity of production. However, little is known about
what drives this process in one of the biggest world market, namely transition countries.
In order to answer this question we take the perspectives of property rights theory and
new institutional economics and analyse whether or not the organizational choices of firms in
transition countries have been affected by technological and institutional developments, as well
as by the increase in international openness.
The focus on transition countries has two main motivations: The first is related to the
historical tendency towards excessive vertical integration during the Soviet era. In the period
of planned economy, firms in modern transition countries were mainly locked into highly specific
supply relationships with a small number of firms or even with a single supplier. In the last
25 years transition countries have gone through significant political and economic changes.
Such changes entailed institutional transformations, trade liberalization, and changes in the
organization of industries, business practices and firm interactions. However, a systematic view
on the production links of firms in transition countries is still to evolve. Neither national nor
international production links in transition countries have been extensively discussed in the
literature. The boundaries of the firm in these countries have rarely been analysed, even if the
boundary extension is one of the key decisions for a firm’s economic performance and a firm’s
adjustment to national and international changes.
The second motivation lies in the persistent weakness of institutions and slow technological
advancement in transition countries. These are two features possibly influencing boundaries
extension and vertical integration. However, the question rests which and how much each of
these two features affects firm boundaries in transition countries.
We focus on the strand of literature that examines firm boundaries as a key decision for
firm organization, by analysing relationships between firms and their suppliers. It has already
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been demonstrated that vertical integration influences a firm’s learning ability (Sorenson, 2003),
performance improvements (Novak and Stern, 2009), resource allocation and technology transfer
(Seru, 2014), as well as its productivity (Schoar, 2002; Broedner et al., 2009). However, it has
also been shown that the choice of integration versus arm’s length trade does not guarantee a
better performance, unless it is an optimal response to institutional hazards (Leiblein et al.,
2002).
The questions on the choice between vertical integration and dealing with stand-alone sup-
pliers have been asked in the literature since Coase (1937). However, it was not until Antra`s
(2003), that the property-rights approach to integration was combined with the framework of
international trade. The Antra`s (2003) study gave rise to the new and fast-growing literature of
sourcing in international trade context, that is mostly applied to the analysis of multinational
corporations. It was further extended in Antra`s and Helpman (2004) and became the global
sourcing model where firms organize production on a global scale depending on the intensity
of their inputs use and their level of productivity. Further, Antra`s and Helpman (2004) was
generalized in Antra`s and Helpman (2008) theoretical model to analyse the impact of varying
degrees of contractual frictions affecting either the supplier or the sourcing firm.
The results 1 of the first two papers (Antra`s, 2003; Antra`s and Helpman, 2004) are twofold.
First is the development of organizational models explaining make or buy decision, the choice
sometimes called integration procurement versus market procurement or vertical integration
versus outsourcing. The main assumption behind this is that vertical integration allows the
firm to partially control the customized intermediate inputs produced by its supplier. The
central implication is that we should see vertical integration in industries that intensively use
the headquarter inputs produced by the firm. Second is the development of organizational
models treating the drivers of the make-or-buy decision in a global context where the choice of
how to source goes hand in hand with the choice of where to source.2
Both these papers identify the influence of technological complexity on organizational forms.
But the main message of the third paper (Antra`s and Helpman, 2008) is that the relative
prevalence of alternative organizational forms depends not only on technological complexity,
but also on varying degrees of contractual frictions, across countries and across inputs, i.e.
the quality of contracting institutions plays an important role in organization of production.
On this basis, the technological intensity and institutional quality highlighted by the Antra`s
and Helpman (2008) paper, as well as participation in international trade make them good
candidates for an empirical analysis of the relative prevalence of alternative organizational forms
in the context of the increasing openness3 to international markets of transition countries.
There exist substantial variations of both forces - technology intensity and institutional
quality - across transition countries as a result of substantial disparities in economic and insti-
tutional development. Consequently, these countries offer suitable settings in which to study
1Models are summarized elsewhere (Helpman, 2006; Nunn and Trefler, 2008)
2The second type of decisions are outside of the scope of this paper as the data does not allow us to
disentangle domestic integration from integration abroad.
3Although an empirical approach towards accounting for the participation in international trade differs from
the theoretical model of location decisions in Antra`s and Helpman (2008)
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the impacts of these forces on organizational choices.
However, there are not many empirical tests of the Antra`s and Helpman (2008) model4
because of the multiplicity of outcomes on firms’ sorting into different sourcing strategies. The
combination of input cost advantages (related to location and organizational forms) and the
fixed cost disadvantages, together with the variability of contracting institutions, generates
many ambiguities, at least with respect to the available data.
Moving to the level of data is not an easy task, especially in the case of transition countries.
Hence, the empirical analysis uses the EBRD firm-level survey data5 aggregated to the industry
level in transition countries. Such an approach allows us to compare our results with the
previous studies made on the industry level and bring to light two main results.
First, we partially utilize the theoretical predictions of Antra`s’ approach. Our empirical
results show that both technological (capital) intensity and institutional quality can play a role
in the relative prevalence of alternative organizational forms (decision about how) not only
in more developed, but also in transition countries. However, the empirical extension of this
approach to the decisions about where to source is constrained by data.
Second, we make room for an empirical analysis of the determinants of organizational choices
in transition countries in a context of increasing international openness. Our results show that
globalization in transition countries has enhanced rather than weakened the historical tendency
towards excessive vertical integration or integrated procurement. This evidence constitutes one
of our contributions to the literature. Such results are in contrast with McLaren (2000) pre-
dictions of a close and negative relationship between international openness and the vertically
integrated organization of production, as a result of the increasing variety of suppliers entering
the market.
Another contribution is our evaluation of two forces (technological and institutional) simul-
taneously. We show that these forces have opposite effect. Moreover, our results illustrate that
the economic influence of the institutional quality on vertical integration tends to be higher
than the influence of production complexity. Consequently, in countries with poorly functioning
contracting institutions, higher levels of vertical integration mostly reflects contracting ineffi-
ciencies. Thus, an improvement in institutional quality in transition countries would decrease
vertical integration and increase the efficiency of the production organization.
The rest of this chapter is structured in the following way. In Section 2.2.1 we present the
theoretical background and empirical hypotheses for the analysis. Section 2.3 describes the data
used in the analysis and explains the specifications of our empirical model and methodology
adopted. Section 2.4 presents empirical findings, and the paper is concluded by the final remarks
4The Antra`s (2003) study also provide the first empirical validation of the theoretical model at the (4-digit
SIC) industry level. The Antra`s and Helpman (2004) model has also been empirically tested at the 2-3-digit
1987 SIC industry level by Yeaple (2006) and at the 6-digit HS industry level by Nunn and Trefler (2008).
Self-selection into foreign sourcing based on the Antra`s and Helpman (2004) has been empirically analyzed by
Kohler and Smolka (2014) and Defever and Toubal (2013) at the firm-level. To the best of our knowledge,
the only study that has made an empirical test of the Antra`s and Helpman (2008) prediction on the effect of
different contractual frictions is the Nunn and Trefler (2008) study.
5The BEEPS, survey organized by the EBRD and The World Bank. This paper is based on the wave of
this survey that took place in 2005.
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in Section 2.5.
2.2 Related Literature and Empirical Hypotheses
2.2.1 Antra`s and Helpman (2008) in a Nutshell
In order to analyse the influence of contractual frictions, due to both technological and
institutional reasons, we base our empirical analysis on the extended model of global sourcing
presented in the work of Antra`s and Helpman (2008). This model defines optimal sourcing
strategy in a context where contractual imperfections exist.
This model considers a bargaining process between a firm (headquarters) and its supplier
within the following set-up. Production of final goods requires two inputs: an intermediate
input and a headquarter input, provided by the final-good producer. It is assumed that the
final-good producer is unable to produce the intermediate input, and therefore she has to rely
on its supplier. There is a differentiation in the final goods, which leads to final-good producers
having market power. Differentiated goods also imply tailor-made inputs, with two important
consequences.
First, writing enforceable contracts that specify the entire set of input features is impossible
(incomplete contracts). Second, both types of input have no value outside of this particular
sourcing relationship (relationship specificity). Consequently, both the supplier and the firm
are locked up in a relationship characterized by opportunistic behaviour from their contracting
partner, and bargaining over the final surplus of the production relationship. Due to insufficient
incentives, both inputs are provided in a less than optimal amount and in an inefficient input
mix, with the outcome depending on the ex post outside options that the agents have.
By choosing vertical integration the final-good producer may opt for higher outside option
relative to the other organizational form, called outsourcing, which implies relying upon an
independent supplier. For either of the two organizational forms, final-good producers may
decide to turn to domestic or foreign input suppliers. They choose their sourcing strategy,
in other words, a combination of location and organizational form to obtain the intermediate
input, so as to maximize expected profits from the production relationship. This choice is
driven by two types of advantages: A location advantage of obtaining the input in the domestic
or the foreign economy;6 in addition, there is an incentive advantage in favour of either vertical
integration or outsourcing, depending on the bargaining details of the hold-up problem and the
importance of the headquarter input (headquarter-intensity) for the relationship. Importantly,
the advantage of one organizational mode or location over the other in sourcing is magnified
by a firm’s productivity.
The optimal sourcing strategy is then determined through the comparison of these advan-
tages with a specific structure of fixed cost disadvantages associated with different organiza-
tional forms and locations of sourcing.7
6The advantage that is not evaluated in our empirical study due to the data structure
7The industry equilibrium is structured as a productivity based self-selection of firms into sourcing modes.
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Using the theoretical approach discussed, we make two simplified predictions of the model
about the role of contractual frictions and a firm’s productivity in the form of propositions.
Later, we will bring these propositions to data by elaborating empirical hypotheses.
The first proposition concerns the influence of headquarter-intensity or technological com-
plexity. Proposition 3 of the Antra`s and Helpman (2008) study states that there exists a unique
value of the headquarter-intensity (νhc) such that it is more profitable for a firm to integrate
when its headquarter-intensity ν is greater than νhc and to outsource when ν is lower than νhc.
Assumed that a firm will seek to maximize its profits, it is expected that a firm will integrate
if ν > νhc and source from an independent supplier when ν < νhc.
Consequently, we will base our empirical analysis on the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The incidence of vertical integration with suppliers is positively connected with
the average industry headquarter-intensity.
The same Proposition of the Antra`s and Helpman (2008) study also states that the cut-off
νhc decreases in the degree of contractibility of the supplier’s inputs. The contractability of the
supplier’s input µs depends on what share of the supplier activities
8 can be verified by a court
of law. In its turn, the ability of the court of law to verify supplier’s activity depends on the
quality of contracting institutions regulating the production of supplier’s input.
Considering cases where the quality of contracting institutions affecting the supplier’s input
varies between countries and industries the higher quality of these institutions is positively
connected with the higher input contractibility. Importantly, the Antra`s and Helpman (2008)
model predict that the cut-off νhc is higher with higher degree of contractibility of the sup-
plier’s inputs µh and with smaller degree of contractibility of the headquarter’s inputs µs.
Consequently, by the Proposition 5 in sectors with νh > νhc the share of integrating firms de-
crease with µh and increase with µs. Thus, we should expect less integrated firms in industries
and countries with stronger contracting institutions that regulate supplier’s activities, but the
opposite with stronger contracting institutions that regulate headquarter’s activities.9 For the
reasons associated with the data structure we focus only on the following proposition that is
connected with the contracting institutions regulating supplier’s activities.
Proposition 2 In industries with a higher quality of supplier-side contracting institutions less
vertical integration should be observed.
This proposition propose that larger contractual frictions in supplier’s input discourage
integration.
The Antra`s and Helpman (2008) paper also demonstrates that the productivity of firms
plays a role in the sorting into different organizational modes of procurement. Assuming (as in
8Supplier activities refer to the activities of supplier aimed at the production of the input required by the
headquarter
9This results rely on the assumption that fixed costs of outsourcing are lower than the fixed costs of
integration. Assuming the opposite it is possible to have the reverse result, i.e. higher quality of supplier-side
contracting institutions increasing the prevalence of integration.
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Antra`s and Helpman (2004)) that the fixed costs of outsourcing are lower than the fixed costs
of integration, the model illustrates that in the sectors with a higher headquarter-intensity,
outsourcing is optimal only for low productivity firms. Proposition 4 of the same study states
that there exists a productivity cut-off θO, such that in an industry with headquarter-intensity
νh > νhs all firms with productivity greater than θO integrate and firms with productivity
less than θO outsource. However, in order to understand the validity of assumptions beneath
such results, and possible empirical framework for transitional countries, additional analysis is
required. Although such an analysis is possible in our future research, in this paper we are not
focusing on productivity sorting.10
The Antra`s and Helpman (2008) develops also Propositions 6-9 for the interactions between
organizational and location decisions, namely between outsourcing at home (North), integration
at home, outsourcing abroad (South) and integration abroad. It is assumed that the headquar-
ter input is produced only at home, while the supplier’s input may be bought (outsourced)
at home or abroad, or made (integrated) either at home or abroad. Thus, only the location
of supplier, either independent or integrated, changes. The sorting of decisions (outsourcing
at home, integration at home, outsourcing abroad and integration abroad) depends on the as-
sumption on the fixed costs both between organizational modes and locations. However, to test
this model the location decision should be observed, which is not the case in our study. Thus,
our empirical hypotheses are based mostly on the closed economy propositions discussed above
with some adjustments towards the possibility of unobserved foreign sourcing.
2.2.2 Empirical Hypotheses
The empirical hypotheses tested in this paper are based on the propositions described in
the previous section. The first hypothesis is related to the first proposition and focuses on
the degree of headquarter-intensity. Following the approach of Antra`s (2003) and previous
empirical literature on the topic (Nunn and Trefler, 2008; Kohler and Smolka, 2014), we use
capital intensity as a proxy for headquarter-intensity.
The evaluation of this hypothesis allows us to analyse whether the prevalence of integration
is driven by the complexity and technological advancement of production in transition countries,
and to what degree.
H 2.1 In industries with higher average capital-intensity the integration with suppliers is chosen
more often than in industries with a lower capital-intensity
If our results prove that this hypothesis is correct it would also demonstrate that, with
a higher participation in trade of more complex and relationship-specific intermediate inputs,
there is a natural tendency for integration and enlargement of a firm’s boundaries in transition
countries. Consequently, more production groups and big corporations may be observed. Such
phenomena should not be considered by policy makers as damaging for the economy when it
takes place in industries with complex production, requiring highly specific inputs. However,
10Nevertheless, we are going to control for possible differences of intra-industry productivity distribution.
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integration driven by other forces, such as institutional weakness, may become excessive and
hinder the increase of productivity.
Similar to the Proposition 3 of the Antras (2008) model, the cut-off of capital intensity
depends on the increase of supplier input contractibility µs. Thus, the test of this hypothesis
should be done simultaneous with, and not separately from, the accounting for the forces
affecting µs, such as supplier-side contracting institutions.
Our second hypothesis is related to the second proposition, discussed in the previous sec-
tion. As we have discussed previously, the Antra`s and Helpman (2008) paper demonstrated
that a higher quality of supplier-side contracting institutions may decrease the prevalence of
integration. Nunn and Trefler (2008) study founds support for this proposition11 by using
Nunn (2007) measure of input relationship-specificity at the industry level multiplied by the
normalized country-level rule-of-law variable (Kaufmann et al., 2007). Thus, Nunn and Trefler
(2008) show that contracting institutions should vary not only across countries, but also across
industries. Moreover, Du et al. (2012) illustrated that the degree of integration is connected
with cross-region differences in the quality of contracting institutions. However, due to the
structure of our data we leave this dimension of contracting institutions variability outside of
the scope of this study.
In testing our second hypothesis we evaluate how the differences in the quality of supplier-
side contracting institutions in different countries and industries are connected with the preva-
lence of integration.12 In order to analyse such an influence we rely on the connection between
the quality of supplier-side contracting institutions and the level of trust between the firm and
the supplier.
According to Raiser et al. (2008), average country levels of trust between firms are highly
connected with the quality of country institutions in transition countries. The institutions,
such as court and legal enforcement system, that affect contracting and contract enforcement
11The empirical approach of Nunn and Trefler (2008) is based on the open economy model (Propositions
6-9) of Antra`s and Helpman (2008). Our hypotheses are based on the closed economy model as the data on
the location of supplier is not observed. To draw the conclusions from the open economy model, it is critical
to know where the supplier is situated. In particular, the Nunn and Trefler (2008) separate two effects of the
rise in contractibility of the foreign supplier’s inputs (µfs ). The first is referred as the “Standard Effect” and is
associated with the increase in the foreign outsourcing due to higher µfs . The second is referred as the “Surprise
Effect” and is associated with the switch of the firms from outsourcing abroad to integration abroad. Another
effect described in the Antra`s and Helpman (2008) model is the switch from foreign outsourcing to integration in
the home country if the contractibility of the domestic supplier’s input µds increase. As a result, to understand
which of this effect is prevailing the location of supplier is a neccessary information. However, as we will discuss
later, our data shows that a small number of firms in the sample switch from outsourcing to integration and
vice versa. Considering that such a switch abroad is associated with higher costs, we can expect that the share
of firms switching to outsourcing abroad or integrating abroad can be much lower, becoming extremely small
to draw any conclusions.
12The stream of literature focused on relational contracting has recently shown that the preference of inte-
gration increases in the parties’ levels of long-term orientation (Kukharskyy, 2016). Relational contracts are
sustained by the shadow of the future (Gibbons and Henderson, 2012). Thus, empirical analysis of the influence
of relational contracts require the data of the length of relationships or time preferences. Due to the data limits,
in this thesis we apply only on-spot perspective on contracts in the similar to Antra`s and Helpman (2008) way.
The incidence of relational contracting in transition countries may serve as an alternative for integration, thus
affecting our results. However, if both main exogeneous and indogeneous variables are affected, they should be
affected in the symmetric way.
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are of particular interest. The empirical evidence presented by Raiser et al. (2008) shows that
a higher confidence of firms in courts as being fair and efficient enforcement mechanisms, as
well as information-sharing through non-governmental networks, are associated with a higher
level of trust between firms.
Following Raiser et al. (2008), we evaluate the influence of contracting institutions on inte-
gration decisions through the analysis of trust between firms. By using such a channel we are
able to separate the influence of contracting institutions that affect firm’s relationships with
its suppliers from the influence of other institutional settings not affecting the design of such
relationships. Taking into account the connection between the levels of trust, contracting insti-
tutions, and the contractibility of the supplier’s input, we expect that the higher trust between
the supplier and the final-good producer is connected with lower incidence of integration.
H 2.2 Lower trust between the supplier and the firm, reflecting a lower quality of supplier-side
contracting institutions, is associated with a higher attractiveness of integration. Consequently,
in the industries with lower trust, integration is chosen more often.
Support for this hypothesis would underline the importance of facilitating trust between
firms, and improving the quality of contracting institutions in transition countries. Better
contracting institutions and contractual enforcement would thus be shown to allow transition
countries to avoid excessive vertical integration and rigidity in the organization of input supply.
2.3 Data and Empirical Strategy
2.3.1 Data
The data used in this work is selected from the firm-level Business Environment and En-
terprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), jointly gathered by the EBRD and the World Bank
on transition countries in 2005. The data on more than 8000 firms is then aggregated to the
industry level by constructing the incidence of certain firm-level answers or by the averaging
of firm characteristics. For performing the analysis, we aggregated the firm-level data to the
industry level based on the 3-digit codes for the main product of each firm.
The analysis presented in this study is undertaken for the 128 industries 13 belonging to 6
activity sectors (construction; manufacturing; transport storage and communication; wholesale
and retail trade; real estate, renting and business services; other services) of 23 transition
countries. We excluded from the main regression analysis two developed countries available in
the dataset (Ireland and Spain) because as baseline countries they are very different from the
countries on which this paper is focused. Country and industry distributions of firm-level data
13The number of industries per country differs across countries due to the industry profiles of these countries.
Some industries are presented in one country, but absent in the other. The maximum of number of industries
per country is 100 (Ukraine) and minimum is 30 (Macedonia).
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that was aggregated are presented in Tables B.1a and B.2a. Country and industry distributions
of the aggregated data are presented in Tables B.1b and B.2b.14
2.3.2 Empirical Model
While testing our hypotheses we focus on the incidence of integration decisions within
different industries. In contrast to most of the previous industry-level empirical studies which
considered the volume of aggregate trade between integrated parties, we study the dissemination
of integration decisions within and between industries. Such a choice brings us closer to the
micro foundations of all three of the theoretical models: Antra`s (2003); Antra`s and Helpman
(2004, 2008).
The models also distinguish between the decisions about how and where to source. How-
ever, due to the data constraints it is impossible to differentiate between domestic and foreign
suppliers in our work. Consequently, we do not specifically analyse the location (where) deci-
sions, but focus only on the choice of organizational forms (how), taking into consideration the
degree of openness to trade.
In order to test first two hypotheses we analyse the following model using fractional logit.15
logit(
N intic
Nic
) = β0 + β1Kic + β2Tic + β¯3W¯ic. (2.1)
Where
N intic
Nic
is the incidence of integration in industry i and country c, Kic is the mean
capital-intensity of firms in industry i and country c, and T 1ic is the measure of trust in supply
relationships in industry i and country c.16 The vector W¯ic is the vector of control variables.
In order to test the sensibility of the empirical model we use several sets of the control
variables. In the first specification of the model, the vector W¯i includes the measures of export,
industry population characteristics and the competitive situation within industry i.
The openness to international trade is an important issue to control for, as different transi-
tion countries are exposed to international trade to different extents. Consequently, we control
for the influence of export participation and competition from imports. Similar to the depen-
dent variable, the export control variable is represented by the share of exporting firms in the
total population of firms in the industry. Such a measure allows us to control for the dissemi-
nation of the decision to export in different industries. In order to analyse the influence of the
import inflows, we include the share of firms signalling that competition from foreign firms is
of high importance (Import Competition) and those signalling that there is an absence of the
competition from imports (Without import competition).
We also control for demand elasticity as the measure of the overall level of competition
in the industry, the share of Small and Medium Enterprises (SME), and the share of multi-
14The firm-level data is aggregated by unweighted averaging, as no weights are provided in the data. There-
fore, obtained results represent the average behaviour of the firms in the sample
15All the specifications are performed on a ratio of integrating firms to the number of firms interviewed in an
industry, as the population of firms differs between industries. The model is used with robust standard errors.
16A more detailed description may be available on request
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establishment firms.
In the second specification the vector W¯i also includes the variables describing financial
obstacles and inclusion in the financial system. In order to evaluate the sensitivity of our
results to country unobserved characteristics we control for the country and region (EU versus
non-EU transition countries) fixed effects in the third and fourth specifications.
The coefficient β1 allows us to test the first hypothesis (H2.1), while the coefficient β2
illustrates the influence stated in the second hypothesis (H2.2).
In order to understand the difference between the EU and non-EU transition countries in
terms of the incidence of integration decisions, we further run the fullest specification of the
above model on the two subsamples of countries. The first subsample includes the countries
that at the moment of the survey were a part of the EU, and second the countries that did not
belong to the EU in 2005.
In order to evaluate the robustness of our results we also perform additional checks, using
another approach to measure capital-intensity. Instead of the replacement value of capital per
employee, we use the ratio of the spending on new buildings, machinery and equipment per
employee.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Technological Intensity and Institutional Quality
With respect to our first hypothesis (H2.1) the results support the stated connection between
capital-intensity and the incidence of integration (Table 2.1). As can be seen from the table,
capital-intensity is associated positively and statistically significantly with integration. The
association remains positive and is of approximately the same magnitude when the first two
specifications are used (column 1 and 2).
However, the magnitude of the connection decreases and becomes statistically insignificant
when we control for country fixed effects. Such results may be explained by country differ-
ences in the upstreamness of production. It has been illustrated that countries may specialize
in more or less upstream production. Consequently, it has been shown that upstreamness is
highly country-specific in low-income countries (Antra`s et al., 2012).17 In our data, the number
of industries for each country varies depending on the industries in which a particular transition
country is specialized. As upstreamness is highly correlated with capital intensity, by introduc-
ing country dummies we smooth the variation of capital-intensity and the influence of capital
intensity becomes invisible. Such results illustrate that capital-intensity is not only industry-,
but also country-specific in transition countries.
The economic significance of the capital-intensity influence (when it is statistically signifi-
cant) is comparatively low as well. The increase in capital intensity by one standard deviation is
associated with a 22% increase in vertical integration on average. If we take into consideration
17In particular it is correlated not with the actual level of development but with the choice of industries
where the production is concentrated.
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the size of the standard deviation and the previous growth of capital-intensity in transition
countries, for vertical integration to increase by 20% capital-intensity should increase on aver-
age by almost three times more than it increased between 2002 and 2005. Nevertheless, the link
between capital-intensity and integration is significant and positive on average for transition
countries. These results confirm the expectations expressed in hypothesis H2.1.
The analysis of the influence of institutional frictions, stated in hypothesis H2.2, is based on
the coefficient of trust variable presented in Table 2.1. The results support the hypothesis and
illustrate that higher levels of trust are associated with a lower incidence of integration. The
association of the same negative sign and approximately the same magnitude can be observed in
all the specifications used. According to the fullest specification presented in column 4 of Table
2.1, the average increase in trust by one standard deviation would decrease the integration
incidence by around 22.5%. It would mean an increase in the integration rate of around 20%
in around 3 years if trust continued to grow as it did between 2002 and 2005. The coefficient of
trust is robust to accounting of the accessibility of financial systems and the degree of inclusion
in international trade.
2.4.2 International Trade and Economic Environment
International trade and competition
Analysing the influence of control variables based on Table 2.1, we can see several important
factors characterizing a higher incidence of integration.
A very important result is associated with the inclusion of transition countries in inter-
national trade. From columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.1 we can see that a higher participation
in international trade through exports is associated with a higher integration incidence. The
effect, however, disappears when we control for country fixed effects (column 3 and 4). In fact,
such a pattern manifests itself due to the presence of countries like Armenia, Hungary, Russia
and Kazakhstan in the data, which are countries characterized by export-led growth.
Exports, however, are not the only way for a country to be linked to international trade.
As mentioned in the variables’ description, we control for the influence of import competition
pressure on integration decisions. Based on the results presented in Table 2.1 we can see that
import competition pressure is positively associated with a higher integration incidence (column
1) when we do not control for country fixed effects. A clearer pattern arises when we separate
two main country groups in further analysis (see Section 2.4.3).
As we also control for the general level of competition (through the elasticity of demand), we
can see that in industries with a higher level of competition, less integration is observed. Such
a result shows that a pro-competitive economic policy and well-functioning market mechanisms
induce firms to operate through the market rather than integrate. One standard deviation
increase in the measure of competition in an industry is associated with a 41% decrease in the
incidence of integration. Such result is robust to the inclusion of country dummies as well as
financial constraints’ measures.
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Table 2.1: Integration drivers
Specifications1 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Capital-intensity 0.146*** 0.147*** 0.051 0.048
(0.051) (0.050) (0.048) (0.047)
Trust -0.465*** -0.468*** -0.625*** -0.609***
(0.151) (0.152) (0.147) (0.147)
International Trade and Competition
Export 0.302* 0.285* 0.124 0.119
(0.157) (0.156) (0.144) (0.144)
Import competition 0.464** 0.379* 0.319 0.233
(0.191) (0.197) (0.199) (0.199)
Without import competition -0.305 -0.259 -0.517 -0.520
(1.275) (1.243) (1.111) (1.084)
High competition -0.623*** -0.674*** -0.547*** -0.563***
(0.222) (0.223) (0.212) (0.209)
Other Controls
EU transition countries -0.255* -0.257* 1.522*** 1.472***
(0.132) (0.134) (0.423) (0.419)
GDP per capita -0.239*** -0.229*** -0.999*** -0.981***
(0.056) (0.056) (0.168) (0.166)
Labour productivity (sd) 0.163 0.184 0.204** 0.212**
(0.146) (0.145) (0.100) (0.101)
SME -0.374 -0.348 -0.442** -0.403*
(0.234) (0.239) (0.206) (0.209)
MES 0.281 0.268 0.089 0.045
(0.172) (0.175) (0.187) (0.185)
Finance acc. difficulty (major) 0.374* 0.101
(0.220) (0.238)
Borrowing from local banks 0.007** 0.010***
(0.004) (0.004)
Borrowing from foreign banks -0.013 -0.009
(0.011) (0.009)
Country dummies No No Yes Yes
Likelihood -842.116 -837.533 -750.014 -746.090
Chi2 134.188 146.6588 345.6422 356.1442
p-value 2.47e-23 3.34e-24 8.00e-55 2.48e-55
N 834 834 834 834
Note: 1 All the specifications include the share of integration firms as a dependent variable. Average
marginal effects are presented
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Other control variables
There are several minor factors connected to integration decisions that require mentioning.
In particular, we can see from the results in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.1 that firms in EU
countries (both transition and developed) are integrating, on average, less than firms in non-EU
transition countries, as well as in the countries with a higher GDP per capita. Such results
may be explained by the higher level of economic development in EU countries, which is usually
accompanied by a lower level of information asymmetries and unobserved contractual frictions.
The results also show that SME are less predisposed to integrate than their bigger counter-
parts (columns 3 and 4) when country fixed effects are captured by the country dummies. It is
also obvious from the results that a higher inclusion of firms in the financial system is positively
connected with vertical integration. In particular, a higher share of borrowing from local banks
is associated with a higher integration incidence. The drawing of any causal inference from this
connection, however, is ambiguous and is not allowed by the data at hand.
As can be seen from columns 3-4, labour productivity heterogeneity is positively associated
with integration when country fixed effects are taken into consideration. This result is robust
to different sets of control variables. Consequently, we can state that these results confirm the
proposition of the Antra`s and Helpman (2008) paper about the positive connection between
productivity heterogeneity and the incidence of integration. However, as the discussion of such
results is not the aim of this work, and would be more appropriately explored at the firm level,
we leave this for further research.
2.4.3 Differences Between Country Groups
In order to deepen our analysis we check if different patterns in two main groups of transition
countries (EU and non-EU) can be observed.
By dividing the countries into two subsets (Table 2.2) we can see that the supporting evi-
dence for our first hypothesis (H2.1) is mostly due to the pattern observed in non-EU transition
countries. The absence of this effect in EU transition countries is mostly due to the fact that
these countries are considerably more homogeneous. If we include other European countries
such as Ireland and Spain in this group, as comparison countries, the coefficients become signifi-
cant for the group of EU countries as well (Table B.6). The connection between capital-intensity
and integration in the more heterogeneous group of non-EU transition countries is statistically
significant (column 3), but as shown in our previous analysis it is also country-specific.
At the same time, we see supporting evidence for our second hypothesis (H2.1) in both
groups. However, the statistical significance of the coefficient drops when no country fixed
effects are considered. Such behaviour is connected with the presence of several very different
(in terms of trust) Polish industries. Introducing country fixed effects allows us to compensate
for such data characteristics and highlight the effect of trust variable in this country group. This
conclusion is also supported by the results for the enlarged group of European countries in Table
B.6 (EU transition countries, supplemented by Ireland and Spain as comparison countries).
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Dividing the sample into two subsamples also gives us a clearer picture in terms of the
influence of competition and international trade. The connection between export participation
and integration is not significant when we divide the data into two subsamples. This result
shows that the positive connection described in Section 2.4.2 results from the difference in export
participation between EU and non-EU transition countries. In fact, the average difference
between the two groups is significant. Participation in international trade through exports is,
on average, almost 30% higher in the group of EU transition countries.
Table 2.2: Group differences
All EU Non-EU
Specifications1 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Capital-intensity 0.147*** 0.048 0.061 0.018 0.170*** 0.044
(0.050) (0.047) (0.059) (0.061) (0.061) (0.062)
Trust -0.468*** -0.609*** -0.244 -0.327* -0.592*** -0.790***
(0.152) (0.147) (0.187) (0.179) (0.200) (0.195)
International Trade and Competition
Export 0.285* 0.119 0.203 0.213 0.132 -0.022
(0.156) (0.144) (0.190) (0.165) (0.200) (0.193)
Import competition 0.379* 0.233 -0.129 -0.040 0.724*** 0.521*
(0.197) (0.199) (0.217) (0.204) (0.252) (0.287)
Without import competition -0.259 -0.520 -5.082*** -5.442*** 0.910 0.921
(1.243) (1.084) (1.723) (1.622) (1.491) (1.173)
High competition -0.674*** -0.563*** 0.335* 0.233 -1.321*** -1.201***
(0.223) (0.209) (0.199) (0.166) (0.313) (0.298)
Other Controls
EU transition countries -0.257* -1.472
(0.134) (0.419)
GDP per capita -0.229*** -0.981*** 0.558*** 0.018 -0.303*** -1.247***
(0.056) (0.166) (0.185) (0.486) (0.069) (0.205)
Labour productivity (sd) 0.184 0.212** 0.420*** 0.421*** 0.080 0.127
(0.145) (0.101) (0.145) (0.141) (0.211) (0.137)
SME -0.348 -0.403* -0.265 -0.411 -0.381 -0.420
(0.239) (0.209) (0.259) (0.272) (0.333) (0.276)
MES 0.268 0.045 0.029 -0.236 0.329 0.283
(0.175) (0.185) (0.232) (0.231) (0.244) (0.256)
Finance acc. difficulty (major) 0.374* 0.101 0.041 0.261 0.534* -0.079
(0.220) (0.238) (0.269) (0.266) (0.284) (0.315)
Borrowing from local banks 0.007** 0.010*** 0.009** 0.008* 0.003 0.008
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Borrowing from foreign banks -0.013 -0.009 0.010 0.009 -0.015 -0.011
(0.011) (0.009) (0.023) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012)
Country dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
Likelihood -837.533 -746.090 -190.864 -177.471 -612.989 -551.326
Chi2 146.6588 356.1442 70.10218 106.3282 114.7303 279.4192
p-value 3.34e-24 2.48e-55 7.69e-10 3.77e-14 2.20e-18 2.67e-44
N 834 834 286 286 548 548
Note: 1 All the specifications include the share of integration firms as a dependent variable. Average
marginal effects are presented
We also can see from Table 2.2 that import competition pressure forces firms to integrate
more often in non-EU countries, the countries with, on average, a comparatively lower level of
import competition. At the same time in EU transition countries, where import competition is
higher on average and homogeneous among all countries in the group, the results show that more
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integration is present in industries protected from import penetration. This pattern highlights
how pressure from import competition is associated with a higher degree of integration among
firms.
The results also show that the negative connection between the level of competition and
integration (previously underlined in Section 2.4.2) is driven by non-EU transition countries. In
a big number of these countries, lack of competitive markets has been well-documented in the
literature. As a result, the low average level of competition stimulates more vertical integration
in these countries.
The analysis of the influence of other control variables allows us to identify three more
characteristic features of the country groups. First, the results illustrate that the heterogeneity
of labour productivity is positively and significantly connected with the integration incidence
in EU transition countries, but not in the non-EU transition countries. Second, the higher
level of development in terms of income is associated with a higher level of integration in EU
transition countries, and a lower integration in non-EU transition countries. Third, a positive
correlation between integration and the higher possibilities for borrowing from local banks,
previously discussed, is driven by EU transition countries, but is absent in non-EU transition
countries.
The robustness check shows similar results (presented in Table B.5). The major difference is
in terms of the degree of statistical significance of capital-intensity when country dummies are
included. Such a difference may be caused by the characteristics of the alternative measure of
capital-intensity used in this robustness check. This measure reflects the intensity of production
in capital investments, rather than replacement value of capital. Thus, the measure is less
affected by the value of historically accumulated physical capital. Moreover, this measure is
more heterogeneous both between countries.18
2.5 Conclusions
Today, transition countries are lagging behind in terms of technological upgrading and
the quality of their contracting institutions. The empirical literature has established some
stylized facts, especially at the country level, but not their effects on the organizational choices
of industries and firms and thus on industrial organization in that part of the world. The
historical tendency towards excessive vertical integration during the Soviet era, and firms’
increasing participation in international trade today and, in particular, international sourcing,
puts the spotlight on the question of organizational choices for sourcing in transition countries.
Organizational choices are examined by using the global sourcing model because it assumes
that both technological (capital) intensity and the quality of contractual institutional can play a
role in the relative prevalence of alternative organizational forms of sourcing. But applying this
model to the data available for transition countries has required some significant simplifications.
On the one hand, given the data constraints that do not allow us to measure the specific location
18Country differences in two measures are presented in the Appendix, Table B.1
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choices of sourcing strategies, we analyse the effect of trade openness on sourcing choices. On
the other hand, the analysis is at the country and industry level: despite the important role of
productivity heterogeneity in the global sourcing model, such a role is limited here. But it is
fully exploited at the firm-level analysis (forthcoming).
The results of the empirical analysis show, first, that the changes in the production or-
ganization in transition economies are significantly affected by contractual frictions but the
main forces have contrasting, even opposite, effects, with technological (institutional) inten-
sity increasing (diminishing) the relative prevalence of vertical integration. These results are
consistent with vertical integration in industries that intensively use headquarter inputs (tech-
nological intensity) produced by the firms because it allows those firms to partially control the
customized intermediate input sourcing (Nunn and Trefler, 2008). They are also consistent
with empirical evidence, drawing a connection between weaker institutions and higher verti-
cal integration (Acemoglu et al., 2009; Du et al., 2012; Fan et al., 2014). But these results
also embody a major message: cross-country differences in contractibility matters, and matters
differently, as shown by differential impacts on EU versus non-EU transition countries.
Second, the results show that increasing openness to trade positively affected the incidence
of integration choices in transition countries, and this happens on both sides, imports and ex-
ports. The import (export) side shows that the more options there are in the procurement
strategy (market diversification strategy) the more increase (decrease) the incidence of inte-
gration. This result is not in line with the theoretical predictions of the literature, as what
is usually expected is a diminishing incidence of vertical integration, due to increasing trade
participation (McLaren, 2000).
One concluding comment is in order. Usually, more options in sourcing strategies, caused by
greater openness, reduces opportunism problems, makes a more efficient organization form pos-
sible, and makes virtual arm’s-length arrangements more attractive which are unambiguously
efficiency enhancing. They provide an avenue for the efficiency benefits of open trade which are
completely separate from the traditionally understood avenues of increased specialization and
competition. But in the case of transition countries, we find that greater openness is associated
with a substantial increase in integrated organizational forms. Globalization in these countries
seems to have enhanced rather than weakened the historical tendency towards excessive verti-
cal integration or integrated procurement. Hence, the theoretically predicted efficiency benefits
haven’t been grasped.
In transition economies, the role of the contractual and legal environment, and the changes
in industrial structure and of the internal organization of firms on a global scale, surely needs
further investigation. At least because, from a macroeconomic perspective, contractual imper-
fections impact economic growth and the comparative advantage of these virtually new players
in the international arena.
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Chapter 3
REDEFINING FIRM BOUNDARIES
IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES.
FIRM-LEVEL ANALYSIS
3.1 Introduction
The performance of firms is largely determined by how firms are organized (Antra`s and
Rossi-Hansberg, 2009). While the decision of firm boundaries is one of the key organizational
decisions, it is rarely analysed empirically at the firm level. Even less is known about the firm
boundaries in emerging and transition countries.
The group of transition countries is a highly specific group of countries sharing a common
economic history of transition from planned to market economy. They are often characterized by
a historical tendency towards excessive vertical integration and locked-in nature of production.
Although transition countries have experienced massive privatization and market reforms (Roaf
et al., 2014), there is little evidence on whether such reforms changed the locked-in nature of
production and whether they helped firms to be more efficient in redefining their boundaries.
Recent literature proposes two main factors connected with optimal redefinition of firm
boundaries in advanced countries. On the one hand, the connection of technological complexity
with firm boundaries has been long argued (Lafontaine and Slade, 2007). However, there is
no evidence of the existence (and the strength) of technological influence on firm boundaries
for emerging economies like the ones of transition countries. On the other hand, low quality
of contracting institutions is often argued to be connected with higher incidence of integration
(Nunn and Trefler, 2008). The literature on integration that focuses on developed countries
with comparatively high quality of contracting institutions advocates integration as the more
efficient way of firm organization (Conconi et al., 2012). However, difficulties of enforcing
the contracts make it riskier for firms to rely on market procurement. Such conditions may
alter the decision-making on firm boundaries and result in more integrated and rigid firms,
especially in some transition countries characterized by a particular history of sourcing rigidity.
Thus, it is important to understand how the weakness of contracting institutions influences
firm organization, in particular in redefining firm boundaries in a new environment created by
the reforms promoted in transition countries.
This chapter deepen the understanding of firm organization in transition countries. The
analysis focuses on the evaluation of possible links between the decision to redefine firm bound-
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aries and the features of both the firm itself and its environment. In particular, the analysis is
made on the connection between technological and institutional factors, and firm boundaries.
By applying the theoretical predictions of Antra`s and Helpman (2008) model from incomplete
contracting theory, this chapter identifies possible impacts of technological and institutional
determinants on firms’ organizational forms, specifically on vertical integration. To the best
of my knowledge, there are no firm-level studies that evaluate the influence of contracting in-
stitutions on firm boundaries for emerging economies like the economy of transition countries.
Therefore, little is known about the drivers of organizational decisions in a group of countries
representing more than 5% of the total world market, with a high potential for growth.
I use EBRD–World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS)
of the year 2005 to test the link between technology intensity and contracting institutions, and
the firm-level decision to redefine firm boundaries. Two types of empirical decision models are
considered. The first model follow the Antra`s and Helpman (2008) idea on the choice between
integration and non-integration. I develop a second model considering a two-staged decision
process. In the developed two-staged model, the first stage represents the decision of a firm
to change its boundaries, and the second stage represents the decision of a particular type of
firm boundary change, namely integration, outsourcing or both. Such model allows the ap-
plication of a systematic approach to understand the redefinition of firm boundaries and the
changes of industrial organization in transition countries in 2005. The differences between two
groups of transition countries, i.e. EU and non-EU, are investigated and specificity of firm-level
decision-making in two groups are identified.
The results indicate that technological and institutional forces have contrasting, even oppo-
site, effect on integration decisions. Quantitative differences between EU and non-EU transition
countries are found, showing heterogeneous adjustments in these countries. By applying the
two-stage decision model this chapter also shows that these forces significantly affect the deci-
sion to redefine firm boundaries. Findings highlight the importance of taking into consideration
the multiple possibilities each firm faces when considering redefining its boundaries. Moreover,
the results underline the role of firm-level heterogeneity, in terms of labour productivity, in firm
boundaries redefinition.
The rest of this chapter consists of five sections. In Section 3.2 I discuss the literature related
to the choice of firm boundary and state the main hypotheses to test. Section 3.3 presents the
data, explains the main variables and describes the empirical approach. Section 3.4 discuss the
results of the empirical analysis made. Section 3.5 summarize main findings and implications.
3.2 Related Literature and Empirical Hypotheses
Among the theory of property rights multiple models have been developed to explain the
decisions on firm boundaries (Antra`s, 2014). Some of the most recent works have given a
new perspective to this issue and the influence of complexity and relationship-specificity. In
these models a decision of firm boundaries is connected with the impossibility to write fully
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enforceable (complete) contracts in order to source intermediate inputs required for a firm
production.
It was often assumed that suppliers are required to bear relationship-specific investments
(Grossman and Helpman, 2002; McLaren, 2000) as intermediate inputs should respect the
specification of a sourcing firm (client). Thus, suppliers’ production should be adjusted to the
needs of the sourcing firm. However, most recent models proposed the relationship-specific
investments being shared between a supplier and a sourcing firm (Antra`s, 2003; Antra`s and
Helpman, 2004, 2008). Such investment-sharing is supposed to enhance the value of final-good
sales. However, as contracts are not fully enforceable (incomplete) the investment-sharing is not
fully contractible as well. This fact creates vulnerability for both sides, suppliers and sourcing
firms. Sourcing firms provide a share of investment, but may not enforce fully the exact quality
of supplied inputs. Suppliers have to adjust their production and have no alternative clients
to whom to sell such a relationship-specific input. Such relationship-specificity merged with
contract incompleteness creates the hold-up problem and leads to to the sub-optimal level of
investments by both sides of the relationship (under-investment).
As sourcing firms are aware of the possibility of under-investment they may prefer to inte-
grate with their suppliers and take the production of intermediate inputs fully under control.
As a result, firms may prefer to extend their boundaries in order to guarantee the supply of
intermediate goods. For a supplier integration means voluntary transfer of the residual rights
of control with the expectation of being compensated by the provision of a certain percentage
of profits.
In particular, the study by Antra`s (2003) introduces the setting described above in the
international trade model by incorporating the decisions on vertical integration in the analysis
of international sourcing of intermediate inputs. The model shows that a firm defines the
organizational form of its sourcing (integration versus arm’s length trade) depending on its
bargaining position, which is determined by the share of capital investments in the relationship
(capital-intensity). The Antra`s (2003) model, thus, attributes the choice of vertical integration
to the higher specificity of production connected with its higher technological complexity and
higher fragmentation. The same reasoning is used in the Antra`s and Helpman (2004) and
Antra`s and Helpman (2008) models 1 with respect to the technological complexity.
Several empirical checks have drawn supporting evidence for the link between technology
complexity and intra-firm trade suggested in Antra`s and Helpman (2008) model. They have
mostly confirmed predicted connection between the industrial shares of intra-firm trade and
capital-intensity (technology complexity) in the international trade. In particular, Nunn and
Trefler (2008) tested the model at the industry level by using the US intra-firm data on import-
ing. They found that industry capital-intensity significantly affects the volume of intra-firm
trade associated with vertical integration. The analysis presented in Chapter 2 also draw sim-
ilar conclusions basing on the industry-level data. However, to the best of my knowledge, no
1Antra`s (2003) model have been enriched by the productivity influence in the Antra`s and Helpman (2004)
and institutional factors in Antra`s and Helpman (2008). The modelling of the connection between the technology
complexity and intra-firm trade is unchanged in all three of the models.
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firm-level tests of the capital-intensity influence on integration decisions have been made yet.
Moreover, most of the empirical checks previously discussed are based on the data for
multi-national corporations (MNC) and international intra-firm trade (integration abroad),
while domestic integration is rarely discussed. The empirical test of this chapter is not limited
to the decisions of MNC on vertical integration made abroad, but will consider the integration
decisions of different firms located in a particular country.
In order to fill in such gaps this study aims at testing the following hypothesis.
H 3.1 Higher capital investments (capital-intensity) of a firm are associated with higher prob-
ability to integrate the production of intermediate inputs previously made by an independent
supplier.
The hypothesis follows from the Proposition 3 of the Antra`s and Helpman (2008) paper
where headquarter-intensity higher than a certain cut-off value have been associated with higher
profits of firms that choose integration. Following the approach used for the empirical appli-
cation of the model in Antra`s (2003) capital-intensity as a proxy for headquarter-intensity is
used. In fact, in the empirical part of the Antra`s (2003) study the authors tested the hypothesis
stating that the share of intra-firm trade is higher, the higher is the capital intensity of the
industry. The author argues that when data is disaggregated in industries based on the crite-
rion other than technology or preferences, the model can be shown to predict smooth positive
association between recorded share of intra-firm trade and recorded capital-intensity. Thus, he
both proxied the headquarter-intensity by capital-intensity and eased the cut-off assumption.
Applied empirical approach allows measuring probability to integrate directly without the need
to measure it through intra-firm trade. Consequently, the hypothesis is formulated in a sim-
ilar to Antra`s (2003) way, substituting the share of intra-firm imports by the probability to
integrate.
The analysis of the connection between capital-intensity and vertical integration would
show whether firm-level integration decisions in transition countries are driven by a higher
relationship-specificity of investments and technology complexity (capital-intensity). Support-
ing evidence for this hypothesis would demonstrate that, with a higher fragmentation of firms’
production and a higher technological advancement in transition countries, the tendency for
integration and enlargement of the firm boundaries will naturally rise. This also means that
more production groups and big corporations will be formed in the industries with a higher
capital-intensity.
Antra`s and Helpman (2008) shows that the technological complexity and relationship-
specificity are not the only factors driving the integration decisions. Different degrees of con-
tractual frictions are introduced, where variations in the quality of contracting institutions
trigger the prevalence of particular organizational and location choices of sourcing. In par-
ticular, better contracting institutions in one country can increase the attractiveness of arm’s
length trade, but decreases the share of integration. Such conclusions are supported by several
empirical studies, which have shown that lower quality of contracting institutions is negatively
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associated with vertical integration (Du et al., 2012; Nunn and Trefler, 2008). Consequently,
there are two principal counteractive forces that drive vertical integration: capital intensity (or
technology complexity) and quality of contracting institutions.
As discussed in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, the quality of contracting institutions in tran-
sition countries is connected with the levels of trust between firms. In particular, contracting
institutions and contract enforcement rely on efficiency of courts and legal systems. In order to
analyse the influence of the quality of contracting institutions, the following hypothesis, where
the connection between contract enforcement and trust is central, is tested.
H 3.2 Higher trust between firms decreases the attractiveness of vertical integration and lower
the propensity of firms to integrate the production of an input that previously was made by an
independent supplier.
This hypothesis results from two studies. It follows the Antra`s and Helpman (2008) predic-
tion stating that the share of integration is declining with increasing enforceability of contracts
and, thus, higher quality of contracting institutions.2 It further bases on the link established
by Raiser et al. (2008) between the higher quality of contracting institutions and higher trust
(lower distrust) between firms. As a result, it is expected that higher trust between firms is
positively connected with the incidence of integration decisions.
This hypothesis underlines the importance of facilitating the trust formation between firms
and improving the quality of contractual institutions in transition countries. Better contracting
institutions and contractual enforcement would thus allow transition countries to avoid excessive
vertical integration and inefficiencies in the organization of input supply.
The analysis of sourcing decisions would not be complete without the analysis of the influ-
ence of firm productivity on the sorting into different organizational modes of sourcing. The
Antra`s and Helpman (2004) work is the first work in the stream of property-rights literature
that connects both integration decisions and decisions on the location of sourcing (whether to
source domestically or internationally) with the productivity. The Antra`s and Helpman (2008)
model applies the same framework regarding the productivity influence and connects positively
productivity and incidence of integration decisions in the presence of differences in contract
enforcement.
By assuming that the fixed costs of outsourcing are lower than the fixed costs of integration,
the model illustrates that in the sectors with a higher capital-intensity, outsourcing is optimal
only for low productivity firms. However, the study also highlight that in the industries with
lower capital-intensity all firms opt for outdourcing regardless their productivity. Proposition
4 of the Antra`s and Helpman (2008) study states that there exists a productivity cut-off θO,
such that in an industry with capital-intensity νh > νhc all firms with productivity greater than
θO integrate and firms with productivity less than θO outsource.
In the data where the disaggregation into industries is based not on the criterion of technol-
ogy or preferences, one can observe the industries characterized by capital-intensity higher than
2More in detail the connection is discussed in Chapter 2
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Figure 3.1: Productivity Sorting
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Note: The figure is based on the graphs presented in Antra`s and Helpman (2008) and Nunn and Trefler (2008)
the cut-off νhc being aggregated together with the industries characterized by capital-intensity
lower than the cut-off νhc. Thus, the share of integration will be dependent both on the capital-
intensity and the productivity. In particular, firms with the same productivity may opt for
integration or outsourcing, depending on the level of capital-intensity. However, as in the cases
of industries with νh < νhc with the increase of productivity the probability of integration does
not change, the connection between productivity and integration will depend on the increase in
integration in industries with higher capital-intensity (νh > νhc). The connection is illustrated
on Graph ...
As a result a higher integration is expected in mixed industries if the share of firms with
capital intensity νh > νhc is big enough to have at least some firms with the productivity higher
than the productivity cut-off θO.
In order to understand whether the positive connection between productivity and propensity
to integrate exists in transition countries, the following hypothesis is tested.
H 3.3 More productive firms with higher capital-intensity tend to choose integration more of-
ten and firms with low capital-intensity do not integrate. If there is at least one firm in the
industry with capital-intensity and labour productivity high enough to integrate, higher firm-level
productivity is positively correlated with the propensity of a firm to integrate.
This hypothesis results from the Proposition 4 of the Antra`s and Helpman (2008) study.
The same approach that was used for the hypothesis H3.1 formulation is applied. The stark
assumption of the Antra`s and Helpman (2008) regarding the existence of productivity cut-off
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θO is smoothed and transformed into a continuous positive connection between productivity
and probability to integrate. The hypothesis is based on the theoretical prediction that the
integrating firms are more productive ex-ante, but test in this chapter is mainly intended to
examine the existence of the positive correlation between integration and firm-level productivity
and does not examine the causality link. However, as more productive firms are expected to
choose the integration more often, this hypothesis also underlines that the heterogeneity in
firm-level productivity plays a role in the firm boundary decisions.3
An attempt to test the hypothesis of productivity influence on the boundary decision at
the the firm-level has been done by Kohler and Smolka (2011) study, which was able to test
the existence of the productivity premia for 4 choices of sourcing strategies in both organi-
zational (integration versus non-integration) and location dimensions (home versus abroad).
The authors of the study underline the importance of ex-ante productivity for the choice of
firm boundaries, thus, supporting causal link between higher firm productivity and the choice
of integration.4 By using a modified theoretical model and empirical analysis, Defever and
Toubal (2013) show that most productive multinationals are more likely to trade through an
independent, rather than integrated, supplier, especially if they use relationship-specific inputs
intensively.
Considering such a contrasting empirical evidence of organizational choices in international
trade, the focus is on on the decisions to integrate regardless the location of the supplier.
Additional evidence is drawn on the connection between productivity and firm boundaries by
testing the hypothesis H3.3 for transition countries.
Although the literature stimulated by the Antra`s (2003), Antra`s and Helpman (2004), and
Antra`s and Helpman (2008) studies has contributed extensively to the understanding of firm
interactions with its suppliers in the context of internationalization, the ability of theory to
predict firm real-life decisions may be yet far from perfect. There are several discrepancies
between a typical theoretical approach and its empirical testing. Most of the property-rights
theory analyses the choice between firm-boundaries decisions basing on the firm-level bargaining
that occur immediately after the decision to produce was made but before production actually
starts. In the reality, however, most of the observed integration decisions are taken by firms that
already exist and produce for a long time. For such firms the integration decision represents
a change of their existing organization of production. Such organizational change (change of
firm boundaries) may face significantly higher resistance when the firm production has already
started and some relationships with suppliers are already established. In fact, there may exist
a high level of structural inertia towards the firm boundaries change. In the countries when
such inertia is high enough, not accounting for it may bias significantly empirical modelling of
firm boundary decision. In order to test, whether the firms that are able to change are different
from their non-changing counterparts, the following hypothesis is considered.
3The hypothesis is not considering the connection between the productivity and the location decision (domes-
tic integration vs integration abroad), but analyse the connection between the productivity and firm boundaries’
choice (integrate or non-integrate) only.
4On the basis of Spanish data Kohler and Smolka (2011) have shown that firms choosing foreign outsourcing,
domestic and foreign integration are ex-ante more productive then their domestic outsourcing counterparts.
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H 3.4 Firms changing their boundaries over-perform firms with not-changing boundaries in
terms of such performance indicators as reinvestment, productivity and participation in inter-
national trade through both imports and exports.
Such an empirical test is required in order to highlight the importance of the difference
between a theoretical approach taking into account the choice between different types of sourc-
ing (integration versus non-integration) and real-life situation when a firm faces wider range of
choices about its boundary, which includes the decision not to change the existing organization
of sourcing (existing firm boundaries). Ignoring the possibility of a firm to keep its boundaries
fixed (lack of firm ability to change) may result in the theoretical approach being unable to
explain persistence of inefficient firm organization (sourcing organization) in such countries as
transition countries.
Another characteristic of the boundary decisions in modern firms, is driven by firms being
multiproduct (Fontagne´ et al., 2016) and, thus, multi-activity. Firm production organization is
organized through the chain of multiple activities aimed to result in the production of multiple
products. Rare firms focus on a single activity or a task. Thus, a firm may decide to integrate
or outsource more than one activity at a time, or to outsource one and integrate another. To
analayse empirically integration decisions on such a close to real-life and disaggregated level,
the data on firm-product or firm-activity level is required. In the absence of such data even for
a large part of developed countries, my analysis has to be based on the level of firm assuming
that all the changes of firm boundaries are connected with firm characteristics and its total
firm-level performance in terms of capital, productivity and trust.
3.3 Firm-level Data and Empirical Strategy
3.3.1 Firms’ Decision Options
The data used are the data of the third round of the Business Environment and Enterprise
Survey (BEEPS) organized by European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
and World Bank in 2005. The survey includes information on 8378 firms in 23 transition
countries and 2 comparative countries. For the analysis only information on 7454 firms is used
for transition countries; 2705 firms are in countries that at the date of interview were a part of
the European Union, and 4749 in the rest of transition countries. The dataset includes firms in
5 activity sectors, namely construction, manufacturing, transport storage and communication,
wholesale and retail trade, real estate, renting and business services, and other services. The
data on mining and quarrying are excluded from the dataset due to the high specificity of this
sector.
The dataset is quite unique as it allows analyzing the changes of firm boundaries in transition
countries based on the direct questions of the survey. the analysis is based on the answers (“Yes”
or “No”) of firm representatives on two questions regarding the initiatives undertaken by a firm
over the 36 months previous to the interview (2002-2005). First question shows whether a
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firm outsourced a major production activity/service that was previously conducted in-house
(integrated). Second shows whether a firm brought in-house (integrated) a major production
activity/service that was previously outsourced. As a result a firm had four main options
regarding the changes of its boundaries: not to change its boundaries, integrate, outsource or
both (integrate and outsource).
As illustrated in the Table 3.1, firms in the dataset change their boundaries not often.
Only slightly more than 14% of firms changed their boundaries through integrating of major
activities (that previously had been outsources) or outsourcing of major activities. Only 6.2%
of firms outsourced, 6% integrated and 2.3% both integrated and outsourced a major activity
in the three years previous to the interview. It shows that the propensity of firms to integrate
is almost equal to the propensity to outsource.
Table 3.1: Options of firms regarding their boundaries
Boundary change All countries EU TC Non-EU TC
Freq % Freq % Freq %
No change 6371 85.5 3195 88.04 3944 83.05
Integration 446 6.0 158 4.35 341 7.18
Outsourcing 463 6.2 198 5.46 335 7.05
Outsourcing and integration 174 2.3 78 2.15 129 2.72
Total 7454 100.0 3629 100.0 4749 100.0
Source: Own calculations based on the BEEPS (2005)
3.3.2 Main Exogenous Variables
The data allows capital intensity to be measured for each firm. The survey contain the
questions on both the estimated replacement value of the physical production assets at the end
of previous year and the value of new capital investments (spending on new buildings, machinery
and equipment) during the previous year. Capital-intensity of production may be evaluated
using both of these pieces of information. The choice is to perform the regression analysis by
using the measure of capital-intensity based on the value of new capital investments. At the
firm-level it both respects more the Antra`s model’s assumption of the investment-sharing and
reflect the most recent needs of production.5 Consequently, the measure of capital-intensity
used is calculated as the spending on new buildings, machinery and equipment divided by the
total number of full time permanent employees.6
5The aggregated version of this measure was used in the previous chapter as a robustness check. This
highlighted that investment-based measure of capital-intensity reflects most recent production needs in capital,
rather than its accumulated value of total physical assets.
6Summary statistics is presented for capital-intensity measured as replacement value per employee for com-
parison (see tables C.1 and C.2)
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The data also allows measuring trust of the relationship between a firm and its suppliers.
I assume that a firm has trusting relationship with its supplier if it is not required to prepay
any of its inputs.7
Labour productivity is also estimated for each firm by using the data on estimated total
sales from the survey. The labour productivity reflects the total sales per employee.
The data show whether, how and how intensively firms are involved in international trade.
For both imports and exports the data is similar and, for example for export, includes infor-
mation on whether a firm is exporting (export status), and what percent of the total sales
are exported either directly or indirectly (involving intermediaries). For the regression analysis
mostly the data on firm export status is used.
At last, the data includes the information on the competition environment of the main
(domestic) market of each firm as well. There are two main characteristics of the market
environment that is possible to extract from data.
First is the measure of the import competition pressure that show how important is the
competition from import for a particular firm. Each firm has been asked how important is
competition from imports in the market for the main product line or main line of services in
the domestic market of this firm. The answer represents the choice between 1 - 6 scale (1 - not
important, 5 - extremely important, 6 - these products cannot be imported). These answers are
grouped to present four dummy variables that show if the competition was not important (No
import competition pressure), slightly or fairly important (Moderate competition pressure),
highly or extremely important (High competition pressure) or the products/services analogous
the main product/service of a firm could not be imported.
Second is the measure of total level of competition on the main market, or the elasticity
of demand. The measures are taken from the answers to the following question: If you were
to raise your prices of your main product line or main line of services 10% above their current
level in the domestic market (after allowing for any inflation) which of the following would best
describe the result assuming that your competitors maintained their current prices? Each firm
was given the following four options to choose from: our customers would continue to buy from
us in the same quantities as now; our customers would continue to buy from us, but at slightly
lower quantities; customers would continue to buy from us, but at much lower quantities; many
of our customers would buy from our competitors instead. Basing on this information four
dummy variables are constructed: Not elastic demand, Slightly elastic demand, Moderately
elastic demand, and Highly elastic demand.
3.3.3 Empirical Model
In order to analyse the connections of integration decisions with capital-intensity and trust
(contracting institutions), expressed in first two hypotheses, a binary (probit) model of whether
a firm decides to integrate some activity or not is performed first. The basic specification of
this model has the following form:
7The connection between trust and prepayment is discussed in more detail in the Chapter 1
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Pr(Int = 1|x) = Φ(β0 + β1CIicj + β2Ticj + β3Expicj + β4EUc + β5Wicj + u) (3.1)
In this specification the coefficient β1 shows the connection between propensity to integrate
and capital-intensity8 (CI) of a firm i in country c and activity sector j, which allows testing
the first hypothesis (H3.1) of this chapter. The coefficient β2 shows the connection between
trust and integration of a firm i in country c and activity sector j, giving the possibility to test
the second hypothesis (H3.2).
As control variables various firm-level characteristics and country group controls are in-
cluded. The variables Expicj and EUc account for the influence of being an exporter and the
differences between transition countries that are a part of the European Union and those that
are not. The vector Wicj account for the influence of such control variables as size and age of
firms, ownership structure, including ownership concentration, stock exchange listing, whether
firms have more than one establishment, and whether the access to finance is an obstacle for a
particular firm.
The controls for different competitive environments of firms’ main markets is further added
to the vector Wicj (specification “Competition” in Table 3.3), as well as country dummies
(specification “CountryFE” in Table 3.3) .
In order to test the influence of productivity on the firm decision to integrate (hypothesis
H3.3) the measure of labour productivity9 is included to the model (specifications “Productiv-
ity” and “Productivity2”10 in Table 3.3).
Pr(Int = 1|x) = Φ(β0 + β1CIicj + β2Ticj + β3Expicj + β4LPicj + β5EUc + β6Wicj + u) (3.2)
The coefficient β4 shows the connection between labour productivity of firms and their
propensity to integrate. Positive and significant coefficient will confirm positive link between
productivity and integration.
The models are tested on the separate subsamples of transition countries (EU and non-EU)
as well. In this way I analyse if any differences in estimates exist depending on the type of a
country group.
All of these specifications test the hypotheses considering the options of firms presented in
the Figure 3.2, where one-stage decision model is considered. Figure 3.2 illustrates the choice
between integration and non-integration as in Antra`s (2003),Antra`s and Helpman (2004), and
Antra`s and Helpman (2008).
8Due to the differences between country groups (EU and non-EU transition countries), the measure of
capital-intensity is normalized by the average capital intensity in each group. Thus, the comparison of the
variation across firms represent firm higher capital-intensity with respect to the average of the country group
9The measure of productivity is normalized by the average value in each country group.
10The specification “Productivity2” also account for activity sector fixed effects.
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Figure 3.2: The decision to integrate or not
Deciding a 
Firm’s 
Boundary  
Integrate Not integrate 
However, as the description of the data shows, firms have different strategies to choose.
They are more various than just integration versus non-integration and are illustrated by the
Figure 3.3. Multinomial logit model is used to account for the decision tree shown in Figure
3.3.
Figure 3.3: The decision tree containing 4 choices
Deciding a 
Firm’s 
Boundary  
Not to change Outsource Integrate 
Outsource and 
Integrate 
This multivariate (multinomial logit) model considers 4 choices in the following way:

Y ∗1 = β1X1 + ε1, Y1 = 1(Y
∗
1 > 0)
Y ∗2 = β2X2 + ε2, Y2 = 1(Y
∗
2 > 0)
Y ∗4 = β4X4 + ε4, Y4 = 1(Y
∗
4 > 0)
Y ∗4 = β4X4 + ε4, Y4 = 1(Y
∗
4 > 0)
(3.3)
where 

ε1
ε2
ε3
ε4

 ∼ N


0
0
0
0
 ,

1 ρ12 ρ13 ρ14
ρ12 1 ρ23 ρ24
ρ13 ρ23 1 ρ34
ρ14 ρ24 ρ34 1

 (3.4)
(3.5)
The main assumption of the multinomial logit model is the Independence of Irrelevant
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Alternatives (IIA) assumption that assumes that none of the options can serve as substitutes
for a firm boundary decision. However, the choice to change firm boundaries may differs
significantly with respect to the choice not to change them. In this perspective the type of
change, i.e. integration, outsourcing or integration plus outsourcing, may serve as substitutes
with respect to the decision not to change the firm boundaries. In this case, the appropriate
decision tree is illustrated by Figure 3.4.11 It will be possible to judge whether the choices of
a particular type of firm boundaries’ change are substitutes from the coefficients of the main
independent variables. If the differences between the coefficients for the same variables in
different equations are not statistically different from zero (the influence of a variable is the
same for choosing integration versus no change and for choosing outsourcing over no change),
it is possible to conclude that the options of integration and outsourcing are substitutes with
respect to the choice of not changing firm boundaries.
Figure 3.4: The two-step decision tree
Deciding a Firm’s 
Boundary  
Not to change To change 
Outsource Integrate 
Outsource 
and Integrate 
In order to highlight the differences between firms that change their boundaries and their
counterparts that stay unchanged, fourth hypothesis (H3.4) is tested. The differences are tested
in terms of such firm characteristics as profits, reinvestment of profits in the firm development,
labour productivity and other. The Wald t-test with unequal variances is used to underline the
over-performance of firms that change their boundaries.
The next step is to test whether the decision of changing or not changing firm boundaries
represent a selection mechanism for further boundary decisions. By using probit model with
Heckman selection, it is tested whether the decision to integrate Y ∗1 is conditional on the decision
to change firm boundaries Y ∗2 .
The model assumes that Y ∗1 is observed only when Y
∗
2 equals one. Thus, the dependent
variables is adjusted in order to fit this assumption. No variability of dependent variable
(decision to integrate) is lost as the variable always equals zero if firms decide not to change
11As the focus is on the connection between main independent variables (capital-intensity, trust and produc-
tivity) and all options a firm faces, such models as nested logit do not fit the aim of this research. Moreover,
the application of such a model would require multiple assumptions on choice- and nest-specific variables. Such
assumptions would alter the results of the empirical analysis making them more assumption-specific
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their boundaries. This model is used exclusively to test possible selection mechanism, not to
evaluate the coefficients.
Y ∗1 = β1X1 + ε1, Y1 = 1(Y ∗1 > 0)Y ∗2 = β2X2 + ε2, Y2 = 1(Y ∗2 > 0) (3.6)
where [(
ε1
ε2
)]
∼ N
[(
0
0
)
,
(
1 ρ
ρ 1
)]
(3.7)
(3.8)
f(Y1, Y2) = Prob[Y1 = 1|Y2 = 1] ∗ Prob[Y2 = 1](Y1 = 1, Y2 = 1) (3.9)
= Prob[Y1 = 0|Y2 = 1] ∗ Prob[Y2 = 1](Y1 = 0, Y2 = 1) (3.10)
= Prob[Y2 = 0](Y2 = 0) (3.11)
This is one of the ways to model the two-stage decision model presented in the Figure 3.4
If the Wald test of the ρ is non-zero will be not significant, it is possible to state that the
equations are independent and the decision to integrate may be modelled separately from the
decision to change boundaries.
Proceeding in such a way a separate model is obtained for each of the two stages of the
decision tree (Figure 3.4). The first stage of the decision process (choice between changing and
staying unchanged) will be modelled by using the binary (probit) model of the specification
same as in equation 3.2. The second stage of the decision process (between the types of change
of the firm boundaries) will be modelled as the multinomial logit including three options:
integration, outsourcing and integration plus outsourcing.
Such modelling makes it possible to understand the influence of the main explanatory vari-
ables (capital-intensity, trust and labour productivity) on each stage of the decision-making
process and highlight the importance of considering the option of an existing firm not to change
its firm boundaries and modes of sourcing. To the best of my knowledge, the importance of
such firm-level perspective has not been underlined in the literature. Consequently, it is rarely
considered that the change of the intra-firm trade flows may be conditioned by the firms being
unable or unwilling to change their firm boundaries (and sourcing) even if the change would be
a more efficient strategy.
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3.4 Results
3.4.1 Country Groups’ Characteristics
The data for two groups of countries (EU and non-EU transition countries) show that firms
in these countries are significantly different (Table 3.2).
First, firms in the non-EU transition countries change their boundaries more often in EU
transition countries. Second, firms in non-EU transition countries are less labour productive
and less capital-intensive. Third, in non-EU transition countries less firms have trusting rela-
tionships with their suppliers. Moreover, if firms do not have trusting relationships, i.e. they
have to prepay their inputs, they prepay more in non-EU countries than in EU countries.
Table 3.2: Differences between EU and non-EU transition countries
All countries European Non-European Difference
mean sd mean sd mean sd
Firm integrated activity 0.083 0.276 0.055 0.229 0.099 0.299 0.044***
Firm outsourced activity 0.085 0.280 0.064 0.245 0.098 0.297 0.034***
Firm changes boundaries 0.145 0.352 0.103 0.304 0.170 0.375 0.067***
Firm chooses integration over other options 0.412 0.492 0.378 0.486 0.424 0.494 0.046
Firm chooses integration over outsourcing 0.491 0.500 0.451 0.499 0.504 0.500 0.0538
Firm chooses integration and outsourcing over integration 0.281 0.450 0.300 0.460 0.274 0.447 -0.0255
Firm chooses integration and outsourcing over outsourcing 0.273 0.446 0.260 0.440 0.278 0.449 0.0179
Labour productivity 36.68 43.04 56.69 46.96 23.90 34.76 -32.8***
Labour productivity (ln) 3.084 1.062 3.769 0.747 2.646 1.000 -1.12***
Capital-intensity 41.31 1350.3 75.15 1966.8 11.16 26.6 -63.98
Capital-intensity (ln) 2.106 1.428 2.729 1.270 1.549 1.328 -1.18***
Capital investments per worker 1.248 3.214 1.822 4.272 0.838 2.067 -0.98***
Capital-intensity as investments per worker (ln) -0.42 1.365 0.056 1.251 -0.77 1.341 -0.83***
Trust 0.541 0.498 0.611 0.488 0.501 0.500 -0.11***
Prepayment levels 0.400 0.319 0.222 0.212 0.479 0.326 0.257***
% owned by private domestic company/organisation 81.91 36.46 82.43 36.41 81.62 36.48 -0.81
% owned by private foreign company/organisation 9.09 26.62 9.25 27.2 9 26.3 -0.25
% owned by government/state 8.08 26.39 7.21 25.28 8.57 27 1.36*
% of the firm owned by the largest shareholder(s) 76.61 28.9 76.49 28.94 76.68 28.89 0.19
Export (dum) 0.271 0.444 0.330 0.470 0.237 0.425 -0.09***
Direct export (% of sales) 9.412 22.990 11.253 24.262 8.365 22.169 -2.888***
Indirect export (% of sales) 1.389 8.519 1.497 8.399 1.328 8.587 -0.169
Import (dum) 0.544 0.498 0.544 0.498 0.544 0.498 0.0002
Direct import (% of sales) 16.602 31.569 14.735 28.782 17.680 33.027 2.945***
Indirect import (% of sales) 16.108 29.926 15.431 28.975 16.500 30.458 1.069
Similar products can not be imported 0.043 0.202 0.034 0.180 0.048 0.214 0.0145**
No import competition pressure 0.260 0.439 0.235 0.424 0.274 0.446 0.0392***
Moderate import competition pressure 0.373 0.484 0.376 0.485 0.371 0.483 -0.00533
High import competition pressure 0.324 0.468 0.354 0.478 0.306 0.461 -0.0485***
Not elastic demand 0.213 0.409 0.161 0.368 0.243 0.429 0.0816***
Slightly elastic demand 0.304 0.460 0.278 0.448 0.319 0.466 0.0409***
Moderately elastic demand 0.190 0.392 0.209 0.407 0.178 0.383 -0.0311**
Highly elastic demand 0.294 0.456 0.352 0.478 0.261 0.439 -0.0914***
Size 103 373 98 411 107 349 9
Size (ln) 3.019 1.674 2.807 1.721 3.140 1.635 0.334***
Age 16 18 17 17 16 18 -1*
Observations 7454 2705 4749
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Fourth, firms in two groups are different with respect to their involvement in international
trade. There are fewer firms that export in transition countries outside of the European Union.
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They also export less, especially directly. There is not a big difference in the number of
importers, but importing firms in non-EU transition countries have higher shares of imports.
Summing up, firms in transition countries outside of European Union are less involved in export,
but more dependent on import of intermediate inputs.
Fifth, the market environment is significantly different in two groups of countries. The
pressure from import is lower on average in non-EU transition countries. As shown in the
Table 3.2, there is smaller number of firms that report high import competition and higher
number of firms that report no import competition pressure. The elasticity of demand on main
markets of firms in two country groups is different as well. It is lower in non-EU transition
countries. More firms in non-EU countries report that they sell on not elastic or slightly elastic
demand and less firms report that they sell their products on the moderately or highly elastic
demand.
Other significant differences between country groups include size, age of firms, and the share
of state ownership.
3.4.2 Integration Decisions, Technology and Trust. One-Stage De-
cision Model
The results of the one-stage (probit) model for the choice of integration over non-integration
support three of the main hypotheses testing the following: the positive connection of the
propensity to integrate with capital-intensity (H3.1), with labour productivity(H3.3), and neg-
ative connection with the degree of trust or quality of contracting institutions (H3.2). The
results are also consistent with the results in the previous chapter of the thesis.
Fist, as illustrated in the Table 3.3, a higher capital intensity is associated with a higher
propensity of a firm to integrate as suggested by the first hypothesis (H3.1). The link is
statistically significant and is robust to the inclusion of a variety of controls and fixed effects.
Second, as proposed by the second hypothesis (H3.2), higher trust, on contrary, is con-
nected with a lower propensity to integrate. The correlation is robust to the inclusion of
different control variables. It illustrates that better contracting institutions stimulate firms to
choose non-integration over integration. The results show the existence of two counteracting
forces, namely technology complexity (proxied by capital-intensity) and quality of contracting
institution (proxied by trust between firms), that are connected with the probability of a firm
to choose integration.
Positive connection is also found between a decision to integrate and firm labour produc-
tivity, supporting the previous evidence on the higher productivity of integrating firms and
the third hypothesis (H3.3). The link is robust to the inclusion of different control variables,
including country and sector dummies.
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Table 3.3: Probit model of the choice between integration and non-integration
Specifications 1 Base Competition CountryFE Productivity(1)IndustryFE Productivity(2)
Capital-intensity (normalized) 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.014*** 0.011** 0.013*** 0.010**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Trust -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.033*** -0.028*** -0.031*** -0.026**
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Labor productivity (normalized) 0.013* 0.015**
(0.007) (0.007)
Control Variables2
Export 0.043*** 0.039*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.027** 0.025**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
EU membership -0.033*** -0.029*** -0.068*** -0.069** -0.073*** -0.076***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.026) (0.029) (0.026) (0.029)
Moderately elastic demand -0.022 -0.023* -0.033** -0.024* -0.033**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Highly elastic demand -0.027** -0.022* -0.024* -0.022* -0.024*
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Medium firms 0.021* 0.018 0.013 0.016 0.009 0.011
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Large firms 0.045*** 0.049*** 0.048*** 0.049*** 0.039** 0.039**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
Young firms -0.021 -0.022 -0.015 -0.023 -0.012 -0.019
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
Multi-establishment firms 0.034*** 0.036*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.033*** 0.033***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Finance obstacles 0.024** 0.023** 0.013 0.018* 0.010 0.014
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Firms listed on a stock exchange -0.031 -0.036 -0.033 -0.040 -0.038 -0.045
(0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033)
Ownership structure3 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector dummies No No No No Yes Yes
Likelihood -1306.86 -1246.11 -1190.97 -1070.91 -1180.54 -1060.03
Pseudo-R2 0.041 0.046 0.083 0.089 0.091 0.099
p-value(Wald) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 4174 4013 3950 3593 3950 3593
Note: ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
1 The names of specifications reflect control variables included the model. Productivity(1) includes productivity and country
fixed effects. Productivity(2) includes productivity, industry and country fixed effects.
2 The vector of control variables also included ownership concentration and the dummy variables for moderate and high competition
pressure, firms whose products has no substitutes as it cannot be imported, and not elastic demand.
With regards to the effect of control variables, several important links are observed. First,
firms that choose integration are more often exporters. This link is significant in all the speci-
fications.
Second, the competitive environment of firms’ market is an important factor for the choice
of integration. On one side, a higher import competition pressure is connected positively
with the propensity of a firm to choose integration. However, the connection is comparatively
week for the full sample. On the other side, the total competitive environment has negative
connection with the probability of integration decision. A higher level of the elasticity of
demand (competition) is associated with a lower propensity to choose integration. It shows
that on more competitive markets less integration will be chosen.
Third, the size and the structure of a firm are important factors for the decision to integrate.
Larger firms and firms with multiple establishments (opposed to small and single-establishment
firms respectively) are more prompt to integrate.
Forth, the connection between the financial constraints and the decision to integrate is taken
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into account. As the results in the Table 3.3 show, firms that report that the access to finance
is a moderate or major obstacle to their activity are more prompt to choose integration over
non-integration.
In order to account for possible differences in the decision-making process in different country
groups five out of six specifications (excluding the basis specification) are tested for each of the
subsamples, i.e. EU and non-EU transition countries (Table 3.4).
Furthermore, firms in EU transition countries are choosing integration less often. For both
of the country groups the positive link between capital intensity and decision to integrate stays
significant in majority of specification (coefficients have lower than 90% level of significance
when controlled for productivity in non-EU countries and for productivity together with fixed
effects in the EU countries). Such results mainly support the first hypothesis (H3.1) for both
of the country groups. It also indicates the possible connection between labour productivity
and capital intensity at the firm-level.
The negative link between the propensity to choose integration and trust between firms
(H2) is robust to the division into two subsamples as well. It stays significant in almost all the
specifications.
Productivity connection with the probability of the decision to integrate is, however, more
characteristic for the EU transition countries. It is robust the accounting of both country and
sector dummies. In the non-EU transition countries the connection between labour productivity
and the decision to integrate is not statistically significant, underlining the possible connection
between control variables, such as export. Such results draw supporting evidence for the third
hypothesis (H3.3) for EU transition countries, but underline the structural difference between
EU and non-EU transition countries in terms of interaction of labour productivity with other
firm characteristics.
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Table 3.4: Probit model of the choice between integration and non-integration in two country
groups
European countries Non-European countries
Specifications1 Comp. CountryFE Prod.(1) IndustryFE Prod.(2) Comp. CountryFE Prod.(1) IndustryFE Prod.(2)
Capital-intensity (normalized) 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.010* 0.014*** 0.009 0.024*** 0.009 0.010 0.011* 0.008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Trust -0.029** -0.032** -0.029** -0.031** -0.030** -0.036** -0.032** -0.032* -0.035** -0.028*
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
Labor productivity (normalized) 0.018** 0.021*** 0.003 0.003
(0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012)
Control Variables2
Export 0.028** 0.028** 0.031** 0.022* 0.023 0.048*** 0.025 0.027 0.028 0.023
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
Medium firms -0.014 -0.013 -0.013 -0.015 -0.016 0.056*** 0.035* 0.052*** 0.039** 0.045**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019)
Large firms 0.037 0.038* 0.033 0.031 0.024 0.068*** 0.057** 0.067** 0.053** 0.059**
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.026) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028)
Young firms -0.020 -0.024 -0.014 -0.020 -0.009 -0.019 -0.007 -0.029 0.001 -0.023
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.025) (0.022) (0.025)
Multi-establishment firms 0.032** 0.032** 0.031** 0.034** 0.034** 0.046*** 0.041*** 0.039** 0.040** 0.039**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
Moderate import competition pressure -0.011 -0.015 -0.015 -0.019 -0.018 0.034* 0.034 0.029 0.022 0.028
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020) (0.022)
High import competition pressure -0.018 -0.024 -0.024 -0.031* -0.029* 0.071*** 0.059*** 0.059** 0.051** 0.056**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.020) (0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.023)
Moderately elastic demand -0.005 -0.004 -0.008 -0.006 -0.009 -0.032 -0.053** -0.058** -0.036* -0.057**
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.021) (0.023)
Highly elastic demand -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.056*** -0.052*** -0.051** -0.048** -0.049**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.022)
Ownership structure Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector dummies No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
Likelihood -583.75 -576.11 -537.90 -568.59 -530.82 -665.35 -490.40 -536.28 -617.47 -532.61
Pseudo-R2 0.031 0.044 0.051 0.056 0.064 0.066 0.130 0.127 0.124 0.132
p-value(Wald) 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 2100 2100 1995 2100 1995 1944 1663 1625 1881 1625
Note: ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
1 The names of specifications reflect control variables included the model. Productivity(1) includes productivity and country
fixed effects. Productivity(2) includes productivity, industry and country fixed effects.
2 The vector of control variables also included ownership concentration and the dummy variables for moderate and high competition
pressure, firms whose products has no substitutes as it cannot be imported, and not elastic demand.
The division of the sample in two country groups allows highlighting the differences in the
integration decision-making in terms of the influence of the market environment. The influence
of import pressure has opposite effects on the probability to integrate in two country groups.
In the EU transition countries high import competition pressure is associated with a lower
propensity to take an integration decision at the firm-level, while in the non-EU transition
countries such pressure has strong positive effect. This opposite effects in two country groups
explain why no significant effect of import competitive pressure on the decision to integrate was
observed for the entire sample. The elasticity of total demand on the firms’ market is negatively
associated with the integration decision, but is significant only for non-EU transition countries.
It highlights that the import competition has the same effect as the domestic competition in EU
transition countries, but have the opposite effect in non-EU transition countries, underlining
the significant difference between domestic and foreign competition in the non-EU transition
countries. Such results also demonstrate that firm in transition countries outside of the Euro-
pean Union tend to avoid foreign competition by extending their boundaries (integration more
production activities).
Among the other control variables the size and structure of firms should be highlighted.
The connection between having multiple establishments and taking the decision to integrate
stays significant across all the specifications in both groups. The size effect tend to be more
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characteristic for the non-EU countries, as both medium and large firms are more prone to
integrate that their smaller counterparts (large more than medium).
3.4.3 Do Firms Decide to Change or to Integrate? Is Two-Stage
Decision Model Necessary?
The results described above show the forces that drive probability of choosing integration
over non-integration within and across different countries and sectors. However, previous results
do not take into account other options a firm faces when consider the changes of its boundaries.
As shown in the Section 3.3 the firm does not only choose whether to integrate or not, the
options of each firm include integration, outsourcing, doing both and doing none. The last
option is, in fact, prevailing in the population of firms in the sample.
Analysing the integration decision in the connection with other options of firm boundaries’
change and taking no change as the base outcome, all of four main hypotheses find support (see
Table 3.5). Capital intensity stays positively connected with the integration decisions, although
the significance of this link decreases when productivity is included. Trust stay negatively and
significantly connected with the propensity to choose integration. Labour productivity stays
positively and significantly connected with choosing the integration as well.
However, what is observed is the choice of integration over not changing the firm boundaries,
which is the most popular choice. It is possible to observe that both the choice of outsourcing
and the choice of outsourcing plus integration have similar connections with the main variables
of interest. It suggests that these strategies are substitutes with respect to the influence of
capital-intensity, trust and productivity when no-change is taken as the base choice of firms.
Such substitutionality of the integration and outsourcing options with respect to the choice
of keeping firm boundaries fixed are not considered in the previously discussed theoretical
models. And to the best of my knowledge, has not been underlined in the existing literature,
most probably due to the lack of firm-level data.
Testing the difference of the coefficients in different equations for main explanatory variables,
this difference is found to be not statistically different from zero. It supports the assumption
that the different types of firm boundary change, namely choosing to integrate, outsource or
do both, are substitutes with respect to the choice of not-changing the firm boundaries. This,
it is possible to suppose that such results are driven by the significant difference between the
firms that are able to change their boundaries and those that are not. In fact, the Table 3.6
show that firms that change their boundaries are significantly different from their counterparts
that keep their firm boundaries unchanged, regardless of the country group. This supports
hypothesis 3.4 on the over-performance of firms that changes their boundaries.
First of all such firms are investing much more of their profits in their development. The
difference between the share of profits that was reinvested equals to 11.5% in transition countries
of the European Union and 5.56% in transition countries outside of the European Union. This
happens, perhaps, because such firms also have higher profits on average especially if firms
with zero profits (mainly among not changing firms) are not considered. Changing firms are
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Table 3.5: Multinomial logit model of all the possible choices for the change of firm boundaries
Base outcome = No Change + Base Productivity CounryFE Productivity(2)1 Productivity(3)2
Integration
Capital-intensity (normalized) 0.028*** 0.020*** 0.015 0.010 0.008
(0.007) (0.008) (0.090) (0.074) (0.101)
Trust -0.099*** -0.100*** -0.074 -0.066 -0.059
(0.018) (0.018) (0.375) (0.599) (0.843)
Labor productivity (normalized) 0.034*** 0.033 0.038
(0.010) (0.339) (0.541)
Control Variables
Export 0.099*** 0.089*** 0.079 0.070 0.059
(0.018) (0.019) (0.369) (0.599) (0.738)
Ownership concentration -0.001** -0.001** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.008) (0.012)
High import competition pressure 0.069*** 0.068*** 0.019 0.023 0.023
(0.024) (0.025) (0.203) (0.402) (0.433)
Not elastic demand -0.019 -0.017 -0.026 -0.027 -0.027
(0.025) (0.026) (0.301) (0.533) (0.715)
Moderately elastic demand -0.068*** -0.079*** -0.059 -0.063 -0.062
(0.025) (0.026) (0.379) (0.883) (1.343)
Highly elastic demand -0.066*** -0.061*** -0.039 -0.035 -0.035
(0.022) (0.023) (0.403) (0.734) (1.065)
Outsourcing
Capital-intensity (normalized) 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.017 0.014 0.010
(0.007) (0.008) (0.028) (0.020) (0.016)
Trust -0.115*** -0.115*** -0.088 -0.080 -0.072
(0.018) (0.018) (0.166) (0.232) (0.318)
Labor productivity (normalized) 0.024** 0.036 0.045
(0.010) (0.132) (0.204)
Control Variables
Export 0.106*** 0.098*** 0.098 0.088 0.076
(0.019) (0.019) (0.171) (0.246) (0.271)
Ownership concentration -0.001** -0.001** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
Moderately elastic demand -0.063** -0.057** -0.063 -0.054 -0.053
(0.027) (0.028) (0.164) (0.375) (0.572)
Integration & Outsourcing
Capital-intensity (normalized) 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.013 0.009 0.006
(0.005) (0.006) (0.127) (0.115) (0.086)
Trust -0.090*** -0.089*** -0.060 -0.051 -0.044
(0.014) (0.014) (0.320) (0.348) (0.402)
Labor productivity (normalized) 0.020** 0.024 0.028
(0.008) (0.164) (0.251)
Control Variables
Export 0.087*** 0.082*** 0.066 0.055 0.046
(0.014) (0.015) (0.361) (0.433) (0.386)
Ownership structure Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies No No Yes Yes Yes
Sector dummies No No No No Yes
Likelihood -2506.29 -2264.31 -2355.88 -2113.78 -2084.95
Pseudo-R2 0.033 0.037 0.091 0.101 0.113
p-value(Wald) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
IC 4 4 10 11 12
N 4018 3657 4018 3657 3657
Note: ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
+ Only significant coefficients are reported. Each of the models account for ownership concentration, import competition
pressure and elasticity of demand in a way similar to previously discussed models.
1 The specification includes also country dummies
2 The specification includes country and activity dummies
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also different in terms labour productivity in both country groups. They overperform more in
terms of labour productivity in the EU countries than in the non-EU countries.
Firms that change their boundaries also are more actively involved in international trade.
They are more often both exporters and importers. They also have higher shares of both export
and import. They export around 10% more in the EU transition countries and around 6% more
in the non-EU ones with respect to their not-changing boundaries counterparts. These firms
also have higher shares of foreign ownership and their ownership structure is less concentrated.
In non-EU transition countries changing firms have also higher capital-intensity measured
using both replacement value of capital (Capital-Intensity) and new investments in physical
capital (Capital investments per worker).
The levels of trust are observed to be lower for these firms in both country groups. This
means that they are more often forced to prepay their inputs because of weak contract en-
forcement. Such lower quality of contract enforcement, perhaps, is one of the forces that drive
their necessity to change boundaries. In the non-EU transition countries they, however, have
to prepay lower share of their input purchases than their not-changing counterparts.
The firms that choose to change their firm boundaries are also bigger and older than their
counterparts.
Table 3.6: Differences of firms that change their boundaries in EU and non-EU transition
countries
European countries Non-European countries
Changing Not changing Difference Changing Not changing Difference
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
% of the total profits in 2003 invested in the firm in 2004 66.822 36.959 55.321 39.615 -11.50*** 54.916 38.468 49.356 39.856 -5.560***
Operating profits 1289.736 3421.341 586.174 2712.460 -703.6** 399.440 1449.994 307.160 1940.922 -92.28
Operating profits (ln) 5.457 1.956 4.475 1.915 -0.982*** 4.446 1.757 3.718 1.870 -0.728***
Labour productivity 68.415 58.141 55.262 45.215 -13.15*** 28.290 44.824 23.008 32.269 -5.282**
Labour productivity (ln) 3.966 0.706 3.745 0.749 -0.221*** 2.809 1.048 2.613 0.987 -0.196***
Capital-Intensity 31.249 34.643 80.906 2091.901 49.66 14.896 40.185 10.239 21.864 -4.657*
Capital-intensity 2.867 1.263 2.711 1.271 -0.156 1.691 1.411 1.513 1.304 -0.178*
Capital investments per worker 2.274 3.070 1.768 4.392 -0.506* 1.166 2.785 0.765 1.864 -0.401**
Capital-intensity as investments (ln) 0.187 1.316 0.037 1.240 -0.150 -0.620 1.377 -0.808 1.329 -0.188*
Trust 0.486 0.501 0.625 0.484 0.140*** 0.359 0.480 0.529 0.499 0.170***
Prepayment levels 0.199 0.193 0.226 0.214 0.0265 0.434 0.310 0.492 0.330 0.0582***
Size 195.076 675.383 86.475 368.297 -108.6** 173.770 542.153 93.600 293.874 -80.17***
Size (ln) 3.537 1.867 2.723 1.684 -0.814*** 3.696 1.637 3.027 1.611 -0.669***
Age 18.372 20.728 16.450 16.940 -1.921 18.685 20.762 14.962 17.741 -3.723***
Export 0.514 0.501 0.309 0.462 -0.205*** 0.393 0.489 0.205 0.404 -0.188***
Direct export (% of sales) 20.986 31.664 10.135 23.008 -10.85*** 13.326 26.102 7.353 21.138 -5.973***
Indirect export (% of sales) 3.565 12.961 1.259 7.673 -2.305** 2.244 10.272 1.141 8.190 -1.103**
Import (dum) 0.705 0.457 0.526 0.499 -0.179*** 0.688 0.464 0.515 0.500 -0.172***
Direct import (% of sales) 21.882 31.144 13.924 28.396 -7.958*** 22.332 34.895 16.726 32.554 -5.606***
Indirect import (% of sales) 14.011 25.288 15.592 29.364 1.581 18.569 30.033 16.075 30.531 -2.494*
% owned by private domestic company/organisation 74.683 42.112 83.312 35.600 8.628** 77.258 38.786 82.505 35.934 5.247***
% owned by private foreign company/organisation 15.665 34.539 8.515 26.135 -7.151*** 11.826 29.163 8.420 25.635 -3.406**
% owned by government/state 7.838 26.397 7.141 25.156 -0.698 9.761 28.391 8.329 26.698 -1.433
% of the firm owned by the largest shareholder(s) 72.549 29.144 76.944 28.888 4.395* 72.403 29.419 77.545 28.702 5.142***
Observations 278 2427 805 805
Note: ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The discussed differences between the firms that decide to change their boundaries and their
non-changing counterparts support the fourth hypothesis (H3.4) and highlight the importance
of modelling the decision to change explicitly. It further may be considered as a first stage of
choosing a particular firm boundary change.
In order to test if there is a selection mechanism into changing boundaries that condition
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the decision to integrate the probit with Heckman selection model is used. The effect of the
selection into change is tested (see Table C.3) basing on the specification equal to the one used
for the choice of integration over non-integration. However, not significant ρ estimates show
that the decision to change and the decision to integrate can be modelled separately. This
test allows moving to the analysis of two-stage decision model, that consist of two separate
equations. First equation explains the change of firm boundaries and second equation explains
the choice of integration and integration with outsourcing over outsourcing.
3.4.4 Two-Stage Decision Model
In order to model two-stage decision making of firms regarding their boundaries and the
organization of input sourcing, first model is focused on the choice to change the firm boundaries
over not changing the boundaries (the first stage of a two-staged decision tree in the Figure
3.4).
The results in the Table 3.7 show that the propensity to change firm boundaries is positively
correlated with the capital intensity of a firm, especially in non-EU transition countries. In the
EU transition countries the connection is positive, though have lower significance with country
and sector fixed effects.
The results also illustrate that trust is negatively associated with the propensity of firm to
change its boundaries. This association is statistically significant for both of country groups
and all the specifications. It indicates that the higher quality of contracting institution is
stimulating the firms to search for optimal firm organization through boundaries’ change much
less than lower quality of contracting institution.
Labour productivity is positively connected with the change in firm boundaries, but it is
significant only for the EU transition countries when the model without country and industry
fixed effects is applied.
Therefore, the results show that both technological (capital-intensity) and institutional
(trust) factors are significantly connected with the propensity of firms to change. The higher is
the technological complexity of the production and the lower is the trust between firms (stim-
ulated by low quality of contract enforcement) the more changes of the firm boundaries may
be observed. On one side the higher technological complexity of production forces a firm to
look for the optimization of its boundaries more often as the environment of the production
process requires it. On the other side, more advanced contracting institutions allow such a firm
to make the modifications of their input supply through the adjustments of both internal and
external contracts without losing their efficiency. Thus, with efficient contract enforcement the
firm is not constrained to change its boundaries in any way, which is not the case when the
contract enforcement is weak and trust between firms is low.
Regarding the control variables, export status and firm size affect significantly the decision
to change the firm boundaries.
In non-EU transition countries the link with the import competition pressure stays positive
and significant, while the link with the elasticity of main market demand is negative and sig-
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Table 3.7: The probit model of the decision to change the boundaries of a firm
European countries Non-European countries
Base Productivity Cntr*ActivityFE Base Productivity Cntr*ActivityFE
Changing Boundaries
Capital-intensity (normalized) 0.020** 0.012 0.013 0.034*** 0.024*** 0.022**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Trust -0.033* -0.041** -0.035* -0.106*** -0.087*** -0.082***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
Labor productivity (normalized) 0.024* 0.015 0.014 0.001 0.015 0.019
(0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014)
Control Variables
Export 0.045** 0.035* 0.043** 0.099*** 0.082*** 0.077***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Medium firms 0.019 0.013 0.008 0.078*** 0.072*** 0.062***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Large firms 0.102*** 0.083*** 0.075** 0.093*** 0.097*** 0.085**
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Firms listed on a stock exchange 0.076* 0.078* 0.016 0.050 0.042
(0.041) (0.041) (0.070) (0.068) (0.068)
Moderate import competition pressure -0.002 0.003 0.002 0.052** 0.031 0.031
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
High import competition pressure -0.013 0.003 0.008 0.119*** 0.081*** 0.080***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027)
Moderately elastic demand 0.007 -0.001 -0.002 -0.090*** -0.094*** -0.093***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Highly elastic demand 0.008 0.001 -0.006 -0.060** -0.048* -0.048*
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025)
Ownership structure Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Activity dummies No No Yes No No Yes
Likelihood -491.28 -460.50 -456.13 -796.18 -747.10 -743.36
Pseudo-R2 0.045 0.104 0.113 0.081 0.137 0.142
p-value(Wald) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 1359 1359 1359 1684 1684 1684
Note: ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The vector of control variables also included ownership concentration, the dummy variables for young firms, firms whose
products has no substitutes as it cannot be imported, and not elastic demand.
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nificant. This shows that in non-EU transition countries the competitive market environment
significantly affects a firm’s propensity to change its boundaries. In particular, a higher pres-
sure of domestic competition is associated with firms opting more often for not-changing their
boundaries, while pressure of foreign competition on the final market drives firms to opt for
changing their boundaries.
In order to conclude the empirical modelling, the decision of the types of the boundary
change is analyzed (the second stage of the two-staged decision tree in the Figure 3.4, conditional
on the choice of changing the firm boundaries).
As the results in the Table 3.8 show, there is a positive link between the choice of inte-
gration over outsourcing and labour productivity. Such results support hypothesis H3.3. The
connection is positive and significant only if no country and sector dummies are included. This
may be caused by a significantly reduced sample size.
The results also show that there is a significant and negative connection between choosing
integration over outsourcing as a firm boundary change. Moreover, positive link is observed
between the trust measure and the propensity to choose integration over outsourcing. These
results are opposite to the predictions of property-rights theory.12
Such results may be caused by the structural differences of the firms in analysed countries
or the data limitations. Due to the data constraints it is not feasible to control for multiple
characteristics of a particular activity that is integrated or outsourced. Nevertheless, the re-
sults underline that the firms with higher technological complexity (capital-intensity) tend to
opt for outsourcing not integration as well as firms experiencing lower quality of contractual
enforcement (trust between firms). This shows that the boundary decisions in transition coun-
tries should be receive more attention so that the reasons for such structural differences in the
decision-making are understood.
The results, however, do not contradict directly the Antra`s models as the theoretical frame-
work applied in these models does not account for the possibility of choosing between changing
and not changing the firm boundaries. The models include only the choice between a choice of
a particular type of sourcing which define a firm boundary of a new-born firm. In practice the
models assume a firm that decides between internal sourcing (integration) and external sourc-
ing (non-integration or arm’s length trade) for each of its input before it enters the market or
on a continuous basis before starting to produce new products.
12Another theoretical model, however, may shed more light on the positive connection between integration
and higher trust between domestic sourcing firm and suppliers. The Conconi et al. (2012) model if adjusted for
different degrees of contractibility may explain why managers of firms may choose to integrate more when the
contracting institutions are better. By the assumptions of the model if different degrees of contractibility (due
to higher or lower quality of contracting institutions) are possible the compensation of the HQ manager will
grow with the quality of contracting institutions and, thus, it will be more prompt to integrate (no changes of
prices assumed). However, such modification of the model has not been elaborated fully in the literature and is
not the scope of this chapter.
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Table 3.8: Multinomial logit model with three choices of firm boundaries’ changes
Base outcome = Outsourcing Base Productivity CounryFE ActivityFE
Inetgration
Capital-intensity (normalized) -0.006 -0.046** -0.058 -0.061**
(0.017) (0.021) (0.170) (0.027)
Trust 0.117*** 0.132*** 0.104 0.114*
(0.045) (0.048) (0.206) (0.059)
Labor productivity (normalized) 0.085*** 0.024 0.009
(0.028) (0.192) (0.042)
Control Variables
Export -0.028 -0.033 -0.006 -0.030
(0.046) (0.049) (0.125) (0.061)
Young firms -0.116* -0.112* -0.166 -0.160*
(0.063) (0.068) (0.292) (0.082)
Firms listed on a stock exchange -0.143 -0.142 -0.405 -0.431**
(0.120) (0.123) (1.858) (0.168)
High import competition pressure 0.123** 0.121* 0.063 0.026
(0.061) (0.065) (0.126) (0.083)
Not elastic demand -0.106* -0.122** -0.067 -0.037
(0.059) (0.062) (0.479) (0.075)
Highly elastic demand -0.098* -0.116* -0.109 -0.078
(0.057) (0.060) (0.222) (0.076)
Inetgration & Outsourcing
Capital-intensity (normalized) 0.028** 0.041*** 0.010 0.008**
(0.012) (0.013) (0.534) (0.003)
Trust -0.041 -0.042 -0.013 -0.008
(0.031) (0.032) (0.679) (0.007)
Labor productivity (normalized) -0.029 -0.009 -0.008
(0.170) (0.482) (0.006)
Control Variables
Young firms 0.042 0.028 0.007 0.009
(0.040) (0.042) (0.387) (0.009)
Firms listed on a stock exchange -0.042 -0.110 -0.037 -0.028
(0.096) (0.116) (2.037) (0.021)
High import competition pressure -0.058 -0.068* -0.006 -0.008
(0.038) (0.039) (0.323) (0.010)
Not elastic demand 0.052 0.042 0.023 0.016*
(0.039) (0.040) (1.232) (0.009)
Highly elastic demand 0.032 0.018 0.003 -0.000
(0.039) (0.039) (0.169) (0.010)
Ownership structure Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies No No Yes Yes
Sector dummies No No No Yes
Likelihood -572.67 -499.24 -429.48 -414.10
Pseudo-R2 0.035 0.051 0.184 0.213
p-value(Wald) 0.119 0.015 0.000 0.000
N 589 525 525 525
Note: ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The set of control variables includes also the export-status, size dummies, finance obstacle measure, controls for moderate
import competitive pressure and moderately elastic demand.
The table shows that firms rarely change the firm boundaries in order to adjust the orga-
nization of their input sourcing that means that the boundaries of a firm is rarely changed in
transition countries. Such a feature of the boundary decision-making require much more atten-
tion from both theoretical and empirical point of view as the firms that change their boundaries
are also found to be better performing firms. Consequently, the rigidity of firm boundaries is
highly important to take into account especially in (but not limited to) transition countries.
The results on two subsamples (Table 3.9) show that capital-intensity keeps to be connected
negatively and significantly in the subsample of the EU transition countries. The trust is
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positively and significantly connected with the choice of integration versus outsourcing in the
non-EU transition countries. The labour productivity is (positively and significantly) connected
with the integration decision in the non-EU transition countries. These results appear not to
be robust to the different specification. It demonstrates that the model efficiency is limited
by the small sample of firms in each of the country groups. Dividing in the sample into two
groups the sample size shrinks, especially for the EU group. Thus, considering the complexity
of the empirical models, the robustness of the results is decreasing, especially when country and
activity dummies are introduced. However, the results indicate, that while in EU group the
capital intensity has a more significant role; in the non-EU group the weakness of contracting
institutions (lower trust) has a stronger role.
Results regarding the choice of doing both integration and outsourcing should also be men-
tioned. These results show that firms that choose a joint strategy of both integrating and
outsourcing are more capital-intensive, especially in EU transition countries. It indicates that
the boundary decisions should be analysed at more disaggregated level, such as level of trans-
actions or tasks. However, since little of such disaggregated data is available for the research
purposes, and even less for transition countries, for the empirical analysis of boundary decisions
at the firm-level the multiplicity of combinations of boundaries’ change should be taken into
account both in empirical and theoretical studies.
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Table 3.9: Multinomial logit model of the type of the change of firm boundaries in two country
groups
European countries Non-European countries
Base Productivity CounryFE ActivityFE Base Productivity CounryFE ActivityFE
Base Outcome = Outsourcing
Integration
Capital-intensity (normalized) -0.066** -0.097** -0.108** -0.063 0.021 -0.021 -0.041 -0.046
(0.034) (0.039) (0.046) (0.050) (0.022) (0.025) (0.185) (0.034)
Trust 0.026 0.065 0.118 0.103 0.157*** 0.154** 0.117 0.120
(0.084) (0.091) (0.102) (0.119) (0.056) (0.062) (0.504) (0.075)
Labor productivity (normalized) 0.029 0.068 -0.012 0.099*** 0.018 0.011
(0.064) (0.080) (0.095) (0.035) (0.129) (0.049)
Control Variables
Medium firms -0.079 -0.142 -0.136 -0.304** 0.009 0.054 0.053 0.041
(0.105) (0.113) (0.127) (0.137) (0.063) (0.070) (0.358) (0.082)
Large firms -0.160 -0.208 -0.249 -0.418** 0.082 0.070 0.000 -0.002
(0.132) (0.141) (0.168) (0.208) (0.091) (0.099) (0.125) (0.125)
Young firms -0.157 -0.166 -0.228 -0.266 -0.120 -0.127 -0.164 -0.181*
(0.124) (0.129) (0.167) (0.207) (0.078) (0.089) (0.741) (0.098)
Firms listed on a stock exchange -0.509* -0.553* -0.714** -0.702*** 0.057 0.400** -0.226 -0.274
(0.269) (0.296) (0.320) (0.259) (0.166) (0.173) (8.133) (0.251)
High import competition pressure 0.125 0.184 0.027 -0.232 0.135* 0.107 0.090 0.081
(0.109) (0.119) (0.148) (0.176) (0.077) (0.085) (0.387) (0.099)
Similar products can not be imported -0.340 -0.356 -0.585 -0.566* 0.706*** 0.611*** 0.153 0.203
(0.270) (0.267) (0.372) (0.317) (0.185) (0.199) (8.188) (0.226)
Not elastic demand -0.091 -0.161 -0.336* -0.010 -0.106 -0.118 -0.052 -0.039
(0.140) (0.153) (0.203) (0.243) (0.069) (0.072) (0.233) (0.083)
Moderately elastic demand -0.154 -0.252* -0.149 -0.011 0.011 -0.077 -0.023 -0.025
(0.119) (0.130) (0.142) (0.170) (0.079) (0.093) (0.217) (0.109)
Outsourcing & Integration
Capital-intensity (normalized) 0.052** 0.061** 0.042 0.016** 0.018 0.019* 0.002 0.001
(0.021) (0.024) (0.026) (0.007) (0.012) (0.010) (0.259) (0.001)
Trust -0.062 -0.089 -0.104** -0.027* -0.031 -0.008 0.000 0.000
(0.055) (0.055) (0.053) (0.016) (0.030) (0.024) (0.031) (0.002)
Labor productivity (normalized) -0.009 -0.015 -0.012 -0.013 -0.002 -0.002
(0.037) (0.035) (0.010) (0.011) (0.255) (0.001)
Control Variables
Finance obstacles 0.065 0.079 0.091* 0.018 -0.002 -0.009 -0.002 -0.002
(0.060) (0.058) (0.055) (0.014) (0.029) (0.023) (0.313) (0.002)
Firms listed on a stock exchange 0.025 0.038 0.030 -0.023 -0.031 -0.886*** -0.108 -0.076***
(0.124) (0.111) (0.132) (0.022) (0.113) (0.142) (17.694) (0.015)
Similar products can not be imported 0.029 0.076 0.111 0.001 -1.264*** -0.937*** -0.116 -0.082***
(0.156) (0.138) (0.145) (0.030) (0.170) (0.145) (18.556) (0.014)
Not elastic demand 0.239*** 0.235*** 0.333*** 0.089*** 0.009 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.086) (0.085) (0.096) (0.029) (0.035) (0.028) (0.119) (0.002)
Ownership structure Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Sector dummies No No No Yes No No No Yes
Likelihood -169.19 -149.49 -126.19 -107.77 -385.12 -329.37 -284.54 -278.91
Pseudo-R2 0.103 0.138 0.272 0.378 0.048 0.066 0.193 0.209
p-value(Wald) 0.095 0.038 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 184 171 171 171 405 354 354 354
Note: ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The set of control variables includes also the export-status, size and age dummies, finance obstacle measure, controls for
moderate import competitive pressure and moderately elastic demand.
To conclude, the differences between firms that choose integration over outsourcing are
evaluated (Table C.4). The results illustrate that firms that chooses integration over outsourcing
are over-performing their counterparts that chooses outsourcing both in terms of profits (and
profit reinvestment) and labour productivity in the non-EU transition countries.
3.5 Conclusions
Multiple theoretical studies try to model macroeconomic predictions basing on the the-
oretical modelling of production function, however, most of these studies tend to treat the
production process as a black box. In practice, the production is determined by how and what
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kind of organization decisions are made by firms.
In this chapter the links between the decisions to redefine firm boundaries and technological
and institutional determinants are uncovered. Such decisions are one of the key decisions that
define firm organization, and are particularly relevant for the changes of industrial structure
in transition countries. This chapter highlights, however, that there are significant differences
between transition countries within and outside of the European Union.
By using a single-stage empirical model I analyse the choice of integration over non-integration
as a way to redefine the boundaries of a firm in 23 transition countries. I find that institu-
tional and technological factors play a role in taking integration decisions of firms in transition
countries. In particular, a higher technological complexity (capital-intensity) is positively con-
nected with a higher probability of choosing integration as a way to redefine firm boundaries.
On the contrary, weakness of contracting institutions, acting through the low trust between
firms, increases the probability of firms to opt for integration in redefining their boundaries.
Such results are in line with the prediction of the property-rights approach and, in particular,
Antra`s and Helpman (2008) model. They are also in line with previous empirical studies on
more advanced countries (Nunn and Trefler, 2008; Antra`s, 2003). The results underline that
there is no differences between advanced and transition countries in terms of the existence of
two counteractive forces, namely technology complexity and contracting institutions. How-
ever, the results show that the intensity of the connection is slightly different between EU and
non-EU transition countries. Such results underline that the degree of the influence of both
technological and institutional determinants may be different depending on the advancement
of the economy.
The chapter also highlights a positive connection between firm productivity and the decision
to integrate, supporting previous evidence (Kohler and Smolka, 2011) and Antra`s and Helpman
(2008) model. However, this connection is mostly observed in EU transition countries. The
connection for non-EU transition countries is too weak to be considered significant. This
highlights the difference of the structural connection between productivity and integration
decisions in less advanced countries like non-EU transition countries. Such results call for
collection of specific data and for further investigation of the link between productivity and
integration in less developed countries.
Furthermore, by using the two-stage empirical model I analyse all possibilities of firms with
respect to the redefinition of firm boundaries. I find that the possibility of a firm not to change
its boundaries is an important option of firms that should be considered carefully. the results
show that although the firms that decide to redefine their boundaries are over-performing
those who do not in terms of multiple performance outcomes, they represent a small share of
the sample in transition countries. Firms that decide to redefine their boundaries are over-
performing their unchanging counterparts even more in EU transition countries, but are even
less numerous. Such differences highlight that firms are different both within the same country
group and between country groups. The results also suggest that the forces defining the rigidity
of firm boundaries in transition countries should be considered when analysing firm boundaries.
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This chapter shows that technological complexity and the quality of contracting institu-
tions are affecting all types of the redefinition of firm boundaries, suggesting that these two
forces (technological and institutional) trigger the search of the boundary optimization strat-
egy in transition countries. Such results are important from both theoretical and empirical
perspectives.
From a theoretical perspective, the results call for the development of dynamic theoretical
models that could account for the possibility of firms to choose between keeping their firm
boundaries unchanged and redefining them. Such theoretical models would allow explaining
the dynamics of changes in industrial organization in different groups of countries and its con-
sequences in terms of the dynamics of intra-firm trade. Such models would also help explaining
why in some countries, like transition countries, firm boundaries continue to be highly rigid
even if their changes may bring significant benefits. Finding the reasons for the absence of effi-
ciency increasing change in these countries would help to elaborate adequate policies to foster
further economic growth in these countries. As the results show, the technological complexity
and weakness of contracting institutions could be in the list of the major factors defining such
dynamics, but may be not exhaustive.
From an empirical perspective, the results call for more data being gathered in transition
countries focusing on the firms that decide to redefine their boundaries. While the data do not
allow a detailed analysis of the choice of integration over outsourcing as a way of redefinition of
firm boundaries, more data on the firm-level decisions on this topic would allow researchers to
evaluate the drivers that causes firms to redefine their boundaries through either integration or
outsourcing, or both. Such empirical studies would uncover the dynamics of the development
of firm organization in a group of countries, where the industrial structure has changed greatly
in the last two decades, but has been almost totally unexplored.
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Chapter 4
INTERNAL ORGANIZATION. THE
EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LIBERALIZATION
4.1 Introduction
Globalization has been particularly pronounced in the recent decades, especially in terms
of massive inclusion of different countries in international trade (IMF, 2016; Soubbotina et al.,
2004). The studies evaluating effects of international trade on national and world economy
have been manifold (Melitz and Redding, 2014; Antra`s, 2014; Melitz and Trefler, 2012; Harri-
son and Rodr´ıguez-Clare, 2009). However, the mainstream economic models of international
trade rarely account for firm-level organizational adjustments to the changes in economic en-
vironment. This happens in spite of the capability of such adjustments either to restrain or to
magnify the effects of increasing international trade (Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2015).
Such a capability is connected with the link between a firm organization and its productiv-
ity. The positive effect of the international trade liberalization on productivity is often argued
to occur through the productivity reallocation or selection mechanism (more productive firms
survive, while less productive firms leave the market) (Melitz, 2003). However, the effect of
trade on the growth of productivity within a single firm is rarely considered. In order to under-
stand whether and how firm productivity is affected by the international trade liberalization,
it is essential to understand what intra-firm changes are caused by the international trade lib-
eralization. An example of such intra-firm changes is the change of firm hierarchies (Wulf,
2012).
Firm hierarchies are evidenced to become flatter in advanced countries. This has been
widely discussed in business press, but has attracted far less the attention of academics. There
is only a small number of academic papers that focus on the changes in firm hierarchies, which
has started to grow only recently. Existing studies document that the depth of hierarchies
(number of organizational levels) is remarkably diminishing, while their width (the span of top
managers’ control) grows (Wulf, 2012; Rajan and Wulf, 2006). Such a trend shows that firm
flattening has been significant in recent decades in advanced countries. However, little is known
about the implications and the drivers of flattening. Even less is known about flattening and
its drivers for emerging and transition economies.
A classic example of flattening may be represented by the elimination of the position of the
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chairman of the General Electrics that previously connected the top manager with the heads
of business units (Rajan and Wulf, 2006). By the elimination of this position the top manager
simultaneously decrease his organizational distance and increase the number of positions who
report directly to him/her. This example illustrates a well-recognized fact that flattening is
associated with the trade-off between the depth of a hierarchy (number of organizational layers)
and its width (number of direct subordinates). However, there are multiple factors that may
affect this trade-off. Such factors have been little explored in the literature.1
In the literature, flattening used to be often associated with the empowering of middle
and lower management and pushing more decision-making down the organizational structure
(Aghion et al., 2014). However, while empowering is one of the features of organizational
decentralization, it is not straightforward whether flattening may be unambiguously associated
with “decentralization”. The nature of flattening is such that the top manager of a firm
is getting connected further downward in the organization hierarchy, and is getting directly
involved in decision making across a higher number of organization units. Considering the
nature of the flattening process, flattening may be much more associated with centralization and
higher control than it used to be assumed. Moreover, the emergence of highly restrictive control
structures has also been documented within the firms that have flattened their organizational
hierarchy (Teubner, 2001).
This chapter discuss the organizational changes that are often ignored in the mainstream
international trade literature, in particular flattening. The two main questions addressed in this
chapter are: i) What drives the flattening decisions? and ii) Are flatter structures associated
with a higher degree of control or more empowerment? With respect to the first question, we
are interested in whether the increase of import competition due to higher trade liberalization
forces more flattening in transition countries. With respect to the second question, this chapter
investigates whether the flattening has delivered on its promise to push more decisions down-
ward. In particular, we propose the measure of the degree of control in a firm and analyse its
connection with prevalence of flatter organizations.
Both of the two questions are very important for transition countries. On the one side, the
trade-off between the organizational depth and width (flattening) has not been fully measured
and assessed after the intense period of organizational restructuring in these countries. Trends
are measured and documented for advanced countries (Rajan and Wulf, 2006; Wulf, 2012), but
close to nothing is known for transition countries. On the other side, even less is known on the
causes behind these trends for transition countries.
Transition countries experienced both organizational changes and increasing openness to
international trade. They went through a massive privatization, WTO accession or negotiations
that bounded them to open their markets. Thus, transition countries may serve as good
candidates for testing how much and how far increasing product competition resulting from
1It is often assumed that the result of this trade-off depends on the interplay between the cost of supervising
and the cost of information spreading. Any force that lowers the cost of supervising is assumed to enlarge the
optimal span of control. At the same time, anything that lowers the cost of acquiring and spreading the
information would imply higher number of organizational layers as the marginal cost of adding another layer
becomes lower. However, this idea has been rarely tested
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trade liberalization has impacted organizational design through flattening.
By using a unique dataset (MOI) of firm organization in 10 transition countries, we find
that increasing international competition leads firms to become flatter. In particular, they
decrease the number of organizational levels (depth of hierarchies), thus, reducing organizational
distance between top manager and production employees. The data structure does not allow
us to identify also the connection with the changes in the span of control, the second feature
associated with flattening. Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study of
flattening in a different from advanced countries’ set-up.
Moreover, the results show that firms in transition countries differ in terms of their internal
organization both between and within countries. Only around 9% of firms eliminated the
organizational levels in 2007-2009. This is consistent with the prevailing notion of flattening.
However, a big share of firms did not change their internal organization, regardless the changes
in economic environment. This illustrates a high degree of inertia of organization in transition
countries in these years.
Furthermore, the results underline that flattening may be associated with higher degree of
control of the top managers. Such a finding supports the arguments expressed in Wulf (2012),
Rajan and Wulf (2006) and Teubner (2001) emphasizing that it is inaccurate to equal flattening
and decentralization. In fact, flattening can show features of both empowering (decentraliza-
tion) and increasing control (centralization).
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses related literature
including both property-rights and knowledge-based perspectives. Section 4.4 presents the data
used for the analysis and Section 4.5 describe the empirical strategy. Section 4.6 presents and
discusses the results of the analysis. The chapter ends by concluding remarks in Section 4.7.
4.2 Related Literature
The topic of internal organization of firms has received growing attention from business
and organizational studies in the last decade. However, special attention has been paid to
hierarchical structures and the allocation of decision-making authority (i.e. centralization or
decentralization).2 Although a large share of the theoretical literature has been focused on the
authority allocation, the empirical literature has been evidencing rapid changes of the internal
organizational structure of firms in developed countries (Rajan and Wulf, 2006).3 Rajan and
Wulf (2006), Wulf (2012) and Caliendo et al. (2015) have shown that firms have been actively
adjusting the number of management layers in their organization.
2Multiple studies have been documenting the increase in decentralization in developed countries. In partic-
ular, Bloom et al. (2012) showed that firms has been decentralizing in recent decades. Technology, institutions
and other factors have been proposed as possible factors affecting decentralization. Caroli and Van Reenen
(2001) and Bresnahan et al. (2002) have pointed out a positive correlations between decentralization and both
human capital and information technology. Bloom et al. (2012) have examined the importance of culture, find-
ing that a higher level of trust in the region where a plant is located is associated with a significantly greater
degree of decentralization. On the other hand, much less is known about the causes of decentralization and
changes of internal organization of firms in transition countries.
3On average firms were observed to flatten in 1986-1998 and 2002-2007
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Unlike authority allocation, the drivers of flattening and changes in firm organizational
structures have received much less of attention. From a theoretical point of view, changes
in firm organizational structures have been associated with either the results of bargaining
or the distribution of knowledge between the agents of a firm. From an empirical point of
view, the pressure from product market competition has been proposed as a driver of the
flattening process. In particular, Guadalupe and Wulf (2010) argued that trade liberalization
has affected the process of firm internal reorganization to a large extent. They empirically
show that Canadian-US Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in 1989 implied an exogenous increase
in competition for US firms in the industries where tariffs were removed. Exploiting this policy
experiment they found that competition is associated with flattening that is likely to be related
with increased delegation. However, the link between flattening and higher delegation has yet
to be clarified.
Although no model dealt directly with the connection between product market competition
and flattening, several theoretical models have been developed for understanding the internal
organization of firms. Some aspects of these models may be helpful to explaining the process
of flattening; however, much more theoretical work is still needed. Two frameworks can be
identified among existing models dealing with internal organization from different aspects. The
most extended body of the theoretical work dedicated to the internal organization is based on
property rights/incomplete contracts theory. However, these models do not treat flattening.
We are going to discuss some of these models because several notions covered in this body of
the literature may be useful for our empirical analysis. The second body of literature we are
going to discuss includes theoretical models of knowledge-based hierarchies. This body of the
literature considers changes of the firms’ organizational structures such as flattening, although
paying little attention to the import competition.
4.2.1 Theoretical Models Based on the Property-Rights Perspective
The studies of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) gave rise to the
property rights theory of firm dedicated to both its boundary (see Chapter 2 and Chapter 3)
and its internal organization.
Among the first models focused on the internal organization of firms, Aghion and Tirole
(1997) proposed the ideas of real and formal authority within the organization of a firm. Their
model (denoted as AT model) illustrates the trade-off between top manager loss of control
and middle manager initiative effect. The results of such a trade-off are driven by the effort
to acquire information of either top or middle managers. Moreover, the model introduces
the connection between the span of the top manager control real authority in a firm. The
increase in the span of control is assumed to decrease the possibility of the top manager to pay
enough attention to each of her subordinates, thus limiting her control. Another feature that is
thought to limit top manager’s control is the urgency of decision making. Urgency is considered
to constraint manager’s time and control, increasing the initiative of middle managers. The
model, however, does not consider changes in the depth of control and their connection with
78
CHAPTER 4. INTERNAL ORGANIZATION. THE EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LIBERALIZATION
changes of the span of control, a link that describe flattening. Thus, while urgency is proposed
to cause changes in internal firm organization, no clear predictions can be made with respect
to flattening.
A theoretical notion that may be potentially useful for the analysis of product market
competition has been described in the very close to AT model of Acemoglu et al. (2007).
In this model the owner of a firm (top manager) can learn about the possible outcomes of
her decisions either from the experience of similar firms on the market or by relying on the
superior information of middle-managers. In particular, the more difficult it is to learn from
the production decisions of other firms in the sector, the more the top manager will rely on
the knowledge of its subordinates. In sum, the the model illustrates that the changes in the
composition of firms on the product market, or their higher heterogeneity, might affect firm
internal organization. However, the problem of product market changes is considered separately
from the problem of changes in both span and depth of control.
Even if useful for the understanding some notions on the potential drivers of firm internal
reorganization, described models mostly focus on the distribution of authority within a firm.
None of above-mentioned models explicitly explain the changes in both span and depth of
control. The first model based on the property-rights approach that illustrate the differences
between hierarchies with various span and depth of control is developed in the Rajan and
Zingales (1998) study.
Rajan and Zingales (1998) introduced the notion of access as complementary to ownership.
The access is described as a relationship-specific investment of middle managers’ human capital
in specific activities of a firm. From one point of view, middle managers’ specialization reduces
their outside option. From another point of view, the access gives them more power and the
opportunity for expropriation of firm critical resources, such as ideas or clients. This gives rise
to the competition against the entrepreneur (or top manager/CEO).
By further developing the idea of access, Rajan and Zingales (2001) describe two types of
hierarchies, namely vertical and horizontal, that may be formed for production of goods and
services. The vertical structure is characterized by the high organizational distance between
the head of the hierarchy (CEO) and numerous levels of managers. The horizontal structure is,
vice versa, characterized by flatter structure and numerous managers at the level right below
the head of the hierarchy. The Rajan and Zingales (2001) study does not focus on the change
from vertical to horizontal hierarchies as such and does not focus on the drivers of this change.
However, the answers on what can drive such a change may lie in the forces that magnify the
problems of vertical hierarchies.
In the vertical hierarchy the main incentive problem lies in the possibility of expropriation by
middle managers. Middle managers have direct power over their subordinates, with whom they
can form coalition and start a rival spin-off. In the horizontal hierarchy this problem is resolved
by the reporting of multiple subordinates directly to the head of the hierarchy (top manager).
In this case the risk of expropriation is significantly lower as middle managers have fewer
subordinates with whom they can form a coalition. The study further makes the conclusion,
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that a higher incidence of horizontal structures is associated with a higher expropriability. In the
tradition of property rights theory, higher expropriability is further connected with the type of
production (physical-capital-intensive or human-capital-intensive) and the strength of property-
rights enforcement. In particular, horizontal hierarchies are assumed to be predominant in the
human-capital-intensive industries and countries with weaker property-rights enforcement, as
critical resources are harder to protect there. However, while it takes a long time to change
the property-rights enforcement to cause a switch from vertical to horizontal hierarchies, other
forces may affect the necessity to protect firm critical resources. For instance, the increase of
the product market competition might increase the value of the critical resource, or the cost of
it being expropriated, and force firms to opt for the horizontal hierarchies.
4.2.2 Knowledge-Based Hierarchies
Property-rights models, discussed previously, aim at the analysis of the bargaining process
within firms and its effect on resulting internal organization. However, they examine organi-
zation in isolation from the market, rarely taking into consideration the interaction between
organization and the economy. Neither of these models incorporates changes of economic en-
vironment, like trade liberalization, nor productivity heterogeneity of firms. Moreover, none of
the mentioned studies has allowed for the analysis of macroeconomic gains of such transforma-
tions as firms’ flattening.
The theories on knowledge-based hierarchies developed in a great degree by Garicano,
Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg give the first attempts to incorporate internal firm organiza-
tion into mainstream economics frameworks. The approach to model internal organization is
different from property-rights approach: no conflict or bargaining within a firm is assumed,
rather firm managers optimize their time with regards to the amount of problems they have
to resolve and their knowledge. The knowledge an individual possesses can be used in order
to solve limited amount of problems. In order to optimize the use of knowledge in a restricted
time, individuals closer to production process focus on routine tasks, while the complexity of
non-routine tasks increase with the organizational distance from production employees. The
aim of the organization then becomes the definition of the distribution of knowledge, organi-
zation of communication between the individuals, the number and type of workers required to
minimize the cost of producing a certain amount of output. In other words, the problem for
the internal organization becomes the efficient use of knowledge.
Garicano (2000) study proposes the basic production technology of knowledge-based hier-
archies. The study introduces the organization of a single firm that has potentially multiple
layers of management and define the optimal number of layers and managers on each of this
level in order to use the knowledge efficiently. As the distribution of knowledge is connected
with the level of information and communication technology (ICT), this approach predicts
flattening (increase of hierarchical layers) when acquiring knowledge (communication) is be-
coming cheaper. The model proposed by Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) goes further
and incorporates the Garicano (2000) approach in a standard international trade model with
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heterogeneous firms based on Melitz (2003). It is focused on the gains from international trade
liberalization due to heterogeneous demand changes when firms start to export. Although the
model gives the first link between trade liberalization and changes in internal firm organization
(depth of hierarchies), it considers trade liberalization only from the perspective of exports, no
effects of import increase is introduced.
Some insight on the possible connection between increase in import competition due to
trade liberalization may be drawn from Patacconi (2009) model. He proposes that increasing
importance of fast execution and urgent decision-making of firms facing high import competition
may explain the tendency of such firms towards flatter organizational structures. In particular,
he argues that when the competitive time pressure grows the role of coordination increases
and firms tend to minimize duplication of tasks, thus, moving towards flatter and broader
organizations.
The theories on knowledge-based hierarchies has contributed largely not only to the un-
derstanding of the drivers of firm internal reorganization, but also to the understanding of its
economic impacts. In particular, it is shown that changes of layers affect the distribution of
wages in firms (Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2004, 2006). The evidence suggests that interna-
tional trade causes job polarization (Keller and Utar, 2016; Autor et al., 2014). In particular,
the biggest gains from the changes in the wage distribution were grasped by the bottom and top
percentiles of workers. In other words, these changes must have affected workers in the middle
of the skill (or knowledge) distribution negatively, whereas it should have affected other workers
positively. Nonetheless, little is known about the mechanisms behind such a causal link. It is
proposed that accounting for internal organization allows explaining why globalization has led
to higher wage inequality, or job polarization, in less advanced countries (Feenstra and Han-
son, 1997; Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007). In particular, several recent studies propose that this
causal link is driven by organizational adjustments of firm organizational hierarchies (Garicano
and Rossi-Hansberg, 2015; Friedrich et al., 2015). As with the increase of international trade,
firms are argued to eliminate the middle organizational layers (Guadalupe and Wulf, 2010) that
consist of middle-skill and mid-wage jobs, international trade liberalization may cause lower
employment possibilities for mid-wage jobs through flattening. Thus, it is highly important to
incorporate the hierarchies and internal firm organization in more general framework, allowing
the analysis of the effects of international trade liberalization to be done more accurately.
Summing up, the knowledge-based approach has allowed both the evaluation of the effect
of changes in the economic environment on the width and the depth of firm hierarchies, and
the effect of hierarchical changes on the distribution of gains from trade. However, the analysis
of the effects of other than ICT changes in economic environment is still to be fully developed.
Although trade liberalization and increase in urgency (Patacconi, 2009) have been introduced
in these models, trade liberalization has been associated exclusively with the increase in export
opportunities, while possible effects of import pressure have been mainly overlooked. The con-
nection between the increase in urgency and flattening has not been associated with particular
economic environment changes, like increase in import pressure.
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4.2.3 Flattening, Centralization and Decentralization
While the drivers of flattening have been rarely discussed in the theoretical literature, flat-
tening has often been associated with decentralization.
As it has been previously underlined, the property-rights perspective mostly considers the
changes of internal firm organization through the lenses of the changes in distribution of author-
ity, in particular through centralization or decentralization. Traditionally the decentralization
has been associated with the increase in the span of control (Aghion and Tirole, 1997). Top
managers were expected to decrease the time they can spend controlling each of their sub-
ordinates when the number of subordinates increase. Thus, subordinates could enjoy higher
degree of autonomy in making decisions, higher decentralization. Traditional perspective has
been persistent among the theoretical studies, within both knowledge-based (Patacconi, 2009)
and property-rights perspective (Aghion et al., 2014; Marin and Verdier, 2012), and empirical
studies (Bloom et al., 2010; Marin and Verdier, 2014). However, some recent studies, including
this thesis, suggest that flattening may be rather associated with centralization.
The studies of Wulf (2012) and Rajan and Wulf (2006) highlight that flattening may have
features of both centralization and decentralization. They argue that flatter structures may in
reality mean higher control of the top management and, thus, it may not be considered as an
unambiguous and full equivalent of decentralization. Often the decrease of the organizational
distance between top management and production workers, hierarchy flattening, allows CEOs
to have more direct contacts with the employees and faster decision-making (Wulf, 2012). In
particular, by analysing the use of top managers’ time Wulf (2012) shows that firms with flatter
organization and larger span tend to spend more time in meeting with their subordinates, rather
than being alone. Contrary to the predictions of Aghion and Tirole (1997), this indicates that
top managers of flatter organizations are more, rather than less, involved in the firm operations.
Such findings show centralizing features of the flattening process.
Moreover, some indirect evidence exists that flattening is associated with strengthening
other control features. Hannan et al. (2010) study suggests that flattening (modelled as in-
creasing span of control) improves the effectiveness of the budgeting process, an important
component of most firms’ control environment.
As a result, although flattening has been documented and some attempts were taken to
theoretically explain it, the traditional link between flattening and decentralization has been
recently questioned.
4.3 Bringing Theory to Data
The two theoretical approaches, namely property-rights theory and the theory of knowledge-
based hierarchies, can have different predictions with respect to some phenomena; for instance
the development of information technology and the decrease of its costs. However, it is im-
portant to understand the differences in theoretical predictions as regards the effects of trade
liberalization on firm internal organization.
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First, it is important to differentiate between the effects of trade liberalization through
import and the ones through export. While the property-rights approach focuses on the mod-
elling of interactions between agents of the same firm, it says little if nothing with respect to
the connection of internal organization with international trade, either import or export. On
the contrary, the approach of knowledge-based hierarchies incorporates international trade in
the model that predicts changes of the number of managerial layers. However, only the effect
of export is incorporated. The impact of import penetration and the consequent increase in
competition pressure has not been included in the models of this approach explicitly.
Second, with respect to the effects of import, some aspects described in theory may be
useful, in particular the concept of the decision-making urgency. The increase in the import
competitive pressure may increase the urgency of decisions-making. Both, property-rights and
knowledge based, approaches highlight the importance of urgency for the internal organization
of a firm. Although the mechanisms and affected features considered in two approaches are
different. While property-rights approach focus on the time constraints of the top manager
and their influence on the top manager’s control, the literature on knowledge-based hierarchies
show that with the increase in urgency the coordination within the firm becomes so important
to make the organizational hierarchy flatter. This is possible only if the interests of managers
within the organization are aligned. However, such an alignment of interests is hardly possible
in countries where the levels of trust are on average considerably low.
The property-rights perspective is based on the presence of incentive conflict between the top
managers (owners) and their subordinates. In particular, when the actions of the similar firms
on the product market are less observable, which is the case when more foreign competitors
enter the market, it is expected that a firm top manager depends more on the knowledge of
her subordinates. Loosing the control over the situation and depending on the behavior of the
subordinates, a fear of subordinates misbehaviour may be born. This is the case especially in
countries where the level of trust is low and property-rights are less enforceable. Due to the
theory, top managers may opt for a flatter hierarchy if they expect that the critical resource
can be expropriated. More so if the cost of loosing the critical resource increase significantly,
like in the case of high competition. For instance, when the competition increases the loss of
a share of firm clients (being taken away by a subordinate spin-off) may result in bankruptcy
for a firm. Thus, in this chapter we test the following hypothesis.
H 4.1 When a firm faces an increase in the competitive pressure due to higher import pene-
tration on its product market, it reacts through the adjustment of its internal organization. In
particular, it eliminates managerial layers between the top manager and production employees,
in other words it flattens.
With respect to the connection between flattening and centralization, Wulf (2012) empiri-
cally shows that the managers of flattening organizations tend to be more involved in the firm
decision-making. This demonstrate that flattening may have features of centralization. In order
to analyse the involvement of the top manager in the activities of a firm, a relevant factor is
the share of firm non-production workers that respond directly to the top manager. A higher
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absolute number of subordinates directly responding to the top manager (the span of control)
used to be associated with higher initiative or decentralization in Aghion and Tirole (1997)
model. However, Wulf (2012) shows that with the increase in the span of control the involve-
ment, and associated control, of the top manager in the activities of the firm does not decrease,
but rather increase. Moreover, the top manager involvement takes a different form. Managers
start to use their time more efficiently, participating more in the multilateral meetings. Thus,
in this chapter we provide preliminary evidence to support the following hypothesis.
H 4.2 The decrease in the depth of control (number of organizational layers) is positively asso-
ciated with a higher control of the top manager, and in particular with a higher share of directly
reporting employees.
4.4 Measuring Internal Organization and Trade Liberal-
ization
4.4.1 Data
The sample is based on the EBRD-World Bank Management, Organisation and Innovation
(MOI) survey. The MOI survey covers 10 transition countries (Belarus, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan) and two baseline coun-
tries (Germany and India). The primary dataset is a cross-section of more than 1800 manu-
facturing firms. The survey was implemented in October 2008 - November 2009 in most of the
countries with the interviews in the Far East region of Russia organized in February 2010 -
April 2010.
In order to allow better comparability of organizational structures and avoid the ambiguities
of data for multi-establishment firms the focus is on single-establishment firms. New firms, aged
less than three years, are also eliminated. As the result the data used for the analysis consists
of the sample of 1059 firms in transition countries and 1218 firms in the sample that includes
Germany and India. For the regression analysis we use only the sample of transition countries
(not including Germany and India).
Most of the interviews in the transition countries took place in October-November 2008
(around 60%), around 30% of interviews took place in January-March 2009. The interviews of
Russian firms in the Far East region (February-April 2010) represent around 6% of the sample
of transition countries.
The size of firms in the revised sample varies between 8 and 4800 employees, with 95% of
firms being between 8 and 800 employees, with the average size being different across countries
of the sample (see Table D.1)
The survey also included the direct questions on what is the main market of the firm in
the last year, in particular whether it is local, national or international market. In this way,
domestic firms (both local and national) may be distinguished from exporters (see Table D.2).
84
CHAPTER 4. INTERNAL ORGANIZATION. THE EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LIBERALIZATION
4.4.2 Organizational Structure
The dataset is rather unique as it allows us to analyse internal structure of firms in a
group of countries, for which the data is rarely available. In particular, the dataset includes
information on two main features of firm flattening: the reporting relationships within firms
(span of control) and the organizational distance (depth of control) from both the national
headquarters’ top manager (further HQ top manager or HQTM) and factory managers FM to
a typical production employee. Moreover, not only it gives us the view on the static picture of
firm organization in different transition countries, but it also includes the information on the
dynamic change of the organizational distance in three years previous to the interviews.
Span of control. The information on reporting relationships includes information on the
number of workers directly reporting to either HQ top manager or FM. The measure of directly
reporting employees is also known as the span of control or breadth of hierarchy and reflects
the horizontal dimension of the hierarchy. As argued by Guadalupe and Wulf (2010) this
information reflects two main features of firm organization. First, it shows over how many
employees either HQTM or FM has direct authority. Second, higher number of subordinates
directly reporting to, for example, HQ top manager means that the information is exchanged
more directly than it would be if intermediary positions would exist. Such information is
available for almost all firms in the sample, with no information for less than 4% of the sample.
The span of control of the HQ top manager varies between 1 and 300 people, with the average
(mean) span between 4 and 33 depending on the country (see Table D.3). The span of control
of the FM varies between 1 and 800 people, with average between 5 and 60 (see Table D.4).
The dataset also provides us with additional information on internal firm organization,
which, to the best of our knowledge, was not available in previous studies on the topic. In
particular, the data includes the information on the number of employees directly managed
either by the HQ top manager or by the FM. The information on the number of workers
directly managed by either HQTM or FM is available for smaller number of firms in most of
the countries of the sample as the interviewees were asked about it only in the case the number
of employees reporting directly were more than 20. (No information is available for India).
Consequently, we explore this information with caution at the descriptive stage of the analysis.
This information allows us to draw some stylized facts on the internal organization of firms
in transition countries, which has not yet been done in the literature. The number of directly
managed employees varies between: 2 and 200 for the HQ manager, with the average number
between 12 and 55 depending on the country (see Table D.5); between 1 and 590 for FM with
the average between 16 and 52 depending on the country (see Table D.6).
Depth of control. Another measure of the organization structure is the measure of orga-
nizational distance, which represents the number of managerial layers between the production
employee and either HQ top manager or FM. It is also often called the depth of control or
depth of hierarchy in the literature and represents a vertical dimension of the internal firm
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organization. An example is presented in the Figure 4.1. Unlike the measure used in the work
of Guadalupe and Wulf (2010) where the depth of hierarchy was measured as the distance
between the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the division manager, the data provide the
information on the distance between either HQ top manager or FM from the level of typical
production employee. The information on the factory organization is not available. As a fac-
tory may include several divisions, we use the full organizational distance from a production
employee as a measure of the hierarchical depth of a firm.
Figure 4.1: An example of internal organization structure
Headquarters
top manager
(HQTM)
Factory
managers
(FM)
Production
workers
FM depth of
control = 1
HQTM depth
of control = 2
In the sample the number of layers between production employee and the HQ top manager
ranges between 0 and 14 with the mean values for different countries between 2 and 4 (see
Table D.8). The number of layers between production employees and FM is between 0 and 10
with mean values for countries between 0.9 and 3.2 (see Table D.8).
Further the discussion will be mostly focused on the analysis of the internal organization of
firms with respect to the position and reporting relationships of top managers.
Flattening and growth. Apart from the description of the organizational structure at the
moment of interview, the data provide the information on the changes of the depth of control
in the three years previous to the interview, which allows us to capture one side of the process
of flattening. The dataset allows us to know whether the organizational distance (number of
layers) between the HQ top manager and a typical production employee increased, decreased
or did not change (see Table D.9).
The information on the changes of the span of control, the other side of the flattening
process, is not provided by the data. Consequently, we measure flattening by using only the
change in the number of layers or the change of the depth of control.
The dataset also allows us to observe if a particular firm has been growing in the previous
years in term of employment and how much it was growing. Some information is available with
respect to the growth of firms in terms of operating revenues, profits and other information
merged from the Orbis dataset. Such information is going to be used in the description analysis
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when the discussion moves to the connection between the growth (in terms of employment,
value-added and value added per employee), flatter structures and the change in the depth of
control. However, a more extensive use of this information is limited due to missing data.
4.4.3 Trade Liberalization
For the analysis of trade liberalization we use the data provided in the Eora input-output
tables (Lenzen et al., 2012, 2013) for each country from 2000 to 2010.
For measuring trade liberalization we follow the approach used in Bloom et al. (2012) and
use the import penetration rate. The import penetration rate is measured as the ratio of
imports to the sum of domestic production and imports in a particular industry. Due to the
difficulty of concordance between the domestic production statistics in transition countries and
the MOI dataset on the product level4 (as in Bloom et al. (2012)), we used the Eora input-
output tables to construct the industry measure of input penetration. As the result, the data
on the import penetration rate in 9 manufacturing industries per country were used.
As the dataset provides the information on the main product of each firm, we organize the
sample in three groups with respect to the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) classification. In
particular, firms are divided into those producing mostly final, intermediate or capital products.
This division gives us the possibility to calculate the import penetration measures for each
industry and each type of product. As a result, the measure of import penetration is constructed
such that it varies across types of products, industries and countries.
The measure of import penetration MPjc for final goods
f is calculated as the ratio of import
Mjc from the world to country c in industry j to the total final consumption of households,
government and non-profit institutions serving households FCjc in country c that includes both
imported and domestic products of industry j consumed in country c, i.e.
MP fjc =
M fjc
FCjc
(4.1)
, where
FCjc = M
f
jc +D
f
jc (4.2)
The measure of the import penetration for intermediate inputs i is calculated as the ratio of
imported to country c intermediate inputs M fjc produced by industry j to the sum of imported
and domestic intermediate inputs ICjc produced by the industry j (where the firm products
belong to) and used by all industries H in country c. As the data on the industry to which
a particular firm is selling its products is not available, we assumed the probability of selling
4The main product of each firm (the product representing the largest share of annual sales) in the MOI
dataset is given in terms of the 4-digit ISIC Rev. 3.1 code. Most of the countries in the dataset use both
different between them classification and different from ISIC classifications. To the best of our knowledge, there
are no concordance tables or other ways to transform those specifications on the product level. The supply and
use tables available for these countries are also not having the same product-level classifications and are not
comparable to each other.
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them to any industry being equal. Consequently, the share of input penetration on the potential
market of a particular firm, if it is producing intermediate inputs, is measured in the following
way:
MP ijc =
M ijc
ICjc
(4.3)
, where
ICjc =
H∑
h=1
M ihjc +
H∑
h=1
Dihjc (4.4)
The measure of the import penetration for capital goods k is calculated as the ratio of
imported capital goods M cjc in total gross fixed capital formation in industry j in country c.
The total gross fixed capital formation includes both domestic production Dkjc and import M
c
jc
of capital goods.
MP kjc =
Mkjc
CFjc
(4.5)
, where
CFjc = M
k
jc +D
k
jc (4.6)
Each of this measures is calculated for each year between 2005 and 2010 and is associated
with a firm in country c with the main product of type z = {i, f, k} belonging to the industry
j. Around 20% of the sample was associated with a unique measure, other 30% was associated
with the measure equal for 2-4 firms, in total 80% of the sample was associated with the measure
equal for not more than 10 firms. Maximum number of firms associated with the same measure
of import penetration is 43.
In order to account for the changes of import penetration we calculate the ratio of 3-year
import penetration change to its beginning value. As firms may be interviewed in different
months of the same year, the change of import penetration rate is counted as either difference
between year t value and year (t− 3) value if interview took place in the last 6 months of the
year t; or difference between year (t − 1) value and year (t − 4) value if interview took place
in the first 6 months of the year t. Most of the firms in the sample were interviewed either
between October and December or between January and March. As results the measure of
import penetration becomes even more specific for each firm. Consequently, the measure of
import penetration change is counted as following:
If a firm was interviewed in January-June
4MP 3zjct =
(MPzjc(t− 1)−MPzjc(t− 4))
MPzjc(t− 4) (4.7)
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If a firm was interviewed in July-December
4MP 3zjct =
(MPzjc(t)−MPzjc(t− 3))
MPzjc(t− 3) (4.8)
t={2008,2009,2010}
(4.9)
4.5 Empirical Model
In order highlight the influence of import competition on the internal firm restructuring
in transition countries, we exploit the fact that some transition countries have gone through
significant opening towards international markets, which reflected in an increasing import pene-
tration. The sectors and countries that went through significant increase in import penetration
are discussed in Section 4.6.1.
First, we draw some stylized facts using descriptive statistics and correlation analysis. In
particular, we analyse the differences between firms and countries with respect to the orga-
nizational distance (number of layers) and the span of control (number of employees directly
reporting to the national HQ top manager and to the factory managers (FM)).
Second, basing on the work of Rajan and Wulf (2006) we define a new measure of control
within the organizational structure. By using this measure we give preliminary evidence for the
hypothesis H4.2 stating that flattening is connected with the increasing control of top managers.
Third, the regression analysis is presented to highlight the influence of trade liberalization
on the process of flattening. we use probit model in order to analyse the probability of a firm
to flatten. The binary variable on whether the number of management layers of a firm has
decreased is used. In the rest of this paper we use “flattening” for referring to the decrease of
the number of management layers. The data does not allow evaluation of the changes in the
number of directly reporting employees.
In order to analyse this influence we use the following empirical model:
Pr(Y = 1|X) = Φ(β∗X ′), where (4.10)
X = (4MP 3zjct,Markf , PTjcz,Wf ) (4.11)
To reflect the flattening as a dependent variable we use the binomial data on whether the
firm decreased the depth of its organizational hierarchy in the three years previous to the
interview Pr(Y = 1|X), where Y is either 1 (number of layers decreased) or 0 (number of
layers did not decrease).5
5At the last stage of the analysis, we use the data on increase in the number of layers in order to control
for the robustness of the results and to check if the increasing import competition is connected with increasing
hierarchical depth. In that case Bivariate Probit model is used with two dependent variables: Pr(Y1 = 1|X)
being the probability that the number of layers decreased and Pr(Y2 = 1|X) being the probability that the
number of layers increased.
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Specification 1 In the basic specification the main independent variable is the change of
import penetration (4MP 3zjct). we also include several important control variables, such as
the type of the main market Markf
6, the type of the main product PTjcz
7. The vector Wf
in this specification includes size of the firm (Sm), accounted through the natural logarithm of
the number of full time employees in the year t, and the share of non-production employees
(NpEm) in the firm in year t.
Specification 2 More extended specification of the model is used in order to control for
different probability of flattening among either growing or contracting firms. As it is illustrated
by Rossi-Hansberg, Garicano and Monte (2012) the firms that decrease the number of layers are
often the firms that contract. Consequently, we want to avoid the possibility that the results
are driven by the influence of import competition on the size of firms. To do so vector Wf
is extended by the inclusion of dummy variables for firms that either contract or grow in the
three years previously to the interview.
Specification 3 The next specification also includes the control variables for the influence
of ownership. The vector Wf in this specification includes the set of ownership dummies as
well.8 Thus, the differences between firms with different types of main owners is taken into
consideration. Another important issue with respect to ownership in transition countries is
whether these firms have ever been state owned. The discussion of the differences between
privatized firms and either originally private or state-owned firms is not the aim of this study.
The overview of only their performance and decision-making differences could result in a sepa-
rate study. Some of the features differentiating the privatized firms from their counterparts are
summarized in Estrin et al. (2009) and in Godoy and Stiglitz (2007). What is the objective of
this specification is to be sure that the results are not driven by the issues connected with the
privatization history of a firm.
Specification 4, 5 As firms has been interviewed in different years we include year dummies
in the vector Wf as well. This is done in the Specification 4 in order to exclude possible
time specific effects . In this specification 5 other controls are included to control for the
characteristics of the survey data. As the data is based on the survey, it may be biased by
the several characteristics. First, opinion and personal experience of the respondent may affect
her responses. Second the procedure followed in order to obtain the answers or to provide the
answers (especially for the quantitative questions) may be important to account (Schweiger and
6First of the Markf variables is a dummy taking 1 if the main product of a firm m was sold mostly at the
national market and 0 otherwise. Second of the Markf variables is a dummy taking 1 if the main product was
sold mostly to the foreign nations (exported) and 0 otherwise. Thus, the baseline group consists of firms selling
their product on the local market.
7Measure PTjcz accounts for the type of product through the inclusion of two dummies - capital good and
intermediate good(final goods are the baseline).
8The measure includes the dummies for firms owned by foreign individuals/firms, foreign state, foreign
family, domestic family, the state where firm HQ is situated, other owners or for firms owned by multiple
owners with no one holding the largest block of shares. The domestic private individual/firm is taken as a
baseline.
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Friebel, 2013). As a result, we include in the vector Wf control variables for the number of
times the interview was rescheduled, respondent’s willingness to answer the questions and her
knowledge about the firm, the way how quantitative questions was answered (taking figures
from accounting books, making some counts or giving approximate measure not supported by
objective information), judgment of the interviewer about the truthfulness regarding opinions
and perceptions of the respondent, and the number of years the respondent is working in the
firm.
Specification 6 Country fixed effects are controlled for in a separate specification. However,
a significant correlation between country fixed effects and main independent variable may be
expected as trends of import penetration suggest more country- than industry-specificity.
Robustness check The survey took place partly during the global trade collapse that has
affected imports in transition countries in different years over 2007-2009. we acknowledge the
possibility of the crisis influence on the results. In order to account for this a robustness check
is proposed. To perform such a robustness check we first regress the main independent variable
of import penetration on two dummy variables. First dummy variable take value 1 if the firm
is performing within the industry and country that has been affected by the import drop in the
same year (or 1,5 year) before the interview and 0 otherwise. The second dummy variable is
taking value 1 if the firm is performing within the industry and country that has been affected
by the import drop in the previous three years but more than 1,5 year before the interview
and 0 otherwise. Then, we correct the main independent variable for the influence of these two
dummies. we further analyse the influence of adjusted measure of import penetration change
using all specifications described above.
4.6 Results
4.6.1 Static Picture of the Firm Organization in Transition
As data show, the internal organization of firms differs significantly between transition
countries both in terms of its width and breadth. The countries with lower number of layers
between the national HQ top manager and production employees in median are Uzbekistan,
Serbia, Lithuania and Bulgaria (see Figure 4.2 and Table D.7). Uzbekistan, Serbia and Lithua-
nia have in median the factory managers in a layer directly below the HQ top manager, while in
Bulgaria the top manager and factory manager are situated at the same level of organizational
hierarchy (Figure 4.2).
The typical internal organization of firms in different countries is presented in Figure 4.2.
The group of countries with the maximum median width of hierarchies includes Belarus, Russia
and Ukraine (see also Table D.3). The smallest median width of hierarchies is characteristic for
Lithuania, Uzbekistan, and Romania. However, big variability is observable within countries as
well. The distribution of the number of layers (the depth of hierarchies) in different countries is
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summarized in D.7. Large right tails are characteristic for Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Romania
where the hierarchies are reaching the breadth of 11-14 levels.
The measures of the number of employees directly reporting to the national HQ top manager
and the number of employees she/he manage directly on the daily basis are highly positively
connected. In multiple countries the share of the employees the top manager manages directly
arrives at more than 0.8. It highlights that a big share of top managers control or interact
with their subordinates (which report directly) on a highly regular basis. However, there is
significant variation of such a share; it varies between 0.3 and one (see more in Table 4.1). The
possibility to use this information for further analysis is limited by the small sample size of the
firms that responded to this question.
Table 4.1: The share of employees directly reporting to the national HQ top manager that
he/she manages directly
Country Min Max Mean Median Num
Belarus 0.27 0.50 0.34 0.29 4
Ukraine 0.29 1.00 0.85 1.00 14
Uzbekistan 0.33 1.00 0.82 1.00 7
Russia 0.08 1.00 0.55 0.40 39
Poland 0.20 1.00 0.64 0.67 5
Romania 0.24 1.16 0.73 1.00 9
Serbia 0.04 1.36 0.38 0.20 20
Kazakhstan 0.33 0.43 0.38 0.38 2
Lithuania 0.25 1.36 0.78 0.78 6
Bulgaria 0.33 1.00 0.81 1.00 9
Total 0.01 1.36 0.54 0.43 149
Source: Own calculations based on the BEEPS (2005)
The measure of both breadth (depth of control) and width (span of control) of hierarchies
are positively and statistically significantly correlated with the size of firms. It underlines that
firms are bigger if they have either a higher number of layers or a higher number of top manager
subordinates.
4.6.2 Depth, Span and Control
The measure of the span of control reflects the two main phenomena. First, the higher
number of subordinates reporting directly to the top manager implies that the top manager is
having the authority over higher number of employees. Second, the higher number of direct
reports also suggests that the information sharing is more direct. As it has been underlined by
the study of Rajan and Wulf (2006) and Wulf (2012) the higher span of control (more directly
reporting subordinates) is associated by managers with the more direct control and involvement
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Figure 4.2: Organization structure of average firm (median)
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in decision-making.
In order to analyse the degree of control we calculate the share of employees who directly
report to the top manager in the total number of firm non-production employees. Such a
measure shows the degree of direct authority or direct control of the top manager.
The results show that such a degree of control is negatively correlated with the share of
employees that regularly use personal computers in their jobs. Such results confirm the negative
connection drawn by Bloom et al. (2014) between information technology and control of the top
manager over the employees. Bloom et al. (2014) conclude that improvements in information
technologies are associated with the increase in autonomy of workers and plant managers. we
find the same results. This further supports the consistency of the proposed measure as a
measure of control.
By further analysis of the connection between the proposed measure of control and firm
internal organization we find that this measure is negatively and highly significantly correlated
with the number of layers in the organization hierarchy (Pearson correlation coefficient equals
to −0.1618, p-value < 0.001). Such a significant connection suggests that the flatter is the
hierarchy of the firm the bigger share of firm organization is under direct control of the top
manager. Hence, the conclusion can be made that the process of flattening increases the degree
of control of the top manager. It underlines that even though the flattening may have some
features of decentralization it is also associated with a significant expansion of the control from
the part of the top manager.
4.6.3 Trade Liberalization and Its Impact on the Firm Performance
By using the data from the input-output tables we analyse the dynamics of import penetra-
tion as a measure of trade liberalization and its influence on firm’s environment and behaviour.
The dynamics of the import penetration measure calculated for the analysis is presented in
tables D.4.
The majority of countries did not experience big changes in the import penetration in the
period of 2005-2010, the exception is Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Serbia in some cases, and Russia.
And while Ukraine was through a significant increase of import inflow, Uzbekistan and Serbia
experienced an increase of import penetration in multiple industries and types of products,
Russia saw a significant decrease of import penetration. For example, in the 3-year period
before the interviews in Russia, import penetration had dropped almost by 16% for capital
goods in metal products’ sector, by 12 and 21 percent for intermediate goods in the sectors of
“Wood and paper” and “Transport equipment”. It also had dropped by 13% for final goods
in the sector of “Wood and paper”. The opposite picture may be observed in Ukraine. The
increase of import penetration varies in the range between 20% and 200%. Uzbekistan is
characterized by a notable increase in import penetration as well. The majority of sectors and
product types has seen the increase of import penetration between 17% and 32%. In Serbia
import penetration of the market of capital goods increased by 18-38%, followed by several
industries in final goods with increase between 19% and 22% and several in intermediate goods
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with the increase of 11-15%. In Germany the increase of import penetration took place in capital
goods, final goods of food and beverage sector, while most of the markets of intermediate goods
experienced the decrease of import penetration. Penetration of food and beverage sector also
increases in Bulgaria and Romania.
Such changes in import penetration could have had an impact on the environment and
performance of firms in these countries. In order to analyse it we draw some stylized facts on
the connection between the changes of import penetration rates and firm performance.
In order to analyse whether the increase in import penetration contributes to the increase
in competition pressure we analyse its contribution to the change in firms’ profit margins. we
find that the changes in import penetration are negatively associated with the profit margins of
firms(results presented in Table D.10). Hence, more import in the industry is connected with
smaller possibilities for higher profits. It underlines that import penetration is actually affecting
the competitive situation on final markets of firms and increase the competitive pressure, as
assumed in the literature.
Moreover, the data analysis shows that the changes in import penetration and the changes
of firm size are negative connected. The change of employment in the period of three years
previous to the interview is calculated using the survey data. The results illustrate that import
penetration changes in these years are negatively associated with the changes in total employ-
ment of firms. Such results, suggest that pressure from import penetration constrain firms to
contract in terms of employment. It is underlined by Caliendo et al. (2015) that the firms that
contract have higher probability to decrease the depth of control. However, only around 12%
of contracting firms choose flattening, and no increasing trend of this share is observed when
increase in import penetration is considered.
When the yearly changes in import penetration are considered, the positive link is observed
between the changes of import penetration and the following (a year after) changes in the value
added and value added per employee. For example, an increase of import penetration in 2008-
2007 is positively correlated with the growth of both value-added and value-added per employee
in the year after.9 we also find that firms that faced higher increase of import penetration in
the previous 3 years have lower labour productivity (Table D.11). As it is shown in the table,
the increase of import penetration change by 10% is associated with the decrease of labour
productivity by around 6%.10
4.6.4 Influence of Trade Liberalization on the Change of Internal
Firm Organization
The fact that the changes in import penetration affect firm performance can be observed
from the results of the previous section. The question of this section is whether such changes
affect firm internal structure as well. In particular, we analyse whether it increases the probabil-
9However, the results of this correlation analysis are ambiguous and may be year specific. As such results
require more detailed analysis the issue is left for the further research.
10I do not find significant correlations between import penetration change and total factor productivity
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ity of firm to become flatter. The probability of flattening in the empirical model is represented
by the probability that a particular firm decreases the number of layers between the national
HQ top manager and a typical production employee.
The results show that the change of import penetration is positively connected with the
decreasing number of organizational layers. The connection is statistically significant and robust
to the accounting for multiple control variables. Although the results show that connection
between import competition and flattening is highly significant in most cases, country fixed
effects decrease the significance of such a connection. This may be explained by the presence
of Ukraine in the data. we will discuss the particular features of the link in Ukraine further on.
For the whole sample marginal effects are quite small but they increase significantly with
the increase in the magnitude of the main dependent variable. However, if the test of the same
model is done only for the firms that faced the increase in import penetration of at least 50%,
the effects of increase in import penetration by 20% rise from 0.4% (on the total sample) to
2-4% (on the “tail” sample). An increase of the change in import penetration from 56% to
200% is associated with the increase of the flattening probability by almost 40% (from 0.9%),
keeping all other factors stable at their mean.
With regards to the effects of control variables four significant links can be observed. First,
firms with higher share of non-production employees tend to flatten more often. The group
of non-production workers may include top and middle managers, lawyers and administrative
support workers, and is characterized by higher skill-intensity. Skills have already been argued
to complement organizational changes in developed countries (Caroli and Van Reenen, 2001).
The results of this chapter show that even in developing (transition) countries they are positively
connected.
Second, the firms that have an experience of being state-owned tend to flatten more than
their originally private counterparts. However, on average the firms that have passed through
privatization are also more often publicly or privately traded and, thus, has no single owner.
It is especially important as the results show that the firms with no single largest owner tend
to flatten less often. In order to check whether the model is biased by such a connection, we
eliminated either of these variables and the results tend to be robust. Thus, firms that both are
not having single owner and are the ones privatized in the past have lower tendency to flatten
than their counterparts with a single person/firm/state as a main owner. At the same time
they have higher tendency to flatten than their originally private counterparts. Such results
underline the influence of the ownership structure, and in particular the effect of ownership
concentration.
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Table 4.2: Trade liberalization and flattening
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Import penetration (3years change) 0.327** 0.339** 0.292* 0.314* 0.432 0.374
(0.161) (0.167) (0.170) (0.175) (0.360) (0.377)
Import penetration # Firm contracted 0.217
(0.370)
Control Variables:
Main market - national 0.237 0.283* 0.244 0.224 0.295* 0.296*
(0.157) (0.165) (0.169) (0.170) (0.177) (0.177)
Mainly exporters 0.196 0.224 0.179 0.122 0.215 0.224
(0.188) (0.201) (0.206) (0.213) (0.230) (0.230)
Share of non-production workers 1.102*** 1.168*** 1.219*** 1.156*** 1.158*** 1.135***
(0.340) (0.357) (0.361) (0.370) (0.397) (0.399)
Firm shrunk 0.343* 0.277 0.274 0.283 0.368* 0.330
(0.189) (0.195) (0.196) (0.199) (0.209) (0.219)
Firm grew -0.181 -0.167 -0.178 -0.179 -0.134 -0.131
(0.190) (0.197) (0.198) (0.202) (0.209) (0.209)
No single ownership -0.499** -0.522** -0.502** -0.526** -0.524**
(0.217) (0.220) (0.221) (0.226) (0.226)
Domestic family ownership 0.594*** 0.580*** 0.555** 0.619*** 0.612***
(0.212) (0.213) (0.216) (0.225) (0.226)
Privitized 0.416*** 0.431*** 0.442*** 0.386** 0.389**
(0.152) (0.153) (0.160) (0.164) (0.164)
Constant -2.394*** -2.502*** -2.499*** -2.956*** -3.568*** -3.542***
(0.398) (0.423) (0.438) (0.690) (0.813) (0.814)
Other control variables:
Size Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of interview No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey characteristics No No No Yes Yes Yes
State, Foreign and Other Ownership No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies No No No No Yes Yes
Likelihood -262.875 -249.156 -247.259 -242.443 -236.988 -236.815
Pseudo-R2 .0711876 .1191877 .1258958 .1321 .1516291 .1522462
P-value 6.72e-06 5.95e-08 5.75e-08 1.03e-06 3.25e-06 4.72e-06
Marginal effect1 ( ↑ sd) .007 .007 .005 .005 .010 .008
Marginal effect2 ( ↑ from min to max) .017 .017 .012 .014 .027 .020
N 1085 1083 1083 1070 1070 1070
Note: ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Specifications also included the measure of size and dummy variables for intermediate goods and capital goods. Specefi-
cations 3-6 also included dummy variables for the type of foreign ownership (family, firm or state). Specifications 4-6 included the
dummy variables for the year when interview took place. Specifications 5-6 included noise variables for respondent’s willingness to
reveal information, knowledge about the firm, years in the firm, as well as reliability of figures and truthfulness regarding opinions
Third, a strong connection between the family ownership and flattening is established. The
results show that domestic (not owned by foreigners) family firms are more predisposed to
flatten. It may be caused by the multiply documented differences in management styles. The
evidence exists that family-owned firms has different management styles, in particular they
tend to be more centralized (Levina, 2016), and have a more hierarchical management approach
(Mullins and Schoar, 2016). Thus, the effect of family ownership on a higher probability to
decrease the number of managerial layers and family ties connection with higher centralization
underline the centralization feature of the flattening.
Fourth, the firms that sell their main product on the national markets are flattening more
often than their counterparts targeting local markets. Moreover, the positive correlation be-
tween the status of being an exporter and flattening may be observed, however it lacks enough
significance.
Firms that face contraction in employment do not have statistically significant connection
with higher probability of flattening in presented specifications. Neither do firms that have
increased their employment in the previous three years. When the entire sample is considered,
the connection of import competition with the flattening does not pass through the contrac-
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tion of firms. In particular, the interaction between import penetration (import competition
measure) and the dummy for contracting firms is not significant. If import competition forced
firms to contract and flattening would be the consequence or the preferable choice of firm con-
traction, one would observe positive and significant connection between the interaction term
and flattening. This is not the case in the transition countries.
As the results are sensitive to the country dummies, one can rightful doubt if they are not
driven by the tail of distribution characteristic for a particular country. The answer is: they
actually are. The highest effect on the probability to flatten comes from the big increase in the
import penetration in particular country, which is Ukraine. As it is illustrated in the Figure
D.4 Ukraine firms faced a comparatively much higher change of import penetration (import
surge), especially in intermediate inputs. Almost 90% of Ukrainian firms in the sample faced
import penetration increase of more than 50%. There are no Ukrainian firms in the sample
that faced less than 20% increase.
Consequently, to avoid mixing up two different phenomena (import surge and comparatively
mild increase of import penetration) we organize the sample in two subgroups: firms that faced
import penetration increase of at most 50% and firms that faced import penetration increase
of more than 50%.
First, we test the model on firms who faced an import surge (Table 4.3). Among such
firms, an increase of import competition by one standard deviation (39%) from its mean (94%)
increase the probability to flatten by 15.5 percentage point, keeping all other factors stable
at their mean. Previously, on the full sample, similar increase of import competition (31%)
increased the probability to flatten by only 0.5 percentage points.
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Table 4.3: Effects of the import penetration increase of more than 50%
(1) (2) (3)
Import penetration 1.211 1.806* 1.807*
(3years change) (0.810) (1.009) (1.016)
Import penetration # Firm contracted -0.010
(1.046)
Control variables:
Share of non-production workers 1.505 1.002 1.004
(0.997) (1.155) (1.170)
Firm shrunk 5.488 5.497
(548.6) (548.4)
Firm grew 4.253 4.253
(548.6) (548.4)
Constant -3.746*** -8.001 -8.002
(1.271) (548.6) (548.4)
Other control variables:
Size Yes Yes Yes
Main market Yes Yes Yes
Type of good Yes Yes Yes
Year of interview No No No
Survey characteristics No No No
Ownership No No No
Likelihood -32.260 -25.496 -25.496
Pseudo-R2 .0951793 .284895 .2848962
P-value .4513997 .0160656 .0264106
Marginal effect(↑ sd) .134 .155 .155
Marginal effect2(↑ from min to max) .399 .695 .695
N 109 109 109
Note: ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Specifications 4 - 6 are not feasible due to the sample size
limitations
Second, we test the model on firms who experienced a mild increase in import penetration
(Table 4.4). When the regressions are made on the sample of such firms, the significance of the
main independent variable is decreasing drastically. By analysing if the change of the variable
form from a share to a percentage (share multiplied by 100) may change the results, we find
that the coefficient become significant, but is very small. Such results may be explained by the
fact that the changes of import penetration, if the tail is excluded, varies between -38% to 38%,
with the 80% of firms in the range of -8% to 20% , with median at 2.1% and mean at 3.9%.
It shows that majority of firms in this period did not face a significant increase in the import
penetration rate and thus didn’t face significant increase of competitive pressure from import.
However, the results changes when we account for different effects of import penetration on
firms that contracted and those that grew. In particular, Table 4.4 shows that for firms that
do not contract increase in import competition by one standard deviation (10%) results in the
increase of flattening probability by 29 percentage points.11 Meanwhile, the effect for the firms
11The same change of 10% for the whole sample (including also firms facing the decrease of import pen-
etration) is only 7 percentage points. Such results highlight that higher changes in import competition have
much more visible effects on the internal organization of firms. For example, the inflow of imports due to rapid
reduction of tariffs would induce a much bigger share of firms to flatten. In such a case our results would be
99
CHAPTER 4. INTERNAL ORGANIZATION. THE EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LIBERALIZATION
that contract is close to zero. This shows that in front of the increasing import penetration
firms tend to opt for either flattening or contraction, thus, suggesting that firm reorganization
is an alternative to firm shrinkage when the reaction to mild increase in market competition is
considered.
Table 4.4: Effects of the import penetration increase of at most 50%
Import Penetration < 50% Import Penetration > 0, but < 50%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Import penetration 1.025 1.880** 1.665 3.487**
(3years change) (0.626) (0.774) (1.253) (1.534)
Import penetration # Firm contracted -1.927* -3.381**
(1.010) (1.592)
Control variables:
Share of non-production workers 1.020** 1.027** 1.127** 1.194**
(0.427) (0.430) (0.535) (0.544)
Firm shrunk 0.169 0.276 -0.076 0.350
(0.219) (0.227) (0.267) (0.333)
Firm grew -0.197 -0.209 -0.372 -0.382
(0.219) (0.221) (0.265) (0.268)
Constant -3.121*** -3.065*** -3.632*** -3.849***
(0.789) (0.794) (1.006) (1.028)
Other control variables:
Size Yes Yes Yes Yes
Main market Yes Yes Yes Yes
Type of good Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of interview Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ownership Yes Yes Yes Yes
Likelihood -208.12 -206.28 -144.60 -142.27
R2 0.144 0.152 0.156 0.169
p-value(Wald) 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.005
Marginal effect(↑ sd) .023 .076 .055 .256
Marginal effect(↑ from min to max) .12 .361 .204 .92
Marginal effect(↑ sd) for Shrinking Firms .00005 .0002
Marginal effect(↑ from min to max) for Shrinking Firms .0002 .0007
N 964 964 619 619
Note: ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01; 1
When the possible influence of crisis is accounted in the model, similar results are found.
The marginal effects of the main variable are slightly lower than in the main model, but not
significantly. Moreover, most of the underlined connections stay statistically significant.
I also control for the possible influence of the simultaneity of the decisions to increase or to
decrease number of managerial layers. By applying the bivariate probit model, one of possible
unobserved variable biases is eliminated. In particular, the bias connected with the multiplicity
of decision options. As a result, we obtain highly similar results (see Table 4.6).
similar to the results presented in Guadalupe and Wulf (2010).
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Table 4.5: Trade liberalization and flattening, adjusted for crisis influence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Basic Firm growth Ownership YearFE Survey CountryFE
Import penetration (3year change) adj. 0.249** 0.257** 0.257* 0.249* 0.267* 0.461
(0.119) (0.129) (0.134) (0.138) (0.140) (0.320)
Control variables:
Main market - national 0.196 0.229 0.275* 0.244 0.225 0.300*
(0.119) (0.157) (0.165) (0.169) (0.171) (0.177)
Mainly exporters 0.194 0.170 0.197 0.167 0.113 0.222
(0.149) (0.188) (0.202) (0.206) (0.213) (0.230)
Share of non-production workers 1.047*** 1.082*** 1.141*** 1.212**** 1.151*** 1.174***
(0.336) (0.340) (0.357) (0.360) (0.370) (0.396)
Firm contracted 0.331* 0.263 0.262 0.272 0.363*
(0.189) (0.194) (0.196) (0.199) (0.209)
Firm grew -0.191 -0.179 -0.190 -0.193 -0.143
(0.190) (0.197) (0.198) (0.202) (0.209)
No single ownership -0.491** -0.518** -0.496** -0.529**
(0.217) (0.220) (0.220) (0.226)
Domestic family ownership 0.592*** 0.581*** 0.557*** 0.619***
(0.212) (0.213) (0.216) (0.226)
Other ownership 0.486* 0.451* 0.445 0.546*
(0.263) (0.266) (0.273) (0.279)
Privitized 0.417*** 0.430*** 0.440*** 0.390**
(0.152) (0.153) (0.160) (0.164)
Still state-owned 0.298 0.295 0.338 0.236
(0.205) (0.207) (0.214) (0.236)
Number of rescheduling 0.066 0.100
(0.058) (0.062)
Country FE No No No No No Yes
Constant -2.337**** -2.325**** -2.431**** -2.473**** -2.861**** -3.398****
(0.410) (0.399) (0.423) (0.438) (0.683) (0.827)
Likelihood -271.284 -262.930 -249.367 -247.090 -242.226 -236.662
Likelihood C -283.0226 -283.0226 -282.8713 -282.8713 -279.3443 -279.3443
Pseudo-R2 .041477 .0709927 .1184438 .1264948 .1328758 .1527958
Chi2 24.92123 40.18506 67.0087 71.56351 74.23617 85.36528
P-value .0007836 7.03e-06 7.01e-08 5.05e-08 8.87e-07 2.64e-06
Marginal effect1 .004 .004 .004 .004 .004 .013
Marginal effect2 .010 .011 .010 .009 .011 .034
N 1085 1085 1083 1083 1070 1070
Note: ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Specifications also included the measure of size and dummy variables for intermediate goods and capital goods. Specefi-
cations 3-6 also included dummy variables for the type of foreign ownership (family, firm or state). Specifications 4-6 included the
dummy variables for the year when interview took place. Specifications 5-6 included noise variables for respondent’s willingness to
reveal information, knowledge about the firm, years in the firm, as well as reliability of figures and truthfulness regarding opinions
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Table 4.6: Robustness check: Bivariate probit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probit Probit Bivar.Probit Bivar.Probit
Pr(Y1 = 1|X) 1
Import penetration (3years change) 0.312** 0.314* 0.308** 0.305*
(0.140) (0.175) (0.139) (0.175)
Control variables:
Main market - national 0.202* 0.224 0.196* 0.221
(0.119) (0.170) (0.119) (0.171)
Mainly exporters 0.217 0.122 0.213 0.122
(0.150) (0.213) (0.150) (0.213)
Share of non-production workers 1.067*** 1.156*** 1.052*** 1.150***
(0.337) (0.370) (0.335) (0.367)
Firm contracted 0.283 0.289
(0.199) (0.198)
Firm grew -0.179 -0.163
(0.202) (0.202)
No single ownership -0.502** -0.507**
(0.221) (0.220)
Domestic family ownership 0.555** 0.546**
(0.216) (0.214)
Other ownership 0.445 0.439
(0.273) (0.272)
Privitized 0.442*** 0.446***
(0.160) (0.159)
Still state-owned 0.346 0.358*
(0.215) (0.214)
Constant -2.395*** -2.956*** -2.391*** -2.919***
(0.412) (0.690) (0.416) (0.692)
Pr(Y2 = 1|X) 2
Import penetration (3years change) 0.006 0.023
(0.152) (0.218)
Control variables:
Main market - national 0.065 0.069
(0.152) (0.167)
Mainly exporters 0.081 0.139
(0.185) (0.215)
Firm contracted 0.681***
(0.261)
No single ownership -0.345*
(0.207)
Still state-owned -0.516**
(0.251)
Constant -2.052*** -2.510***
(0.387) (0.699)
athrho
Constant -1.522*** -1.657
(0.221) (30.806)
Likelihood -271.285 -242.443 -502.450 -456.110
Chi2 23.37515 73.80278 31.66216 87.60972
P-value .0014661 1.03e-06 .0044732 .0007991
Marginal effect1 .006 .005 .006 .005
Marginal effect2 .015 .014 .015 .013
N 1085 1070 1085 1070
Note: ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The results for selected variables are presented. Full table is available upon request.
1 Pr(Y1 = 1|X) - The probability that a firm decreased the number of layers (flattened);
2 Pr(Y2 = 1|X) - The probability that a firm increased the number of layers
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4.7 Conclusions
By using unique data on the organization of firm in transition countries, namely EBRD
“Management, Organization and Innovations” (MOI) dataset, merged with the Orbis dataset
on firm performance indicators and Eora input-output tables we analyse the effect of changes
in import penetration on the changes in internal firm organization, and flattening in particular.
we consider the effect of import penetration growth on the probability to decrease the depth
of control (organizational distance between top managers and production employees) within
organizational structures of firms in transition countries.
Our results show that firms differ in their internal organizational structures, which they
adjust actively in 2007-2009. Multiple firms eliminated the layers of their organizational struc-
tures. This finding is consistent with the prevailing in the literature notion of flattening. Firms
decrease their depth of control (one of the characteristics of flattening) as a response to inten-
sified competition in their product markets due to higher import penetration. However, the
connection between increase of import competition and flattening is not homogeneous through-
out transition countries and in different industries. we find that the organizational response, in
particular the decrease of the depth of control, is stronger when the openness of the markets to
the international trade is higher. For example, the connection is much stronger and has higher
magnitude for Ukraine, which in 2007-2009 experienced a remarkable increase in import pene-
tration in most of the manufacturing industries, than for Russia, which experienced significant
decrease of import penetration in multiple manufacturing industries.
Moreover, by proposing a new measure of the degree of control (the percentage of non-
production workers under direct authority of the top manager) we find that firms that flatten
their organizational structures are also the firms that have a higher degree of control over non-
production workers. Such a finding suggest that in transition countries flattening is associated
with some features of centralization (higher control) supporting the previous research on the
link between flattening and functional centralization (Wulf, 2012).
As a result, we conclude that greater international competition following trade liberalization
leads to flatter firm hierarchies in transition countries. Moreover, we argue that it is inaccurate
to label flattening as a synonym of decentralization as decentralization does not accurately
represent changes of internal governance. In the case of transition countries, flattening is a
complex phenomenon that in the end is more similar to the centralization of organizational
structure. Moreover, improving corporate governance per se was not the primary goal for
organizational change in transition countries. Instead, perhaps it was an evident increase in
the amount of competition faced by firms to act as an external impetus for organizational
change.
Considering the link between the depth of organizational structures and the job polariza-
tion proposed in multiple studies (although not analysing it directly), the heterogeneity in the
connection between import market competition and firm flattening is illustrated. Such hetero-
geneity of countries with respect to the connection between trade openness and firm flattening
could allow explaining why, for example, job polarization has not been documented in Russia
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in 2000-2012 (Gimpelson and Kapelyushnikov, 2014). In fact, the degree of import penetration
in the manufacturing industries in Russia in the bigger share of this period was either stable
or falling. Therefore, it did not cause significant flattening of firm organizational structures in
this sector of production and did not result in job polarization.
This chapter provides a relevant contribution to the understanding of the influence of in-
ternational trade openness on the changes of firm organization. The increase of the openness
towards the international trade has been often argued as one of the main policies to increase the
efficiency and productivity of these countries. Multiple studies have been dedicated to under-
stand the impact of such a policy on the country performance, welfare and economic growth.
However, a big share of international trade studies has been treating a firm as a fixed pro-
duction technology. Regardless the fundamental role of firm organization for the efficiency of
production, firm organizational changes have been rarely considered. In some cases accounting
for the change of firm organization while analysing the response to international trade opening
may significantly alter, or even cancel out, the gains from international trade.
The results of this chapter also contribute to the understanding of firm organization in tran-
sition countries. Firm organizational structures have been documented to change significantly
in recent decades in developed countries as response to higher international trade. However,
little is known about the organizational structures of firms in developing countries due to data
constrains, even less in transition countries. Transition countries have experienced changes
in multiple areas, including international trade liberalization and World Trade Organization
(WTO) accessions (or negotiations), privatization and structural reforms resulting in signif-
icant organizational changes. However, the results of such reforms are often falling short of
expectations. Accounting for organizational changes or their absence may give us more insight
on why the expected results have not been met in transition countries, especially in terms of
international trade openness.
104
Chapter 5
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT,
MANAGERIAL PRACTICES AND
CORRUPTION
5.1 Introduction
Research suggests that firms that apply good management practices perform significantly
better than those that do not. This indicates that improved management practice is one of
the most effective ways for a firm to outperform its peers, accessing notable improvements in
performance simply by adopting good practices used elsewhere. For policy makers, it lays down
a challenge. The overall performance of most countries is determined not by the performance
of its leading companies, but by the size of its “tail” of poor performers. By developing
environments that promote good management practices across all firms and by devoting as
much attention to the followers as to the leaders, governments can drive the competitiveness of
their entire economies.
Even in transition countries the quality of management practices is positively associated
with various measures of firm performance (Bloom et al., 2012), with privatized and private
firms showing better outcomes than state-owned firms. However, some exceptions exist. In
Russia, only firms operating in most competitive regions present positive association, while
majority of firms in the country does not (Schweiger and Friebel, 2013).
In transition countries, management practices were traditionally affected by significant ad-
ministrative burden from public regulations. This has changed a lot with either extensive
national or specific reforms. Examples abound. In Russia, the level of regulatory burden prior
to the Russian liberalization reform of business regulations was extremely high. Between 2001
and 2004, Russia started a drastic liberalization reform of business regulation. Three consec-
utive national laws focused on liberalization of entry and operation of existing businesses in
the areas of inspections, licenses, and registration. The reform consisted of a package of three
laws passed at different points in time during the period 2001–2004: the law on inspections
— on 8 August 2001; the law on delicensing on 11 February 2002; the law on registration —
on 1 January 2004. Moreover, Russia launched in 2003 a large-scale reform project focusing
on modernization of the Federal Custom service in order to promote internationally acceptable
practices for processing of internally traded flows by Customs. However, the success of the im-
plementation of reforms and legislation was largely uneven (Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya, 2007).
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Another example may be found in the regulatory reforms in Ukraine. Public procurement in
Ukraine was harshly criticized since early 2000s and a new public procurement law was passed
in 2010.
But business operations and management practices in transition countries are still subject to
numerous obstacles: corruption is characterized by significant amount and frequency of bribery
(sometimes called administrative corruption (World Bank, 2011) and often represent a major
obstacle for businesses, regardless extensive reforms in the region in cutting red tape, simplifying
taxes, and strengthening audits. These reforms reduce the opportunities for corruption and
show real results on the ground in many countries, with firms reporting bribery to be in some
cases less frequent and in smaller amounts.1 However, there is still a large gap between the
level of corruption in transition countries and their more advanced counterparts.
Thus, there remain important reasons to reinforce and accelerate reforms. Moreover, cor-
ruption is falling not in all countries or all sectors, and even the most successful reformers still
tend to have higher levels of corruption than in Western Europe (World Bank, 2011). Corrup-
tion continues to weigh most heavily on new private firms that are the engine of growth and
employment in the region.2 Whenever corruption is perceived as a severe obstacle to business,
it is generally positively correlated to bribery or informal payments to government officials.
The impact of corruption on firm performance and the associated underlying mechanisms
need to be assessed. Management is one of such mechanisms as quality of management is
strongly linked to firm performance. This chapter investigates whether bribe frequency and
corruption as an obstacle explain differences in managerial quality in transition countries. We
find that it does explain substantially the difference between transition countries that are
now EU members and the remainder of the region. EU memberships created incentives for
improvement in governance and business climate that has given European transition countries
an advantage over their peers in other regions, in terms of corruption levels and regulatory
burden. This advantage is clearly reflected in significant improvement of managerial quality.
This chapter use the latest release of BEEPS V showing results characteristic for years 2012-
2014, comparing these results with previous data. It is organized as follows: Section 2 looks
at the literature related to managerial quality and its determinants. Section 3 explains how
to measure management practices; Section 4 describes the pattern of management practices
across transition countries, while Section 5 investigates the factors accounting for differences in
management practices across firms and countries. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
1On the one side, results about relative comparisons in 2008 versus 2005 in the perception of severity
of corruption as an obstacle show that corruption increased in the period and moved up from third- biggest
problem in 2005 to the second biggest in 2008. On the other side, results on administrative corruption show
mixed results with an average increase in 22 transition countries according to the World Economic Forum survey
and a decrease with the exception in public procurement, according to BEEPS IV.
2World Bank (2011) assesses levels and trends in corruption and the administrative burden from government
regulation of private firms. Results are largely based upon BEEPS 2008 updating the progress that transition
countries have made since 2005, showing favourable trend regarding firms’ payments of administrative bribes
with some country outliers and a significant exception in bribery in public procurement
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5.2 Related literature
Economists have long been raising a question on the differences in productivity, across coun-
tries, firms and over time. Businesses’ productivity levels vary significantly within industries.
For example, looking at disaggregated data on U.S. manufacturing industries, Syverson (2004)
found that plants at the 90th percentile produced four times as much as plants in the 10th
percentile on a per-employee basis. Only half of this difference in labour productivity could be
accounted for by differential inputs, such as capital intensity. Foster et al. (2008) show large
differences in total factor productivity even within industries with very homogeneous goods.
Some of these productivity differences across firms and plants are temporary, but in large part
they persist over time. At the country level, Hall and Jones (1999) show how the stark dif-
ferences in productivity across countries account for a substantial fraction of the differences in
average per capita income. Moreover, they document that the differences in capital accumu-
lation, productivity, and therefore output per worker are driven by differences in institutions
and government policies.
Aggregate TFP, rather than labour productivity, differences across countries have been
important explanations of the cross-country success. But, a puzzle still remains: observable
characteristics such as human and nonhuman capital seem to be unable to account for large
GDP per capita differences observed across countries. However, an expanded view of human
capital that includes managerial and entrepreneurial skills can account for a significant share
of the TFP differences(Gennaioli et al. 2013).Aggregate TFP differences across countries are
also affected by how different economic systems allocate output to plants of heterogeneous
productivity levels. The empirical evidence from firm-level data has shown that the widespread
heterogeneity in firm-level performance is accompanied by substantial heterogeneity in the size
of firms, even within narrowly defined industries. Data suggest that there is considerable
variation in the strength of the link between productivity and size both, across countries and
industries, as well as over time. Misallocation or allocative inefficiency as well as policy-induced
distortions may be at the heart of the observed variation in the productivity-size covariances,
contributing to the explanation of observed differences in aggregate performance.
However, recent empirical evidence focuses on another possible explanation for persistent
differences in productivity at the firm and the national level, namely persistent differences in
productivity largely reflect variations in management practices. The issue of whether manage-
ment practices are an important factor in understanding the heterogeneity of firm productivity
was at the heart of the World Management Survey (WMS) with their large scale samples of
management data across firms and countries. Practices that are essential for good management
(Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010) have been identified and measured, and most recent literature
is in search for explanations. Many empirical contributions show 3 that numerous organizations
throughout the world are very badly managed. Moreover, they show that indicators of better
management and superior performance are strongly correlated with measures such as produc-
tivity, return on capital employed, and firm survival, and that management makes a difference
3For a survey on what has been learned empirically and theoretically from WMS see Bloom et al. 2014
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in shaping national performance.4
Looking at transition countries, evidence suggests that while there are many well-managed
firms, many firms are also operating with extremely old-fashioned management practices. More
generally, it appeared that decades of central planning had left many managers in small and
medium-sized firms with weak financial management, no vision of how to develop their company,
and how much investment they need. Several studies on firm productivity in transition countries
highlights the lack of appropriate managerial skills as a possible explanation for lower produc-
tivity found among state-owned or formerly state-owned firms (Estrin et al., 2009). Bloom et al.
(2012) investigate the factors that account for poor management in many transition countries.
They find that factors that matter in non-transition countries matter in transition countries
as well. Stronger product market competition, higher levels of multinational ownership, and
greater employee education are all strongly correlated with better management. They also show
that higher levels of private ownership are strongly correlated with better management. This
suggests that the continued opening of markets to domestic and foreign competition, the pri-
vatisation of state-owned firms, and the increased levels of workforce education should promote
better management, and ultimately higher national productivity.
The business environment in transition countries has improved since the beginning of 2000s.
However, the transition regions have not yet reached the level of mature market economies.
Moreover, any average measures masks important differences between and within countries,
between different types of firms and between different dimensions of the business climate. In
2005, (EBRD, 2005) the business obstacles hit hardest those firms that are most likely to gener-
ate growth and new jobs, such as private firms, exporting companies and firms located outside
of capital cities. Micro and small enterprises also faced a more difficult business environment
than large firms – including accessing finance. In 2009, business obstacles still affected system-
atically especially manufacturing firms, firms in joint ventures with foreign partners and firms
that compete with informal markets firms. Not only firms characteristics, but also country
characteristics as, for instance, country geopolitical location (Anderson and Shimul, 2013) were
important for the impact of business obstacles. Corruption was one of the main obstacles and
its severity was associated to firms characteristics like private and larger firms and to type of
countries where firms operate, like CIS countries. The severity of the corruption obstacle is on
average positively connected with informal payments to government officials or bribe frequency.
In general, as firms judge the obstacle to be more severe, the likelihood of making an informal
payment rises (Anderson and Shimul, 2013).
In more general terms, corruption has been often associated with the deterioration of aggre-
gate efficiency. The channels of the negative effects of corruption are manifold. In particular,
it may alter aggregate efficiency by increasing the costs imposed either on firms, on govern-
ment activity, or through the government’s lack of efficiency to correct externalities (Olken and
Pande, 2011). The most relative to this study is the first channel. In particular, corruption has
been found to affect not only macroeconomic performance (Mauro, 1995), but also significantly
4For example, variation in management accounts for nearly a quarter of cross country and within country
TFP gaps in Bloom et al. 2014)
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affect firm behaviour (Sequeira and Djankov, 2014), firm growth (Fisman and Svensson, 2007;
Gaviria, 2002) and firm productivity (De Rosa et al., 2010). Moreover, Dal Bo´ and Rossi (2007)
developed a model and supported it empirically, arguing that higher levels of corruption are
associated with the higher presence of inefficient firms. Although the evidence supporting neg-
ative effects of corruption is strong (Aidt, 2009), the opinion persists that corruption can foster
development in some cases by “greasing the wheels” of an economy (Me´on and Weill, 2010).
From the firm level perspective, Dreher and Gassebner (2013) illustrate that in highly regula-
tive economy corruption reduces the deterioration effect of excessive regulations on business,
thus, facilitating firm entry. Supporting evidence for “greasing-wheels” hypothesis has also
been found for Chinese firms facing underdeveloped financial markets(Wang and You, 2012),
and for SMEs in the Philippines (Mendoza et al., 2015).
Most of the discussed studies on corruption tended to focus on the corruption impact on
firm economic performance. However, it is important to analyse the role of firm management
in both enduring the negative presence of corruption and exploiting opportunities presented
by it. In other words, it is necessary to look at the connection between corruption and firm
management. The unanswered question is how firms are managed in the presence of corruption.
It is well known that corruption can deteriorate firm management practices (Athanasouli
and Goujard, 2015). The main channels are the following three: first, managers are engaged in
alluring public officials, through unofficial payments or gifts in exchange for services, licences
or contract; second, specific forms of governance could prevail, capable to deal with conditions
of a corrupt business environment; third, firms may pay bribes to outbid competing parties in
public procurement. All this can result in lower managerial quality. However, it is possible
that management of some firms may gain from corruption in terms of its efficiency. Basing
on the issues highlighted by the managerial literature, Galang (2012) generates a theoretical
model of firm strategy in the presence of government corruption. He argues that firms are not
passive with respect to corruption, rather they are active contributors in boosting or resisting
to corruption through their strategic activities. The model emphasizes that not all firms suffer
from being embedded in a business environment with deep-rooted corruption because some
of them are able and motivated to make these institutional inefficiency work in their favour.
Building on the interviews with more that 300 top mangers in India, Collins et al. (2009) show
that top managers are likely to rationalize corruption as mean for being competitive. Thus, the
role of corruption as a determinant of management quality is not straightforward and require
further analysis.
The search for determinants of management quality is a part of a larger field of research on
the effectiveness and the channels of transmission of the many liberalization reforms of business
that took place in transition countries and it can be central to any evaluation and design of
public policies. Good governance institutions surely played an important role for the posi-
tive effects of liberalization reforms on firm performance and small business employment. For
instance, in Russian regions with higher transparency of government, better access to indepen-
dent sources of information, more concentrated large businesses, and better fiscal incentives,
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the liberalization reform was better enforced and led to a significantly higher drop in the actual
regulatory burden, and as a result, better outcomes. On the contrary, the most corrupt regions
delay or circumvent the implementation of liberalization policies (Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya,
2013). Differential enforcement of liberalization features Russian regions goes hands by hands
with different institutional environments. The geography of good governance institutions seems
to have played a crucial role for business reforms enforcement. And thus geography matters not
only for the geographical dispersion of management quality but also for the relative strength
of the determinants of managerial quality, especially in Russia (Friebel and Schweiger, 2013).
The role of good governance institutions and the degree of exposure to corruption seem to play
an important role for firm performance, and for management practices.
We can take for given the importance of management, both at the macro level (in account-
ing for the large disparities in cross-country total factor productivity) and at the micro level (in
accounting for unobservable components of within country TFP differences and firms’ hetero-
geneity). Now the questions are: how we measure management differences, what are the main
determinants of managerial differences across countries and whether or not these determinants
are similar across countries that experienced very different institutional adjustments. Among
these determinants a crucial role is played by the corruption and by the compliance burdens of
firms in transition.
5.3 Data on management practices and corruption
5.3.1 Data: MOI 2008-2009 and BEEPS V 2012-2014
We use data from two data sets. The first data set is the EBRD-World Bank “Management,
Organization and Innovation” (MOI) survey assessing management practices in 1,800 manufac-
turing establishments with between 50 and 5000 employees in 10 transition countries (Belarus,
Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan)
as well as Germany and India. The survey was implemented in partnership with the World
Bank from October 2008 to November 2009. The objective of this survey is to measure and
compare management practices across countries, to assess the constraints to private sector
growth and enterprise performance resulting from management practices.
The second data set is the BEEPS V, the fifth round of the EBRD-World Ban “Business
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey”, implemented from 2011 to 2014 that covers
15,883 enterprises in 30 countries of the transition region, including Eastern Europe and Baltics
(Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia,
Poland), South Eastern Europe (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, FYR Macedonia,
Kosovo, Romania, Serbia, Montenegro), Eastern Europe and the Caucasus (Armenia, Azer-
baijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine), Russia, Turkey and Central Asia (Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Mongolia, Uzbekistan). BEEPS V started in Russia in 2011-2012,
covering 4,220 enterprises in 37 regions, followed by other countries in 2012-2014.
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5.3.2 Good managerial practices: How to measure them.
To measure management requires codifying the concept of “good” or “bad” management
into a measure applicable to different firms across the manufacturing sector. This is a hard task
as good management is difficult to define, and is often contingent on a firm’s environment. The
initial hypothesis is that while some management practices are too contingent to be evaluated
as “good” or “bad”, others can potentially be defined in these terms, and it is these practices
we consider. This is in line with Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) that suggest examples of
practices that may be quantified and compared across countries and firms. However, there is
room for legitimate disagreement over whether all of these measures really constitute “good
practice”. Three practices are generally considered in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007, 2010)
studies as essential elements of good management: 1. Targets: Does the organization support
long-term goals with tough but achievable short-term performance benchmarks? 2. Incentives:
Does the organization reward high performers with promotions and bonuses while retraining
or moving underperformers? 3. Monitoring: Does the organization rigorously collect and
analyse performance data to identify opportunities for improvement? Using data from MOI
(2008-2010) and BEEPS V(2012-2014) in Appendix A we detail the practices and the type of
questions asked, including associated scoring system.5
With these data, we first have to construct a robust measure of management practices over-
coming one hurdle: scoring management practices on the basis of available data. As argued
in Bloom et al. (2012), practices in MOI data set can be grouped into four areas: Operations
(one practice), Monitoring (seven practices), Targets (one practice) and Incentives (three prac-
tices). The operations practice focuses on the introduction of lean manufacturing techniques,
the documentation of processes improvements and the rationale behind introductions of im-
provements. The monitoring practices focuses on the tracking of performance of individuals,
reviewing performance (e.g. through regular appraisals and job plans), and consequence man-
agement (e.g. making sure that plans are kept and appropriate sanctions and rewards are in
place). The targets practice examine the time-scale of production targets, namely whether
goals are simply short term or more long-term or their combination. Finally, the incentives
practices include promotion criteria (e.g. purely tenure based or including an element linked
to individual performance), fixing or firing bad performers and rewarding production target
achievement.
The calculation of the management quality score consists of 4 steps, as in Bloom et al.
(2012). First, since the scaling may vary across practices the scores are converted to z-scores
by normalizing each practice:
Zpijc =
Pijc − P¯ijc
σPijc
(5.1)
Where where Zpijc is the z-score of management practice Pijc of a firm i in industry j and
country c, P¯ijc is the unweighted average of management practice Pijc across all observations
5The questions and scoring is presented for the BEEPS V. For the MOI scoring is fully based on the scoring
tables and questions presented in Bloom et al. (2012)
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in all countries and σPijc is the standard deviation of management practice Pijc across all
observations in all countries.
The second step consist of the calculation of the average of z-scores of different practices be-
longing to the same area. This is necessary to avoid biases towards the area of the management
represented by the higher number of questions in the survey. Thus, the following unweighted
average is calculated:
M¯Aijc =
1
nPijc,A
∑
Pijc∈A
Zpijc (5.2)
Where where M¯Aijc is unweighted average of management practices (z-scores) Zpijc belonging
to the same management area A (operations, monitoring, targets or incentives) of a firm i in
industry j and country c.
The third step is to average the performance of a firm across different management areas:
M˜ijc =
1
4
(M¯Operijc + M¯
Monit
ijc + M¯
Targ
ijc + M¯
Incent
ijc ) (5.3)
The final step of the calculations consists of the trasforming the unweighted average in the
z-score of the final measure with the mean zero and standard deviation 1:
MQijc =
M˜ijc − ¯˜Mijc
σM˜ijc
(5.4)
The overall result Mijc can be used as a measure of the management quality (across countries
and across practices). The (positive/negative) deviations from the average score illustrates the
(“good”/“bad”) quality of the management.
In the BEEPS V data set the practices are also grouped into four areas. While the number
of practices for some areas varies between MOI and BEEPS V, all the areas are represented
and accomplish the same functions. The area of operations (one practice) represent how the
firm deal with problems arising in the process of production, while the area of monitoring (one
practice) cover the use of production indicators. The area of targets (three practices) represents
the timescale for production targets, their difficulty and the awareness of them among managers
and production workers. The area (three practices) of incentives addresses whether and how
firms encourage performance, in particular through performance-based bonuses, promotions
and discharging underperforming employees. The same procedure as for MOI data was used to
average the practices and create a combined measure of the management quality.
Both of the datasets allow us to measure the quality of management at the moment of the
interview. The measurement is, however, based on the survey responses of the firms. Survey
data is often affected by the perceptions and experience of the respondent. One of the ways to
limit such a basis is by elimination potential markers of desired answer in the questions of the
survey. As the questions of the survey regarding the management quality was focused on the
quantifiable measures rather than on the judgment of the respondent6 the bias caused by the
6An example can be fount in the question of the time frame of reassignment/dismissal of under-performing
non-manager, that included the options like whithin 6 months, after 6 months or raraely/never
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question formulation has been minimized. In particular, the ranking of the practices has been
done by the survey organizers, rather than by the respondent. However, it is possible that firms
that performed worse or better in the past could have differences in their management quality
assessment due to their past experiences. This possibility is reasonable to analyze when the
data on the past performances is available, in particular the data on such shock events like a
near bankruptcy situation or the cases of particular success. In the absence of time series data,
exclusion of such biases is highly challenging.
5.3.3 Patterns of management across practices and countries
Accounting for the distribution across countries, Figure 5.1 shows that Germany has on
average the highest scores (0.13 more than sample average), Poland is second, Lithuania is third
and the Uzbekistan is the last. Moreover, several country groups emerge. Central European
transition countries like Poland and Lithuania operate with practices which are close to those of
European countries, like Germany. Central Asian countries, i.e. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan,
are among the countries with the lowest quality of management. The presence of Germany at
the top of the ranking is consistent with anecdotal evidence from other surveys. Figure E.1 in
Appendix provides more details behind these cross-country comparisons, and reveals uneven
distribution of best practices among countries. For instance the table shows a relative strength
of Lithuania in targets, of Bulgaria in monitoring, of Ukraine in incentives, and German strength
in operations.
Figure 5.1: Management practices across countries and country groups (MOI)
(a) Countries
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Poland
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Average Management Score (MOI)
(b) Country Groups
Central Asia
Russia
India
Eastern Europe and the Caucasus
South Eastern Europe
Central Europe and Baltic States
Germany
-.3 -.2 -.1 0 .1
Management quality (all practices)
Source: own calculations based on the MOI survey (2009)
Using the data of the BEEPS V survey performed in 2012-2014, one may observe that some
individual countries have moved up and down in the cross-country ranking of management qual-
ity. However, similar patterns are observed in terms of ranking of the country groups.7 Although
7The countries included in the country groups differ between surveys. In MOI data, Central Europe and
Baltic States (CEB) includes only Lithuania and Poland, Eastern Europe and the Caucasus (EEC) includes
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the representation of the country groups has changed between the surveys, using BEEPS V
survey similar country groups emerge that approximate economic development. Central Euro-
pean transition countries are again among the best performers in terms of management quality.
While, Turkey and Central Asian countries mostly operate with very poor management. The
management quality in Ukraine and Belarus as a part of the Eastern Europe and the Caucasus
countries is again very close to the one in Russia, although in BEEPS V it is slightly lower, while
in MOI it is slightly higher. Scores across country groups (Figures 5.2)confirm this finding: the
ranking goes from the positive results for Central Europe and Baltics, positive but lower results
for South-Eastern Europe, to the negative outcome for Eastern Europe and the Caucasus and
Central Asia. Significant differences across country groups characterize management practices
in transition countries and for many countries these differences are persistent.
Figure 5.2: Management practices across country groups (BEEPS V)
Turkey
Central Asia
Eastern Europe and the Caucasus
Russia
South Eastern Europe
Central Europe and Baltic States
-.05 0 .05 .1 .15
Management quality (all practices)
Source: Own calculations based on BEEPS V. Country groups: Central Europe and Baltics (CEB), Eastern Europe and the
Caucasus (EEC), Central Asia, South-Eastern Europe (SEE)
In the more recent period, management scores range from an average score of -0.22 for
Mongolia to 0.37 in Estonia (the distribution is presented in the Figure E.2 of the Appendix).
Accounting for the distribution of management practices, Figure E.3 and E.4 of the Appendix
shows the distribution of the average management scores in different areas of practices, plotted
for country groups and individual countries. They appear highly heterogeneous within country.
Ukraine and Belarus, Central Asia includes Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and South Eastern Europe (SEE)
includes Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia. BEEPS V allows better representation of the country groups. Thus,
the comparison of country groups performance should be make with caution. However, grouping of countries
presented in MOI data allows us highlight the similarity of the patterns between the surveys.
114
CHAPTER 5. BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT, MANAGERIAL PRACTICES AND CORRUPTION
5.3.4 Corruption
In order two evaluate how deep is corruption incorporated in the business environment of
transition countries we use three different measures. First gives us the idea on how frequent
are informal payments to regulatory authorities when firms need to “make things done”. This
measure gives us the view a firm has on the overall frequency of administrative corruption in
an industry and location where it operates. We will further mention it as administrative cor-
ruption. Second measure gives us the information of the frequency of administrative corruption
in dealing with either customs (imports), taxes and tax collection or courts (further referred
as administrative corruption by type). Both of this measures are normalized by the sample
mean in our analysis in the similar to management quality way. The distribution of these two
measures by group of countries is presented in the Figure 5.3
Unlike most freedom indexes predicts, Turkey is ranked among the countries with lower
administrative corruption reported by operating firms. Such controversial ranking may be
caused by the efficiency of the resent measures against corruption (Adaman, 2011) or by the
structural differences in the perception of corruption frequency in this country.
However, the second best in the ranking is the group of Central European and Baltic coun-
tries, which usually perform better in most of characteristics of the institutional environment
for business. Especially low levels of administrative corruption are in Estonia, Hungary and
Slovenia. If we consider the types of administrative corruption, the lowest is the administra-
tive corruption in taxes and tax collection. The next group of countries that perform better
than average is the group of Southern Eastern Europe. Eastern European and the Caucasus
countries perform worse than CEB, but better than Central Asia and Russia, while Russia is a
leader in terms of highest levels of administrative corruption.
Figure 5.3: Administrative corruption by group of countries
Turkey
Central Europe and Baltic States
South Eastern Europe
Eastern Europe and the Caucasus
Central Asia
Russia
-.4 -.2 0 .2
Administrative Corruption
Source: own calculations based on BEEPS V
Note: Administrative corruption represents the standardized measure of the frequency of informal payments to “have things done”
either in general (variable ecaq39) or in certain spheres like taxes and tax collection, courts or customs and imports (variables
ecaq41a ecaq41b ecaq41c)
The third measure indicates in what degree a particular firm considers corruption an obstacle
to its operation. In particular, it shows whether the obstacle is minor, moderate, major or very
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severe. This measure is more subjective than the two previous measures as the perception of an
obstacle may vary depending on a firm performance, its characteristics and experience of deal-
ing with authorities. Opposite to the previous measures, the answer scale has no quantifiable
minimum and maximum as they are “no obstacle” and “very severe obstacle”, respectively.8
However, the use of this measure allows us to highlight the characteristics of and drivers be-
hind firms’ perception of corruption. As the later may potentially affect firm behaviour and
organization.
The distribution of corruption as an obstacle between country groups is presented in the
Figure 5.4. As the left chart of the figure shows the lowest average score of corruption as an
obstacle is observed in Turkey and Central Europe and Baltics. However, there is significant
differences in severity of the obstacle corruption represents. In Turkey much higher than in
CEB is the number of firms report that corruption is a very severe obstacle, while it is mainly
a moderate obstacle in CEB. Russia and South Eastern Europe are among the worst perform-
ers, and while in Russia corruption is extremely more often a major obstacle, in SEE poor
performance is mostly due to corruption being a very severe obstacle.
Figure 5.4: Administrative corruption by group of countries
Turkey
Russia
Central Asia
Eastern Europe and the Caucasus
South Eastern Europe
Central Europe and Baltic States
0 .5 1 1.5
Corruption as an obstacle
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Corruption as an obstacle
Minor obstacle Moderate obstacle
Major obstacle Very severe obstacle
Source: own calculations based on BEEPS V
Note: Corruption as an obstacle represents either the average score of the variable j30f by country group (left) or the share of firms
responding that corruption represent an obstacle of a certain degree (right)
As these figures show the ranking of countries may differ depending on the type of corruption
measure is used. However, a bigger share of the patterns is characteristic for multiple measures
of corruption. Although, one comment is in order. While the administrative corruption mainly
represent the idea of firms about average exposure of other firms like themselves to informal
irregular payments to regulative authorities, corruption as an obstacle represent the perception
of a particular firm reflecting how big is the burden of corruption to its operations and efficiency.
Such distinction is important as while the main tool of anti-corruption and regulative reforms
is the reduction of the frequency of informal payments to authorities, the main aim is usually
8The frequency of bribes varies between never (0% of cases) and always (100% of cases) that have the same
meaning independently of the country or firm characteristics
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to decrease the burden of corruption for business.
5.4 Empirical Strategy
Main specification
The estimation strategy is to run regressions of the following form:
MQijc = β0 + β1Corrijc + X¯ijcβ2 + β3Wc + β4Wj + u (5.5)
where MQSijc is the Management score by firm i, in industry j and country c The main
variable of interest is Corrijc which is the measure of corruption at the firm level representing
either normalized frequency of administrative corruption or dummy variable of the frequency
of administrative corruption when firms deal with imports/customs, taxes or tax collection,
and courts. The model also includes a number of control variables ( vector Xijc) that serve
to detect the influence of observable firm-level characteristics on the corruption-managerial
quality relationship. It includes dummy variables representing the type of firm ownership, size
and age of the firm, and the that consist of firm-level variables like human-capital and ownership
concentration. We also control for country Wc and industry Wj fixed effects.
Corruption as an obstacle
In order to underline the connection between management quality and the perception of
corruption reported by firms we estimate the following equation:
MQijc = β0 +CorrObstijcβ1 +Xijcβ2 +X
2
ijcβ3 + β4Wc + β5Wj + u (5.6)
where CorrObstijc reflect the degree of obstacle represented by corruption as viewed by a
firm i, in industry j and country c. The difference from the previous specification mainly lies in
two aspects. First, we use the perceived level of corruption as an obstacle CorrObstijc (set of
dummy variables; explained in more details in Table E.1). Second, we include the interactions
of this level with a set of firm characteristics in the vector X2ijc. The inclusion of this vector
allows us to highlight the possible firm features affecting both firm perception of corruption
and its management quality.9 Vector Xijc, as in previous specification, includes the controls
9This allows us to eliminate a part of possible endogeneity caused by different firm characteristics. Nev-
ertheless, other firm-level features may potentially affect firm perception of corruption. Such endogeneity is
often dealt in the literature through the use of instrumental variables or group averages excluding firm own
response (Aterido et al., 2011; Commander and Svejnar, 2011). Although we are concerned with endogeneity
problem, we find the instrumental variable approach infeasible. Moreover, in this study we are interested in the
connection between firm perception and both firm size and type of ownership. Consequently, desired way to
deal with endogeneity other than the one caused by these two features would be to estimate average corruption
perception of firms similar to interviewed firm in terms of country of activities, sector, size and ownership.
However, data limitations do not allow us to have such a grouping, as number of state- and foreign-owned
firms within country-sector-size groups is too small. As a result, acknowledging the possible endogeneity of this
measure we use it strictly as a complement for the main specification
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for human-capital and ownership, size and age of firms. We also control for country Wc and
industry Wj fixed effects.
In both cases the OLS regression is used in order to highlight the influence of corruption on
the continuous differences in the quality of management. Clustered standard errors are used in
order to account for possible correlation of errors between firms within countries.
The detailed description of the construction of control variables is presented in Table E.1
in the Appendix E
5.5 Results
5.5.1 Administrative corruption and management quality by coun-
try
Privatization and the adoption of new regulatory systems in the period of transition provided
enormous opportunities for bribe-seeking and improper use of connections and influence. Some
countries have been able to partly defeat an incentive to use these opportunities. Some other
have been much less efficient in doing so. As a result, we may observe that in countries
with lower frequency of corruption (administrative corruption) successful countries also are
characterized by, on average, higher quality of management. The unconditional correlation
between the management scores and the measure of administrative corruption is displayed in
Figure 5.5 for main groups of countries, whereas distribution of some types of administrative
corruption are displayed in Figures E.5 and E.6.
This initial graphical evidence shows that, although the link between administrative cor-
ruption and management quality on average tends to be negative on the country level, this link
can be quite different for different country groups. While Central and South Eastern European
transition countries show on average a negative link between managerial quality and corruption,
they also present much lower superior limit of corruption and much higher superior limit of
management quality. The rest of transition countries on average show much weaker negative
link between administrative corruption and management quality, mostly due to the presence
of much higher idiosyncrasy of the association: some countries reveal a positive association be-
tween deviations from the average of corruption and the quality of management. For instance,
a comparatively higher level of administrative corruption in Kyrgyzstan is associated with a
comparatively higher level of management quality. Comparatively lower levels of corruption in
Turkey and Belarus are associated with comparatively lower levels of management.
Such initial results illustrate that, although the link between administrative corruption and
management practices is negative on the country level, there are some unobserved features of
countries and firm performance that may alter, and even reverse, this link.
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Figure 5.5: Administrative Corruption and Management Quality (BEEPS V)
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Note: Country groups: Central Europe and Baltics (CEB), Eastern Europe and the Caucasus (EEC), Central Asia, South-Eastern
Europe (SEE). Western Balkans include Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Albania, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro.
5.5.2 Corruption and management quality: within and between
countries
In order to evaluate country and firm features that may affect the link between corruption
and management quality, we have moved to the firm-level regression analysis. The results of the
analysis on the total sample are presented in Table 5.1. The results indicate that administrative
corruption is an important obstacle to management quality.
Supporting previous results of the unconditional correlations, the results in Table 5.1 show
statistically significant negative association between the level of administrative corruption and
management quality. This result is obtained by accounting for both between-countries and
within-country variation. The partial correlation of -0.027 in this case means that an increase
of frequency of administrative corruption from seldom to very frequent, on average, would result
in decrease of management quality from 0.0541 to -0.004. In other words, such a difference would
be equal to the difference between average management quality in Czech Republic and average
management quality in Serbia.
The results also show that the link between administrative corruption and management
quality may be idiosyncratic on the sub-national level in different countries and for different
firm. As soon as we eliminate the between-countries variation from the regression (Table 5.1
column ‘CountryFE’), the coefficient becomes statistically insignificant. Indicating that within-
country connection of corruption with management quality may not be grasped by the unique
empirical model for all transition countries.
However, we find significant negative link between administrative corruption in tax collection
(taxes) and management quality characteristic for all the countries in the sample. This results
underlines that certain types of administrative corruption may have stronger negative impact
at the quality of management that others.
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Table 5.1: Management Quality and Corruption. Firm-Level Results
Base Country FE Corruption
Type
Corruption
Obstacle
Administrative corruption -0.047* -0.013
(0.024) (0.021)
Administrative corruption(customs/imports) 0.020
(0.025)
Administrative corruption(courts) 0.028
(0.046)
Administrative corruption(taxes) -0.083*
(0.042)
Corruption-Minor obstacle -0.260
(0.237)
Corruption-Moderate obstacle -0.918*
(0.492)
Corruption-Major obstacle -0.348
(0.256)
Corruption-Very severe obstacle -0.729*
(0.363)
Foreign ownership 0.186* 0.062 0.067 0.016
(0.099) (0.089) (0.097) (0.071)
State ownership -0.065 -0.123 -0.121 -0.163
(0.141) (0.156) (0.152) (0.149)
Size 0.021 0.033 0.045** -0.001
(0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.032)
Age -0.025 -0.049** -0.044** -0.033
(0.030) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020)
Size# Minor obstacle 0.015
(0.058)
Size# Moderate obstacle 0.130*
(0.073)
Size# Major obstacle 0.037
(0.048)
Size# Very severe obstacle 0.104
(0.068)
State# Moderate obstacle 1.412**
(0.567)
State# Major obstacle 0.605***
(0.194)
Foreign# Moderate obstacle 0.112
(0.199)
Foreign# Major obstacle 0.079
(0.168)
Foreign# Very severe obstacle 0.376*
(0.201)
Constant 0.381** 0.695*** 1.215*** 0.568***
(0.164) (0.147) (0.185) (0.161)
Country dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Response controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Likelihood -2919.31 -2862.71 -2762.00 -3123.01
R2 0.037 0.088 0.092 0.098
p-value(Wald) 0.037 0.088 0.092 0.098
IC
N 2081 2081 2009 2296
The control variables include “Response controls”: the variables controlling for respondent gender, the judgment about the
truthfulness of the responses (variable a16), and the sources of the data for quantity questions (variable a17).
The results also show negative within-country connection between the corruption as an
obstacle and management quality, though its strength differs depending on the degree of its
severity. In particular we find statistically significant negative connection of corruption being
moderate and very severe obstacle. Although, it is important to underline that the connection is
heterogeneous for different types of firms. For example, the effect of corruption being moderate
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or major obstacle on managerial quality becomes positive if the firm is state-owned. The
negative association of corruption being very severe obstacle is weaker if the firm is foreign-
owned. Bigger firms suffer less from corruption as a moderate obstacle. Such results indicate
that while anti-corruption and business regulation measures may give more space for the growth
of management quality in transition countries, the effects of such measures may greatly depend
on the firm-level characteristics, and ownership in particular.
As Section 5.5.1 shows there are significant differences between different groups of countries.
In order to explore the difference in terms of the connection between management quality and
corruption we apply our empirical model to EU transition countries and non-EU transition
countries separately. The results in the Table 5.2 confirm that there exist significant differences
between two sub-samples.
121
CHAPTER 5. BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT, MANAGERIAL PRACTICES AND CORRUPTION
Table 5.2: Management Quality and Corruption. Differences between firms in EU and non-EU
countries
EU countries non-EU countries
Country FE Corruption
Obstacle
Country FE Corruption
Obstacle
Administrative corruption -0.141** 0.014
(0.058) (0.019)
Corruption-Minor obstacle 0.439 -0.212*
(0.675) (0.116)
Corruption-Moderate obstacle -0.414 -0.527*
(0.522) (0.284)
Corruption-Major obstacle -0.185 -0.145
(0.386) (0.188)
Corruption-Very severe obstacle -1.258* -0.289
(0.595) (0.219)
Foreign ownership 0.097 0.037 0.052 -0.026
(0.108) (0.114) (0.115) (0.054)
State ownership -0.356 -0.543 -0.113 -0.093
(0.387) (0.323) (0.179) (0.086)
Size 0.046 0.033 0.022 -0.004
(0.033) (0.066) (0.024) (0.021)
Age -0.024 0.018 -0.025 -0.019**
(0.069) (0.079) (0.021) (0.009)
Size# Minor obstacle -0.132 0.020
(0.154) (0.033)
Size# Moderate obstacle 0.053 0.077*
(0.122) (0.041)
Size# Major obstacle -0.009 0.012
(0.107) (0.035)
Size# Very severe obstacle 0.217 0.036
(0.165) (0.041)
State# Minor obstacle 0.301
(0.281)
State# Moderate obstacle 0.706**
(0.283)
State# Major obstacle 0.879**
(0.330)
State# Very severe obstacle
Foreign# Minor obstacle 0.089 0.103
(0.394) (0.216)
Foreign# Moderate obstacle 0.244 0.004
(0.295) (0.135)
Foreign# Major obstacle -0.243 0.148
(0.236) (0.113)
Foreign# Very severe obstacle 0.352 0.202
(0.226) (0.125)
(0.003)
Constant 0.321 -0.377 1.318*** 0.986***
(0.286) (0.391) (0.185) (0.185)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Response controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Likelihood -533.54 -595.83 -2128.44 -1302.33
R2 0.143 0.145 0.078 0.079
N 435 489 1534 1846
The control variables include “Response controls”: the variables controlling for respondent gender, the judgment about the
truthfulness of the responses (variable a16), and the sources of the data for quantity questions (variable a17).
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In fact, the results show that the connection between administrative corruption and manage-
ment quality is negative and statistically significant for EU transition countries at the within-
country level, but keeps to be insignificant for non-EU transition countries. The coefficient of
-0.71 show us that if the administrative corruption from being seldom should become frequent
it would bring firms from performing above the average of EU transition countries to perform-
ing below the average, with all the rest being equal. The table also present that management
quality of firms in EU transition countries are more sensible to the high corruption levels, while
quality of management quality in non-EU countries is responding more to the lower levels of
corruption. This is drawn from the fact that lower management score in EU countries is mostly
associated with corruption being perceived as a severe obstacle, while it is mostly associated
with corruption being perceived as minor or moderate obstacle in non-EU transition countries.
Table 5.2 (columns ‘CountryFE’), however, highlight that state-owned firms are responding
differently to corruption in terms of management quality both in EU and non-EU transition
countries.
The results provide two main ideas with respect to the link between corruption and manage-
ment quality in non-EU transition countries. First, the link is not evidenced to be significant
for within-country distribution of management quality. Second, corruption only on the lower
levels of severity is associated with lower quality of management. We do not observe the nega-
tive connection of higher levels of corruption. This may perhaps be explained by the diversity
of countries represented in this group. Some of these countries at the very low level of devel-
opment, and, as it was mentioned above, some present idiosyncratic link between corruption
and management quality. One of such examples is Moldova. The results for this country are
presented in Table 5.3.
The table shows the positive connection between administrative corruption and manage-
ment quality at the firm-level, which is the opposite of what we observe for more developed
transition countries of the EU. Evidence has been drawn highlighting that on the lowest level of
development corruption may be correlated positively with firm performance (Svensson, 2003).
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Table 5.3: Management Quality and Corruption in Moldova
Moldova
Adm. Corruption Corruption Obstacle
Administrative corruption 0.254**
(0.091)
Corruption-Minor obstacle -0.236
(0.336)
Corruption-Moderate obstacle 0.416
(0.451)
Corruption-Major obstacle 0.423**
(0.195)
Corruption-Very severe obstacle 0.225
(0.240)
Constant -0.532 -0.159
(0.572) (0.699)
Likelihood -4.63 -9.73
R2 0.620 0.521
p-value(Wald) 0.620 0.521
N 34 39
Note: ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
It is argued that at the low level of development it becomes beneficial for firm growth
(Me´ndez and Sepu´lveda, 2006; Neeman et al., 2008; Me´on and Weill, 2010) as it provides
mechanisms to overcome inefficient regulations (Wang and You, 2012). The presence of such
countries and/or regions in the group of non-EU transition countries creates asymmetries and
may cause insignificant results as we observed above due to positive and negative links between
corruption and management quality being cancelled out.
5.6 Conclusions
Excessive, complicated or continuous changing regulations to business activity create an
environment in which firms make irregular payments or bribes to government officials. Thus,
the reduction of the burden created by such regulations would also reduce bribery or adminis-
trative corruption. Multiple countries in transition have implemented different reforms aimed
at reduction of regulation burdens, but results are highly mixed.
This chapter have drawn empirical evidence on the link between the frequency of irregular
payments (administrative corruption) and corruption as an obstacle with the quality of man-
agement in transition countries. We show that on average corruption affects firm management
quality in a way that changes drastically across country groups. Overall the results show the
negative link between overall management scores and administrative corruption and corruption
as an obstacle. But the differences between groups of countries belonging to the European
Union and those who do not are striking. Some countries in the non-EU transition countries,
in fact, present the opposite trend.
Before interpreting the results of this study, it is important to mention its possible limita-
tions. First, the measurement of the management quality is based on the survey responses of
the firm representatives. Thus, the respondents may be biased by their past experience and
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firm past performance. Although the framework of the survey has been developed to limit
possible responses biases, there is still the possibility of management quality assessment being
biases by the firm and respondent past experience. However, the elimination of such remaining
biases is limited by the data available for the resent study. Second, Athanasouli and Goujard
(2015) show that the link between a firm management quality and corruption may vary be-
tween industries and depends on the degree of industry contract dependence. In our study,
the industry dimension has not been explored in such a detail. Although accounting for the
contract dependence of different industries may help us explain drastic differences between EU
and non-EU countries, at the moment the implementation of such a framework is limited by the
data constraints. Third, potential endogeneity connected with the measurement of corruption
as an obstacle is not fully eliminated in the study. The use of the corruption as an obstacle has
allowed us to illustrate the connection of corruption perception with the firm characteristics,
such as ownership. However, there may exist other firm-level characteristics that affect both
the firm perception of corruption and its management quality. Dealing with this limitation,
however, is bounded by two factors. First, the use of this measure in this study has been moti-
vated by its connection with the firm features, and, thus, aggregation or instrumentation would
eliminate this feature. Second, the sample of the data available for the analysis is not sufficient
to aggregate the corruption perception using location, size and firm features grouping.
The key conclusions of this study include two main points. First, further simplification of
business regulations and measures discouraging payment and acceptance of bribes would be
unquestionably efficient in EU transition countries. Such measures would contribute to higher
management quality both at the firm and at the country level. Second, similar measures may
not be equally efficient for non-EU transition countries. Higher specificity of a number of this
countries, as well as firm characteristics, should be taken into account when reforms of business
regulations are designed. One must be aware of the channel through which policy makers
can positively affect management quality before putting reforms in action. In some cases, the
efficiency of such reforms may be mediated by idiosyncratic connection between corruption
and management quality, and thus performance. No uniform solutions may be applied in
less developed countries and regions among non-EU transition countries where corruption may
act as “efficiency grease”. Especial attention should be paid to firm characteristics in these
countries as, for instance, state-owned firms may react differently from private firms nullifying
the effects of the policies.
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Conclusion
Firm organization has for long been treated as fixed and modeled as a random draw. How-
ever, organization is neither fixed nor random. Studies merging organizational economics with
international trade illustrate that organizational decisions are endogenous and largely depend
on production characteristics and the economic environment. This thesis has explored how
both firm and environment characteristics are connected with changes of firm organization. It
has considered the decisions to redefine firm boundaries, and the prevalence of vertical integra-
tion, internal organizational restructuring and management quality. In particular, the thesis
addresses the following questions:
• To what extent are contractual friction due to technological complexity and the weak-
ness of contracting institutions associated with the decisions of firms to redefine their
boundaries?
• What drives the organizational decisions of firms to flatten in transition countries after
privatization reforms have finished? May flatter structures be associated with a higher
degree of control in these countries?
• Is corruption negatively connected with the quality of management? Are there country-
and firm-level characteristics that define idiosyncrasy in the link between the quality of
management and corruption?
The empirical findings of this thesis show that the main forces defining contractual frictions,
namely technology complexity and quality of contracting institutions, have opposite effects on
firm boundaries. The degree of influence is different for different groups of countries. Moreover,
labor productivity tends to be positively associated with vertical integration in more advanced
EU transition countries, but not in the rest of the transition region. Openness to trade is also
illustrated to be connected with decisions to redefine firm boundaries through the increase in
product market competition and export possibilities.
However, regardless of massive reforms in transition countries and high expectations about
their effect on firm restructuring, only a small proportion of firms experienced organizational
changes in the years concerned (2002-2005 or 2007-2009). This inability of firms in transition
countries to change is driven mainly by the weakness of contractual enforcement. This is
alarming because firms that are able to change out-perform their rigid counterparts in numerous
ways. This may indicate why the results of reforms, especially in the least advanced countries of
the transition region, have largely fallen short of the expectations and why growth perspectives
are so different in two sub-groups of transition countries. While the most successfully reformed
countries of the region have been able to encourage efficient firm restructuring, in the countries
126
CHAPTER 5. BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT, MANAGERIAL PRACTICES AND CORRUPTION
lagging behind in terms of completeness of reforms firms are facing an economic environment
that prevents them from optimizing their organization.
When internal organization is examined, the data show little restructuring as well. However,
firms are readily affected by trade openness. The results show that massive increases in the
level of import competition on the product market drive the decisions of firms to flatten their
organizational hierarchies. Moreover, this study highlights that flattening may be associated
with centralization and more restrictive control, much more than is usually thought in the
literature. These results highlight not only that firms adjust their organization actively when
environment conditions are changing notably; they also emphasize the need for new theoretical
studies on this issue, because little theory has been conclusive in explaining such empirical
findings. The theoretical studies on the gains from international trade openness, therefore,
need to be revisited because consideration of internal firm restructuring, which may potentially
affect intra-firm growth of productivity, may change our understanding of reallocation and
selection effects due to trade liberalization.
A joint reading of the empirical results and stylized facts presented in chapters 1 to 4
illustrates that the economic environment, and especially contract enforcement and regulations,
is significantly associated with firm organization. However, it is sometimes argued that the
policy measures directed to improve that such environment may face obstacles connected with
the structural characteristics of the interaction between firms and regulatory authorities. One of
such characteristics that has been shown to interact with the efficiency of regulatory reforms is
corruption. As the ability of firms to create efficient organizations may be highly dependent on
the quality of management, the last chapter of the thesis illustrates the connection between the
quality of management and corruption. This connection evidences that structural characteristic
of the relationships between private firms and public services may interact with the effects of
regulatory reforms. The empirical results highlight that the presence of corruption is generally
negatively connected with the quality of management. However, this link is idiosyncratic on
the firm level in less developed countries of the region. This indicates that improvement of
the business environment, which is the main objective of the reforms, may be crowded out by
corruption. Moreover, policies that have been highly efficient in some countries may produce
exactly the opposite results in others.
Moreover, the thesis has identified significant differences in all the considered types of firm-
level organizational behavior between country groups, namely between EU and non-EU tran-
sition countries. This illustrates that the countries with comparatively similar starting points
have achieved remarkably different results, not only in terms of their growth perspectives but
also in terms of firm organization and firms’ ability to change their organization with respect
to the changing market environment. The differences are persistent and highlight that not only
are markets and institutions different in these country groups but also firm characteristics and
firm perspective greatly differs between them. This evidence indicates that firm organization,
especially in less advanced countries of the transition region, requires more attention from both
empirical and theoretical points of view. Only through understanding of the firm organization
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in these countries can economists understand how the systemic problems of these countries may
be tackled.
To conclude, the results of this thesis argue that both theoretical modeling and policy ad-
vice should pay careful attention to the complex system of interactions between the economic
environment and endogenous and constantly changing firm organizations, especially in coun-
tries like the transition ones. The use of a bottom-up approach and analysis of firm behavior
may be crucial for understanding the micro foundations of macroeconomic and international
performance. Excluding such micro foundations and the influence of firm organization from
economic analysis may result in inconsistent predictions about the channels of transmission and
effects of trade liberalization policies, as well as regulatory and industrial reforms.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Used Datasets
A.1.1 Business Environment and Enterprise Survey (BEEPS)
The Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) is a joint initiative
of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank Group
(the World Bank). The survey is repeated approximately every three years and represent
firm-level data on the firms’ perception of business environment, their performance and some
organizational and production changes in the previous three years. It represents stratified
random samples of a transition countries’ private sector1. It is collected through face-to-face
interviews.
The survey was first undertaken 1999 – 2000, when it was administered to approximately
4,100 enterprises in 25 countries of transition countries (Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, FYR Macedonia, Georgia,
Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia,
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan) to evaluate the environment for
private enterprises and their business development. The distribution of the size of firms was
skewed towards small and medium enterprises. The differences in industry categories in the
sample reflected the variations in the national economies
In the second round of BEEPS in 2002, the survey included 6,667 enterprises in 27 countries2.
The survey covered both industrial sectors and services. Their representation was determined
by the relative contribution of GDP with minimum of 15% for either. Firms that operated in
sectors subject to government price regulations and prudential supervision, such as banking,
electric power, rail transport, and water and waste water were excluded. The minimum quota
for each category, namely size, ownership, exporters and locality, was set at 10% of the total
sample. The sample frame was elaborated to be as representative (self-weighted) as possible
subject to these quotas. Firms established later that 2000 was excluded from the survey.
In the third round of BEEPS, the survey included more than 9,000 enterprises in 27 coun-
tries3. It was implemented mostly in 2005. As in 2002 sectoral representation of manufacturing
1Since 2008 BEEPS has followed the Enterprise Surveys Global Methodology to create stratified random
sampling. Earlier diverse quota was used to reach representatives. The details on earlier sampling methodology
can be found in the reports on sampling and implementation, available on the EBRD website (http://ebrd-
beeps.com).
2Tajikistan, and Yugoslavia was added to the BEEPS 1999 set of countries
3Yugoslavia was represented by Serbia and Montenegro as a single country
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and services was determined by their relative contribution to GDP. Firms that operate in sectors
subject to government price regulation and prudential supervision were excluded. The quota
in terms of size, location, ownership and export status were the same as in 2002. Moreover, a
panel component of the sample consisted of slightly more than 1,000 firms that were interviewed
in 2002 as well. In seven of the countries (Kazakhstan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Poland, Hungary,
Romania and Moldova) more than 1,700 additional interviews were made among firms in three
manufacturing sectors: garments, food processing and metal and machinery. Furthermore, a
survey was implemented in Ireland and Spain in 2005, and Germany, Greece, Portugal, South
Korea and Vietnam in 2004 to provide comparisons for transition countries.
In the fourth round of BEEPS in 2008-2009, the survey covered more than 11,900 firms in 29
countries 4. The survey was restructured to improve cross-country comparability and to make
it compatible with the Enterprise Surveys of the World Bank. There were significant changes
in the questionnaire and methodology. Some questions were fully eliminated or modified, while
others were added. However, limited use of panel component (2005-2009) of more than 1,500
firms is sometimes possible; panel component including three rounds (2002-2009) includes only
374 firms. Starting from this round three questionnaires, manufacturing, retail, and core (resid-
ual sectors), are used to survey firms in different activity sectors. Numerous questions overlap
between questionnaires, but some are applicable only to specific type of activities. Starting
from this round the weights reflecting the eligibility of firms are also included in the data.
Since 2008, the survey frame included the majority of manufacturing sectors, and services
sectors (wholesale, retail, hotels, restaurants, transport, storage, communications, IT) and con-
struction. Unlike previous rounds firms in extraction, real estate, equipment renting, research
and development, other business activities, and other community, social and personal service
activities were excluded (ISIC Rev 3.1 codes 10-14, 70-74, 92.1-92.4 and 93). No restrictions
on the age of firms were laid. Fully state-owned firms were excluded from the sample.
The fifth round of BEEPS in 2011-2014 covered more than 15,800 enterprises in 30 countries
(Kosovo was interviewed separately), including 4,220 enterprises in 37 regions in Russia. The
panel component including 2,730 firms interviewed in 2008-2009 is also available. The latest
round includes an Innovation Module, covering product, process, organizational and marketing
innovation. A section accessing management practices is also included in the questionnaire
for the first time. However, only enterprises in manufacturing with the size of more than 20
employees (50 employees for Russia) were asked the questions on management practices.
A.1.2 Management, Organization and Innovation (MOI)
The Management, Organisation and Innovation (MOI) Survey aimed at the analysis of
management and innovation practices, and firms’ internal organization in 10 transition coun-
tries (Belarus, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine and
Uzbekistan), and is based on the work of Nick Bloom and John Van Reenen. The data set
4Due to separation of Serbia and Montenegro, the number of countries increased by one. Firms in Mongolia
were interviewed for the first time.
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includes information on 1,800 manufacturing establishments with at least 50 and at most 5000
employees. The survey was implemented by the European Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment in partnership with the World Bank through face-to-face interviewing from October
2008 to November 2009. In order to provide baselines for the performance of firms in transition
countries, firms in Germany and India were interviewed as well. The sampling frame was based
on Bureau Van Dijk’s Orbis database when available and for some firms, with the permission
of the EBRD, merged information from the Bureau Van Dijk’s Orbis database was used to
describe firm performance in this thesis. In some countries (Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) the
sampling frame was based on the information obtained from registering state or statistical
offices.
Two versions of the questionnaire were implemented. First questionnaire was used when
interviewing establishments that are part of multi-establishment firms, while second accessed
the practices and performance of single-establishment firms. The first questionnaire includes
all the questions of the second, only questions regarding the position of a particular establish-
ment and organization of the establishment net are excluded. The main difference is in the
reference to a particular respondent establishment, which is called “national firm” in the first
questionnaire and a “firm” in the second. The survey is targeted at senior managers, who are
close to day-to-day operations of the firm.
Even though the MOI survey was run in conjunction with BEEPS IV, selected establish-
ments participated in only one of these two surveys, that is, either BEEPS IV or MOI survey, but
not both. The survey allows researchers to reach several objectives: (i) to analyse management
and organizational practices applied in transition countries (ii) to give quantitative represen-
tation to the quality of management and compare it across countries, and (ii) to conduct firm
performance analysis focusing on the interaction between firm organization and management,
its organization, and performance in manufacturing. To achieve these objectives the sampling
methodology generates a random sample representative of the manufacturing sector.
A.2 Reforms in Transition countries: space and time dy-
namics
1990s
First stage of transition towards market economy took place in all the transition countries
in the beginning of 1990s, right after the break-up of the Soviet Union. Although in a big share
of countries was expected to be rapid and give fruits in comparatively short time, full scope of
transition challenges and related trade-offs became apparent only when the actual reforms were
attempted. As expected, centrally planned system was demolished in quite a short time. How-
ever, the new market-based mechanisms were nowhere close to being functioning. Production
and trade links within the region were ruptured, complicated by the painful macroeconomic
consequences of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and enterprises (both small and large)
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found themselves at the beginning of a long journey towards the reintegration through market
into both local and global supply chains. Many of producers closed as were unable to adapt
towards new market conditions. As a result, most countries experienced extreme difficulties
during the first years of transition, including extreme drops in output, skyrocketed inflation,
boom of informal economy, and severe increase in poverty.
The countries with better initial conditions, less dependent on trade with the former So-
viet Union and closer to advanced markets were more successful in reaching the stabilization.
Moreover, the policy was critical. Most of the transition countries started the small-scale pri-
vatization, price and trade liberalization already in the beginning of 1990s, but the results
were uneven. For instance, Poland and the Baltics went through the reforms quicker, although
paying high social costs, while countries with longer experience of planned economy tended to
prolong the privatization reforms or make them in a highly cosmetic way.
In the mid-1990s the reforms were proceeding with different speed and scale in different
countries as well. Large-scale privatization was largely initiated, but was mostly completed
only in Central Europe and the Baltics by the end of the first decade of transition. For many
of other countries it was much more difficult and lengthy. More broadly, starting from the
mid-1990s reform programs were focused on macroeconomic stabilization, price liberalization
and current account convertibility, finishing the privatization (mostly large-scale), creation
(strengthening) of social safety nets, and institutional reforms that sustaining the functioning
of market economy. However, the programs tended to be ambitious, and in many cases im-
plementation fell short of expectations. Nevertheless the first decade of the transition was a
period when many countries made progress in market reforms and most countries of the region
started growing. The Central European and Baltic countries started earlier and have become
the leaders in gaining from reforms. The success in the reforms made it possible for some
of these countries to integrate into the global economy through OECD and WTO entrance.
Many South Eastern European countries made great progress as well, although being behind
the Central European and Baltic countries. Despite the late initiation of the reforms the CIS
countries had significant advances. Nevertheless, for many countries there was still a long way
to go until the completion of transition.
The integration in the international market was particularly uneven. Apart from entering
the OECD and WTO, Central and South Eastern European countries signed bilateral trade
agreements with the EU as early as in mid-1990s, lowering tariff rates and fostering with all
possible means closer economic integration with the EU. On the contrary, although signing a
number of partnership agreement, CIS countries avoided taking significant measures toward
higher integration in international trade. It took other 17 years for Russia and 13 years for
Ukraine to enter WTO, while Belarus is still among observers.
The last years of the 20th century was characterized by a number of economic crises. Al-
though experiencing the economic turmoil with different lags, numerous transition countries
were hit by the world economic turbulence. With macroeconomic stability not reached, emerg-
ing market and financial institutions, these countries were particularly helpless against shaking
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global environment. In the 1998 Russian economy suffered from a devastating devaluation and
effective default, having strong impact on the connected economies of other transition countries.
However, the region saw considerably rapid recovery. By the 2000 all countries of the region
were growing. Some of the countries, like Russia, experienced a particularly fast return to
growth, mostly relying on the improvement in commodity prices, more organized policy actions
and growing competitiveness.
2000s
Favourable global economic environment allowed most of the countries in transition reach
much needed stability in the mid-2000s, and brought confidence in successful development. A
key turning point was the accession of 10 countries of the region to the European Union, which
gave them significant economic and institutional benefits comparing to the other countries of
the region. Simultaneously with economic growth, the pace of reforms largely slowed down in
most of the countries. Moreover, the growth of the entire region was reached through the rise
in domestic demand fuelled by the consumption credit possibilities that opened. Large external
imbalances were making the growth highly unsustainable that resulted in high vulnerability by
the time of global crisis in 2008.
When the global financial crisis hit economies worldwide, unleashing their economic breaches,
countries of the transition region had still too many of weaknesses. Most of the countries suf-
fered notable output losses and, what is more dangerous, loss of the confidence in the success
of reforms and their beneficent impact.
The short-term consequences of the global financial crisis varied substantially across the
CEB countries, largely reflecting imbalances created in the previous period of economic growth.
The Baltic countries suffered biggest output contractions, with Latvia losing as much as 15
percent of its GDP. The countries outside of EU, namely SEE countries, Russia and small CIS
countries, experienced the negative impact of financial crisis to a much smaller extent, while
the countries of Central Asia was mostly not affected by it (see Figure A.4).
In the short run the output returned to growth considerably fast, in many cases already by
the end of 2009. However, the crisis damaged the long term growth of these countries through
the rise of Euro area crisis, the fall of external demand, the financial system instability and
the fall in investments and the confidence of the market. As a result multiple countries of the
region saw notable growth slowdown by 2012.
The years after the 2012 have been characterized by the slow down, and even reversal, of
the reforms in transition countries. Each country has had to deal with structural problems
revealed by the global financial crisis. Moreover, a big share of the countries of the region was
affected by the oil price shocks that gave rise to macroeconomic and geopolitical turmoil.
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A.3 Trust, Prepayment and Legal Enforcement in Tran-
sition Countries
This section reflects the connection between terms of contracts, legal enforcement and the
degree of trust between firms in transition countries.
According to Raiser et al. (2008), the quality of country institutions in transition countries
is highly correlated with the trust between firms. The higher degree of trust in the study is
represented through the higher level of prepayment. Thus, prepayment may serve as a measure
of distrust (or trust if inverted). In Raiser et al. (2008) the positive correlation between trust
and the quality of institutions, in particular, concerns the institutions affecting contracting and
contract enforcement (courts and legal systems).
Figure A.1: Prepayment and Trust
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Note: The prepayment is calculated as the share of sales being prepaid. Trust is based on the question
of Life in Transition Survey (LITS): ”To what extent do you trust people from the following groups?
People you meet for the first time?”a The answer options vary between 1 (Complete distrust) and
5 (Complete trust). The answer of each respondent is further standardized by the sample mean by
calculating the z-score. In the figure the averages for each country are presented.
aThe choice of the measure is based on the results of Torpe and Lolle (2011) showing that it better reflect
trust in strangers.
The empirical evidence presented by Raiser et al. (2008) shows that higher court’ fairness and
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legal efficiency as well as information-sharing through non-governmental networks are associated
with lower levels of prepayment. Theoretically the model developed by Teraji (2008) also
support this connection stating that low levels of trust are the result of equilibrium with the
weak property rights institutions. The figure A.1 shows that the level of prepayment (distrust),
in fact, is negatively connected with the trust towards unfamiliar people in transition countries.
The results of Raiser et al. (2008) were based on the data from BEPPS 2002, more recent
evidence is presented in Table A.2. The table shows the link between levels of prepayment
(distrust between firms) and the World Bank estimates of the rule of law in different groups
of transition countries (CEB, SEE, EEC, Central Asia, Russia and Turkey). It illustrate that,
not only higher distrust is observed in the country groups with weaker contracting institutions,
but such a link also has been growing stronger over years.
Figure A.2: Prepayment (mis-trust) and the rule of law
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Source: Own calculations based on BEEPS II-IV and World Bank Estimates
Note: The prepayment (mis-trust) is calculated as the share of sales being prepaid. The rule-of-law
indicator is borrowed from the World Bank Estimates
Empirical studies focusing on the use of prepayment by firms in more developed countries
(Mateut, 2014; Antra`s and Foley, 2015) also document positive connection between the weak-
ness of contracting institutions and levels of prepayment. Mateut (2014) argues that higher
transaction risks connected with weaker contracting enforcement drive higher prepayment levels
in the transactions of French firms. Antra`s and Foley (2015) show that also in the international
trade the US firms’ choice of prepayment is positively connected with how weak are the con-
tracting institutions of the country where importer is located. Taking into account previously
discussed connection between prepayment and level of trust in transition countries, it is evident
that lower trust (higher levels of prepayment) is connected with weaker contracting institutions.
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A.4 Figures and Tables
Table A.1: Country Groups and Memberships
Country
Country Group 
(EBRD) Income Group (WB)
EU 
memebers
CIS 
members
Albania SEE Upper middle income
Bulgaria SEE Upper middle income Since 2007
Bosnia and Herzegovina SEE Upper middle income
Kosovo SEE Lower middle income
Macedonia, FYR SEE Upper middle income
Montenegro SEE Upper middle income
Romania SEE Upper middle income Since 2007
Serbia SEE Upper middle income
Armenia EEC Lower middle income Yes
Azerbaijan EEC Upper middle income Yes
Belarus EEC Upper middle income Yes
Georgia EEC Upper middle income Yes
Moldova EEC Lower middle income Yes
Ukraine EEC Lower middle income Yes
Czech Republic CEB High income Since 2004
Estonia CEB High income Since 2004
Croatia CEB High income Since 2013
Hungary CEB High income Since 2004
Lithuania CEB High income Since 2004
Latvia CEB High income Since 2004
Poland CEB High income Since 2004
Slovak Republic CEB High income Since 2004
Slovenia CEB High income Since 2004
Kazakhstan CA Upper middle income Yes
Kyrgyz Republic CA Lower middle income Yes
Mongolia CA Lower middle income
Tajikistan CA Lower middle income Yes
Turkmenistan CA Upper middle income Yes
Uzbekistan CA Lower middle income Yes
Russian Federation Upper middle income Yes
Turkey Upper middle income
Sources: The World Bank Classification by Income, European Union information on member states,
CIS information on member states
Note: Turkey is not considered a transition country. The information is presented as the country is
included in the database used in Chapter 5
Country groups: Central Europe and Baltic States (CEB), Eastern Europe and the Caucasus (EEC),
Central Asia (CA), South Eastern Europe (SEE).
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Table A.2: Transition Countries: Economic Context
2000 2005 2009 2012 2015 2000 2005 2009 2012 2015 2000 2005 2009 2012 2015
Albania SEE 6.67 5.72 3.35 1.42 2.56 15.955 21.220 26.329 28.400 30.039 5.165 7.046 8.994 9.792 10.397
Bulgaria SEE 5.01 7.24 -4.22 0.24 2.97 73.085 96.985 112.807 114.928 121.713 8.945 12.531 15.153 15.731 16.956
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina SEE
5.50 8.76 -2.87 -0.93 3.16 23.581 31.110 35.512 35.772 38.194 6.217 8.115 9.253 9.344 10.024
Kosovo SEE .. 6.03 3.34 2.81 3.62 7.880 11.457 13.625 15.140 16.426 4.635 6.716 7.735 8.387 9.140
Macedonia, FYR SEE 4.55 4.72 -0.36 -0.46 3.67 17.531 19.326 22.736 23.940 26.448 8.713 9.460 11.043 11.569 12.725
Montenegro SEE 3.10 4.19 -5.66 -2.72 3.37 5.987 6.877 8.334 8.575 9.342 9.896 11.195 13.479 13.817 15.010
Romania SEE 2.40 4.17 -7.07 0.64 3.74 230.037 304.330 354.208 357.368 395.171 10.250 14.275 17.391 17.817 19.926
Serbia SEE 7.76 5.54 -3.12 -1.02 0.73 58.184 78.634 89.168 90.023 91.305 7.741 10.568 12.180 12.505 12.863
Armenia EEC 5.90 13.87 -14.15 7.20 3.00 8.978 15.969 18.871 21.646 23.838 2.919 5.297 6.362 7.268 7.899
Azerbaijan EEC 11.10 26.40 9.41 2.20 1.10 35.889 67.568 137.733 147.693 161.133 4.459 8.052 15.394 15.888 16.695
Belarus EEC 5.80 9.40 0.20 1.73 -3.89 73.033 104.858 138.316 160.007 158.116 7.300 10.851 14.549 16.907 16.621
Georgia EEC 1.84 9.60 -3.78 6.35 2.77 14.439 20.566 24.881 30.146 33.513 3.268 4.908 6.255 7.881 9.109
Moldova EEC 2.10 7.49 -5.99 -0.70 -0.50 8.475 11.930 13.055 14.774 16.853 2.329 3.318 3.661 4.151 4.742
Ukraine EEC 5.90 2.70 -14.80 0.20 -9.90 236.511 342.202 345.318 379.289 319.185 4.809 7.265 7.498 8.319 7.450
Czech Republic CEB 4.29 6.44 -4.84 -0.90 4.20 215.389 261.112 287.836 297.529 314.483 21.003 25.571 27.560 28.307 29.805
Estonia CEB 10.57 9.37 -14.72 5.18 1.07 21.371 30.102 28.847 33.447 35.332 15.298 22.219 21.616 25.287 26.930
Croatia CEB 3.77 4.16 -7.38 -2.19 1.64 69.241 86.262 89.835 86.132 86.305 15.644 19.420 20.283 20.183 20.430
Hungary CEB 4.23 4.35 -6.56 -1.69 2.94 181.409 223.832 219.866 221.586 240.944 17.766 22.190 21.937 22.337 24.474
Lithuania CEB 3.83 7.73 -14.81 3.84 1.59 42.075 60.713 63.329 70.877 76.820 12.023 18.273 20.022 23.722 26.397
Latvia CEB 5.40 10.70 -14.35 4.01 1.89 26.021 38.585 39.202 41.668 44.769 10.991 17.235 18.305 20.483 22.628
Poland CEB 4.26 3.55 2.63 1.56 3.65 560.105 648.316 787.184 870.572 943.752 14.640 16.987 20.633 22.872 24.836
Slovak Republic CEB 1.21 6.40 -5.49 1.52 3.60 82.133 104.714 125.720 137.933 148.587 15.242 19.490 23.340 25.507 27.394
Slovenia CEB 4.16 4.00 -7.80 -2.72 2.88 44.738 53.379 57.445 56.943 59.729 22.494 26.683 28.164 27.680 28.942
Kazakhstan CA 9.80 9.70 1.20 4.60 1.20 154.364 252.803 318.595 383.323 427.249 10.371 16.690 19.797 22.828 24.353
Kyrgyz Republic CA 5.43 -0.18 2.89 -0.09 3.47 10.162 12.236 15.273 16.092 19.211 2.075 2.370 2.837 2.870 3.225
Mongolia CA 1.15 7.25 -1.27 12.32 2.30 11.160 15.278 19.659 27.548 33.944 4.655 6.047 7.364 9.809 11.471
Tajikistan CA 8.30 6.70 3.80 7.50 4.20 7.334 11.699 15.113 18.583 22.190 1.186 1.719 2.038 2.343 2.616
Turkmenistan CA 5.47 13.04 6.10 11.10 6.50 24.085 30.883 46.318 64.454 83.437 5.351 6.505 9.303 12.460 15.527
Uzbekistan CA 3.80 7.00 8.10 8.20 8.00 60.922 79.276 110.173 140.075 176.618 2.471 3.030 3.968 4.705 5.643
Russia 10.00 6.38 -7.82 3.52 -3.73 2059.806 2773.630 3158.676 3562.769 3498.420 14.051 19.326 22.122 24.879 23.895
Turkey ¹ 6.77 8.40 -4.83 2.13 3.98 822.851 1028.044 1101.921 1336.178 1491.396 13.012 15.149 15.463 17.852 18.959
GDP growth rate                                                                       
(annual %) 
GDP per capita, PPP                                        
(thousands, constant 2011 international $)
GDP, PPP                                                                                              
(billion, constant 2011 international $)
Country 
Group 
(EBRD)
Country
Sources: The World Bank Development Indicators
Note: 1 Turkey is not considered a transition country. The information is presented as the country is included in the database used in Chapter 5
Country groups: Central Europe and Baltic States (CEB), Eastern Europe and the Caucasus (EEC), Central Asia, South Eastern Europe (SEE).
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Figure A.3: Change of GDP in tansition countries in 2007-2009
Source: Own calculations based on World Development Indicators of the World Bank
Note: The change of GDP is calculated as the yearly percentage change of the GDP at constant
(2005 US$) market prices
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Table A.3: The World Justice Project (WJP) Rule of Law Index: Indicators
Factor 1: Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 Government powers are effectively limited by the legislature
1.2 Government powers are effectively limited by the judiciary
1.3 Government powers are effectively limited by independent auditing and review
1.4 Government officials are sanctioned for misconduct
1.5 Government powers are subject to non-governmental checks
1.6 Transition of power is subject to the law
Factor 2: Absence of Corruption
2.1 Government officials in the executive branch do not use public office for private gain
2.2 Government officials in the judicial branch do not use public office for private gain
2.3 Government officials in the police and the military do not use public office for private gain
2.4 Government officials in the legislative branch do not use public office for private gain
Factor 3: Open Government
3.1. Publicized laws and government data
3.2 Right to Information
3.3 Civic participation
3.4 Complaint mechanisms
Factor 4: Fundamental Rights
4.1 Equal treatment and absence of discrimination
4.2 The right to life and security of the person is effectively guaranteed
4.3 Due process of law and rights of the accused
4.4 Freedom of opinion and expression is effectively guaranteed
4.5 Freedom of belief and religion is effectively guaranteed
4.6 Freedom from arbitrary interference with privacy is effectively guaranteed
4.7 Freedom of assembly and association is effectively guaranteed
4.8 Fundamental labor rights are effectively guaranteed
Factor 5: Order and Security
5.1 Crime is effectively controlled
5.2 Civil conflict is effectively limited
5.3 People do not resort to violence to redress personal grievances
Factor 6: Effective Regulatory enforcement
6.1 Government regulations are effectively enforced
6.2 Government regulations are applied and enforced without improper influence
6.3 Administrative proceedings are conducted without unreasonable delay
6.4 Due process is respected in administrative proceedings
6.5 The Government does not expropriate without adequate compensation
Factor 7: Civil Justice
7.1 People have access to affordable civil justice
7.2 Civil justice is free of discrimination
7.3 Civil justice is free of corruption
7.4 Civil justice is free of improper government influence
7.5 Civil justice is not subject to unreasonable delays
7.6. Civil justice is effectively enforced
7.7 ADRs are accessible, impartial, and effective
Factor 8: Criminal Justice
8.1 Criminal investigation system is effective
8.2 Criminal adjudication system is timely and effective
8.3 Correctional system is effective in reducing criminal behavior
8.4 Criminal system is free of discrimination
8.5 Criminal system is free of corruption
8.6 Criminal system is free of improper government influence
8.7. Due process of law and rights of the accused
Source: The World Justice Project
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Figure A.4: External institutions: Enforcing Contracts
Economy
Quality of 
judicial 
processes index                 
(0-18)
DTF
Time 
(days)
DTF
Cost           (% 
of claim)
DTF Av.DTF
Korea, Rep. 14.5 80.556 290 86.066 12.7 85.827 84.149
Singapore 15 83.333 164 96.393 25.8 71.091 83.606
China, Shanghai 14.5 80.556 406 76.557 15.1 83.127 80.080
Australia 15.5 86.111 395 77.459 21.8 75.591 79.720
United States, New York 15 83.333 370 79.508 22.9 74.353 79.065
Norway 11 61.111 280 86.885 9.9 88.976 78.991
China 14.275 79.306 452.8 72.721 16.18 81.912 77.980
Lithuania 14.5 80.556 370 79.508 23.6 73.566 77.877
Croatia 15 83.333 572 62.951 16.7 81.327 75.870
Hungary 12 66.667 395 77.459 15 83.240 75.788
Kazakhstan 13 72.222 370 79.508 22 75.366 75.699
Austria 13 72.222 397 77.295 20.6 76.940 75.486
China, Beijing 14 77.778 510 68.033 17.5 80.427 75.413
Estonia 13.5 75.000 425 75.000 21.9 75.478 75.159
Russian Federation 11 61.111 337 82.213 16.5 81.552 74.959
New Zealand 11 61.111 216 92.131 27.2 69.516 74.253
Luxembourg 8.5 47.222 321 83.525 9.7 89.201 73.316
Georgia 12 66.667 285 86.475 29.9 66.479 73.207
Germany 12 66.667 499 68.934 14.4 83.915 73.172
France 11 61.111 395 77.459 17.4 80.540 73.037
United States 13.8 76.667 420 75.410 30.54 65.759 72.612
Latvia 12.5 69.444 469 71.393 23.1 74.128 71.655
United Arab Emirates 12 66.667 495 69.262 20.1 77.503 71.144
Romania 14 77.778 512 67.869 28.9 67.604 71.084
Belarus 9 50.000 275 87.295 23.4 73.791 70.362
Armenia 11.5 63.889 570 63.115 16 82.115 69.706
Spain 11 61.111 510 68.033 18.5 79.303 69.482
Finland 8.5 47.222 375 79.098 16.2 81.890 69.403
United Kingdom 15 83.333 437 74.016 43.9 50.731 69.360
Turkey 13 72.222 580 62.295 24.9 72.103 68.874
Macedonia, FYR 14 77.778 634 57.869 28.8 67.717 67.788
Brazil 13.585 75.472 731 49.918 20.7 76.828 67.406
Uzbekistan 6 33.333 225 91.393 20.5 77.053 67.260
Switzerland 9.5 52.778 420 75.410 24 73.116 67.101
Mexico 10.095 56.083 340.65 81.914 32.973 63.022 67.007
Montenegro 11.5 63.889 545 65.164 25.7 71.204 66.752
Malaysia 12 66.667 425 75.000 37.3 58.155 66.607
Azerbaijan 5.5 30.556 277 87.131 18.5 79.303 65.663
Kosovo 9.5 52.778 330 82.787 34.4 61.417 65.661
Bhutan 5.5 30.556 225 91.393 23.1 74.128 65.359
Japan 7.5 41.667 360 80.328 23.4 73.791 65.262
Bulgaria 10.5 58.333 564 63.607 23.8 73.341 65.094
Economy
Quality of 
judicial 
processes index                 
(0-18)
DTF
Time 
(days)
DTF
Cost           (% 
of claim)
DTF Av.DTF
Argentina 11.5 63.889 660 55.738 22.5 74.803 64.810
Thailand 7.5 41.667 440 73.770 19.5 78.178 64.538
Tajikistan 8 44.444 430 74.590 25.5 71.429 63.488
Poland 10.5 58.333 685 53.689 19.4 78.290 63.437
Chile 9 50.000 480 70.492 28.6 67.942 62.811
Morocco 8.5 47.222 510 68.033 25.2 71.766 62.340
Serbia 13 72.222 635 57.787 40.8 54.218 61.409
Moldova 9.5 52.778 585 61.885 28.6 67.942 60.868
Peru 8.5 47.222 426 74.918 35.7 59.955 60.698
Uganda 8.5 47.222 490 69.672 31.3 64.904 60.600
Bosnia and Herzegovina 11 61.111 595 61.066 36 59.618 60.598
Kuwait 7 38.889 566 63.443 18.6 79.190 60.507
Czech Republic 10.5 58.333 611 59.754 33 62.992 60.360
Vietnam 6.5 36.111 400 77.049 29 67.492 60.217
Ethiopia 5 27.778 530 66.393 15.2 83.015 59.062
Ukraine 9 50.000 378 78.852 46.3 48.031 58.961
Slovak Republic 10.5 58.333 705 52.049 30 66.367 58.916
Nicaragua 6.5 36.111 490 69.672 26.8 69.966 58.583
Mongolia 5.5 30.556 374 79.180 30.6 65.692 58.476
Kenya 9 50.000 465 71.721 41.8 53.093 58.272
Israel 13 72.222 975 29.918 25.3 71.654 57.931
Ireland 8.5 47.222 650 56.557 26.9 69.854 57.878
Rwanda 13 72.222 230 90.984 82.7 7.087 56.764
Saudi Arabia 6 33.333 575 62.705 27.5 69.179 55.072
Italy 13 72.222 1120 18.033 23.1 74.128 54.794
Guinea 5 27.778 311 84.344 45 49.494 53.872
Albania 6 33.333 525 66.803 34.9 60.855 53.664
Slovenia 10.5 58.333 1160 14.754 12.7 85.827 52.971
Qatar 3.5 19.444 570 63.115 21.6 75.816 52.792
Greece 12 66.667 1580 0.000 14.4 83.915 50.194
Nigeria 7.655 42.528 509.79 68.050 57.722 35.183 48.587
Kyrgyz Republic 4 22.222 410 76.230 47 47.244 48.565
Yemen, Rep. 4 22.222 645 56.967 30 66.367 48.519
Libya 4 22.222 690 53.279 27 69.741 48.414
Senegal 6.5 36.111 740 49.180 36.4 59.168 48.153
Liberia 6.5 36.111 1280 4.918 35 60.742 33.924
Cambodia 5 27.778 483 70.246 103.4 0.000 32.675
Afghanistan 5 27.778 1642 0.000 29 67.492 31.756
Myanmar 3 16.667 1160 14.754 51.5 42.182 24.534
Bangladesh 7.5 41.667 1442 0.000 66.8 24.972 22.213
Source: Doing Business 2017: Distance to Frontier Calculator
Note: Countries are sorted due to their Distance to Frontier (DTF) with respect to average DTF (column 8) across 3 categories: quality of judicial
processes (column 2), time (column 4) and costs (column 6) required to enforce a contract. The higher is the % in DTF columns, the shorter is the
distance to the frontier
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Table A.4: Changes in the manufacturing production by technology intensity in several CEB
and SEE countries, 1993-2015
Hgh-tech Medium-high-tech Medium-low-tech Low-tech Hgh-tech Medium-high-tech Medium-low-tech Low-techCzech Republic 1.10 2.70 -0.90 -2.90 1.19 0.73 0.34 -0.02Estonia 2.70 -12.10 8.00 1.50 1.92 1.11 0.99 0.32Latvia 0.02 0.27 0.20 0.09 1.07 0.77 0.36 0.31Lithuania 0.12 0.01 -0.15 0.08 0.66 1.13 1.26 0.52Hungary 11.80 8.20 -5.20 -14.90 0.96 0.46 0.25 -0.11Poland 1.70 1.50 -3.10 -0.10 0.77 0.94 0.62 0.32Romania -0.11 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.33 0.09 0.01Bulgaria 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.11 0.90 1.08 0.74
Hgh-tech Medium-high-tech Medium-low-tech Low-tech Hgh-tech Medium-high-tech Medium-low-tech Low-techCzech Republic 0.19 0.29 0.04 -0.11 0.13 0.20 0.08 0.05Estonia 0.80 0.31 -0.11 -0.11 0.12 0.02 0.10 0.14Latvia 0.01 0.26 0.00 -0.03 0.65 0.26 -0.01 0.12Lithuania 0.03 0.39 -0.07 0.09 0.77 0.29 0.17 0.34Hungary 0.13 0.29 -0.03 -0.11 -0.12 0.36 0.09 0.13Poland 0.36 0.36 0.42 0.20 0.04 0.18 0.21 0.16Romania -0.40 0.75 0.08 -0.08 0.75 0.30 0.13 0.13Bulgaria 0.12 0.12 -0.11 -0.15 0.27 0.24 0.11 -0.03
1993-2001 2001-2006
2006-2011 2011-2015
Source: Own calculations based on the industrial production information of Eurostat and Van den
Bulcke et al. (2009)
Note: The ratio of the production changes is calculated using the volume index of production at the
end and at the beginning of presented periods. Yellow colour highlight significant increases (initial
value almost or more than doubled), while blue colour highlight the drops of production.
Central Europe and Baltics (CEB) include Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary,
Poland; South-Eastern Europe (SEE) includes Bulgaria, and Romania.
For the period 1993-2001 the growth of value-added is taken from Van den Bulcke et al. (2009) for
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland. For the same period calculations of the production growth
between 2000 and 2001 are presented for Latvia, Romania, and Bulgaria, while between 1998 and 2001
are presented for Lithuania.
Figure A.5: Change of Imports (% of GDP) in tansition countries in 1990-2015
Source: The World Bank Indicators
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B.1 Data description
Table B.1: Data distribution by country
(a) Firm-level data
N Percent Cum
Bulgaria 258 3.47 3.47
Albania 185 2.49 5.96
Croatia 217 2.92 8.88
Belarus 307 4.13 13.01
Georgia 178 2.39 15.40
Ukraine 528 7.10 22.50
Russia 527 7.09 29.59
Poland 935 12.58 42.17
Romania 554 7.45 49.62
Kazakhstan 534 7.18 56.80
Moldova 339 4.56 61.36
Bosnia and Herzegovina 178 2.39 63.75
FYR Macedonia 177 2.38 66.13
Armenia 318 4.28 70.41
Kyrgyz Republic 174 2.34 72.75
Estonia 165 2.22 74.97
Czech Republic 298 4.01 78.98
Hungary 566 7.61 86.59
Latvia 176 2.37 88.96
Lithuania 170 2.29 91.24
Slovak Republic 184 2.47 93.72
Slovenia 203 2.73 96.45
Serbia and Montenegro 264 3.55 100.00
Total 7435 100.00
(b) Aggregated data
N Percent Cum
Albania 39 3.51 3.51
Armenia 33 2.97 6.49
Belarus 57 5.14 11.62
Bosnia and Herzegovina 35 3.15 14.77
Bulgaria 56 5.05 19.82
Croatia 37 3.33 23.15
Czech Republic 48 4.32 27.48
Estonia 32 2.88 30.36
FYR Macedonia 30 2.70 33.06
Georgia 53 4.77 37.84
Hungary 47 4.23 42.07
Kazakhstan 65 5.86 47.93
Kyrgyz Republic 34 3.06 50.99
Latvia 34 3.06 54.05
Lithuania 34 3.06 57.12
Moldova 56 5.05 62.16
Poland 56 5.05 67.21
Romania 41 3.69 70.90
Russia 98 8.83 79.73
Serbia and Montenegro 52 4.68 84.41
Slovak Republic 31 2.79 87.21
Slovenia 42 3.78 90.99
Ukraine 100 9.01 100.00
Total 1110 100.00
Source: Own calculation based on the BEEPS (2005)
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Table B.2: Data distribution by activity
(a) Firm-level data
N Percent Cum
Construction 796 10.71 10.71
Manufacturing 3255 43.78 54.49
Transport storage and communication 534 7.18 61.67
Wholesale and retail trade 1967 26.46 88.12
Real estate, renting and business services 452 6.08 94.20
Other services 431 5.80 100.00
Total 7435 100.00
(b) Aggregated data
N Percent Cum
Construction 60 6.51 6.51
Manufacturing 372 40.39 46.91
Transport storage and communication 73 7.93 54.83
Wholesale and retail trade 257 27.90 82.74
Real estate, renting and business services 99 10.75 93.49
Other services 60 6.51 100.00
Total 921 100.00
Source: Own calculation based on the BEEPS 2005
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Table B.3: Variables and Sources
Variable Variable Calculation Description Source
Integration incidence
N intic
Nic
The share of firms that integrated at
least one important activity N inti in the
total number of firms interviewed Ni in
industry i in country c
BEEPS 2005
(question
q60a7)
Capital-intensity Kic = barK
j
ic, the mean capital-intensity of firms in in-
dustry i and country c
BEEPS 2005
(questions
q57b, q66a)
where Kj = ln(
replKj
Lj
)
Trust
Tic =
Nnoprepic
Nic
The share of firms that do not need to
prepay their inputs in the total number
of firms Ni in industry i in country c
BEEPS 2005
(question
q29a)
Export
Expic =
Nexporteric
Nic
The share of exporters in the total num-
ber of firms Ni in industry i in country
c
BEEPS 2005
(questions
q7b, q7c)
Labour productivity
(sd) Lprodic = sd(Lprod
j
ic)
Standard deviation of firm-level produc-
tivity
BEEPS 2005
(questions
q57a, q66a)
where Lprodjic =
salses(USD)
Employment
within an industry i in country c
GDP per capita
ln(
GDP
Population
)
Logarithm of the GDP per capita World Data
Bank: GDP
per capita
(current US$)
SME
SMEic =
NSMEic
Nic
The share of small (2-49 employees) and
medium (50-249 employees) firms in the
total number of firms Ni in industry i in
country c
BEEPS 2005
(question s4b)
MES
MESic =
NMESic
Nic
The share of firms that have more than
one national establishment in the total
number of firms Ni in industry i in coun-
try c
BEEPS 2005
(question s10)
Import competition
ImpHic =
NHimp+EHimpic
Nic
The share of firms, for whose main prod-
uct import competition is highly or ex-
tremely important, in the total number
of firms Ni in industry i in country c
BEEPS 2005
(question
q10)
Without Import compe-
tition
ImpNoneic =
NNOimpic
Nic
The share of firms, whose main product
cannot be imported, in the total number
of firms Ni in industry i in country c
BEEPS 2005
(question
q10)
High competition
Ehic =
NCompic
Nic
The share of firms, whose 10% increase
in price would result in loosing clients, in
the total number of firms Ni in industry
i in country c
BEEPS 2005
(question
q11)
Finance acc. difficulty
(major)
FinAic =
NFinA=majordiff.ic
Nic
The share of firms, for which access to
financing is a major difficulty, in the to-
tal number of firms Ni in industry i in
country c
BEEPS 2005
(question
q54a)
Borrowing from local
banks BLic = barBL
j
ic,
the mean share of firm borrowing from
local banks in industry i and country c
BEEPS 2005
(question
q45a3)
Borrowing from foreign
banks BFic = barBF
j
ic,
the mean share of firm borrowing from
foreign banks in industry i and country
c
BEEPS 2005
(question
q45a4)
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Figure B.1: Measuring Capital-Intensity: Investments vs. Replacement Value
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Source: Own calculation based on the BEEPS 2005
Table B.4: Sensitivity Analysis
Albania Armenia Belarus Bosnia Bulgaria Croatia Czech Republic Estonia FYR Macedonia Georgia Hungary
Capital-intensity 0.184** 0.198** 0.180** 0.138* 0.191** 0.150* 0.205*** 0.179** 0.156* 0.202*** 0.194**
(0.017) (0.012) (0.023) (0.070) (0.014) (0.071) (0.009) (0.020) (0.055) (0.008) (0.014)
Likelihood -189.83 -189.43 -187.75 -190.52 -187.20 -186.82 -183.65 -193.60 -187.57 -187.58 -188.06
p-value(Wald) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 806 810 791 813 792 801 789 806 818 805 791
Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Latvia Lithuania Moldova Poland Romania Russia Serbia Slovenia Ukraine
Capital-intensity 0.143* 0.183** 0.168** 0.199*** 0.199** 0.188** 0.178** 0.146* 0.228*** 0.176** 0.155*
(0.062) (0.018) (0.026) (0.008) (0.011) (0.014) (0.022) (0.059) (0.003) (0.026) (0.057)
Likelihood -190.84 -190.65 -192.26 -189.33 -183.75 -191.99 -186.88 -186.48 -183.92 -188.43 -162.51
p-value(Wald) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 792 806 807 803 801 786 798 779 800 800 750
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B.2 Robustness checks
Table B.5: Robustness check. Measuring capital-intensity through investments
All EU non-EU
Specifications1 (2) (4) (2) (4) (2) (4)
Capital-intensity (investments) 0.302*** 0.101* 0.248* 0.237** 0.255*** 0.079
(0.058) (0.052) (0.141) (0.117) (0.063) (0.056)
Trust -0.584*** -0.770*** -0.565 -0.895** -0.644*** -0.815***
(0.204) (0.195) (0.434) (0.402) (0.219) (0.214)
International trade and competition
Export 0.534*** 0.260 0.525 0.461 0.325 0.065
(0.206) (0.195) (0.421) (0.362) (0.218) (0.216)
Import competition 0.585** 0.503** -0.135 -0.045 0.850*** 0.764**
(0.255) (0.255) (0.475) (0.458) (0.271) (0.298)
Without import competition -0.253 -0.212 -12.513*** -14.052*** 1.428 1.862
(1.812) (1.587) (3.940) (3.764) (1.902) (1.487)
High competition -0.861*** -0.862*** 0.797 0.710* -1.378*** -1.478***
(0.297) (0.284) (0.487) (0.413) (0.323) (0.321)
Other controls
EU transition countries -0.200 0.275
(0.176) (2.484)
Labour productivity (sd) 0.294* 0.302** 1.063*** 1.020*** 0.132 0.151
(0.171) (0.130) (0.301) (0.301) (0.200) (0.144)
GDP per capita -0.421*** -0.652 0.777* -0.639 -0.412*** -0.569
(0.075) (1.157) (0.466) (1.098) (0.076) (0.430)
SME2 -0.437 -0.332 -0.715 -1.131* -0.383 -0.244
(0.310) (0.282) (0.619) (0.629) (0.347) (0.300)
MES3 0.373 0.056 -0.056 -0.718 0.446 0.319
(0.249) (0.260) (0.543) (0.554) (0.285) (0.291)
Finance acc. difficulty (major) 0.669** 0.266 0.109 0.449 0.728** 0.101
(0.281) (0.305) (0.613) (0.592) (0.302) (0.336)
Borrowing from local banks 0.008 0.011** 0.022** 0.018* 0.002 0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
Borrowing from foreign banks -0.027 -0.015 0.022 0.023 -0.024 -0.014
(0.017) (0.014) (0.056) (0.034) (0.018) (0.015)
Country dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
Constant 1.277* 3.398 -10.340** 3.541 1.353* 2.909
(0.709) (8.670) (4.544) (10.526) (0.741) (3.224)
Likelihood -808.123 -733.373 -189.439 -174.796 -589.462 -537.487
Likelihood C -909.0568 -909.0568 -223.2973 -223.2973 -664.6377 -664.6377
Pseudo-R2 .1110314 .1932594 .1516268 .2172072 .1131085 .1913083
Chi2 173.3432 341.9192 71.30324 95.1459 136.9589 271.7571
P-value 1.44e-29 1.59e-52 4.62e-10 4.01e-12 8.55e-23 8.83e-43
N 807 807 279 279 528 528
1 Dependent variable is integration incidence, corrected for the exposure (number of firms surveyed)
2 SME is the share of small and medium enterprises within population (firms with 2-49 employees and firms with 50-249 employees);
2 MES is the share of firms with multiple establishments in the country;
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: Dependent variable is the share of integrationg firms in an industry. Coefficients, rather than
marginal effects are presented
1 SME is the share of small and medium enterprises within population (firms with 2-49 employees and
firms with 50-249 employees);
1 MES is the share of firms with multiple establishments in an industry;
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table B.6: Robustness check. Including Ireland and Spain
All EU non-EU
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Integration incidence
Capital-intensity 0.262*** 0.110* 0.184* 0.195* 0.186*** 0.048
(0.059) (0.059) (0.104) (0.106) (0.066) (0.068)
Trust -0.535*** -0.799*** -0.802** -0.876*** -0.647*** -0.864***
(0.183) (0.180) (0.349) (0.340) (0.213) (0.209)
Export 0.394** 0.199 0.626* 0.431 0.144 -0.024
(0.190) (0.176) (0.323) (0.295) (0.220) (0.211)
EU -0.446*** -2.823
(0.169) (2.426)
Labour productivity (sd) 0.277* 0.214* 0.268 0.251 0.087 0.139
(0.152) (0.122) (0.201) (0.183) (0.231) (0.150)
GDP per capita -0.190*** 0.744 0.251 0.590 -0.331*** -0.496
(0.072) (0.947) (0.186) (0.993) (0.072) (0.429)
SME -0.561* -0.654** -0.750 -0.993** -0.417 -0.459
(0.292) (0.262) (0.463) (0.476) (0.364) (0.303)
MES 0.269 0.063 -0.208 -0.454 0.360 0.310
(0.215) (0.230) (0.359) (0.385) (0.265) (0.277)
Import competition 0.394 0.188 -0.425 -0.302 0.792*** 0.570*
(0.248) (0.243) (0.391) (0.364) (0.275) (0.311)
High competition -0.767*** -0.627** 0.361 0.332 -1.445*** -1.314***
(0.258) (0.245) (0.359) (0.318) (0.333) (0.321)
Without import competition -0.415 -0.783 -7.810* -8.873** 0.995 1.007
(1.619) (1.453) (4.274) (4.500) (1.624) (1.277)
Finance access difficulty (major) 0.325 0.009 -0.292 -0.030 0.584* -0.086
(0.283) (0.294) (0.545) (0.521) (0.304) (0.345)
Borrowing from local banks 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.016** 0.013* 0.004 0.009
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Borrowing from foreign banks -0.019 -0.011 0.047 0.034 -0.016 -0.012
(0.014) (0.012) (0.033) (0.028) (0.016) (0.014)
Country dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
Constant -0.875 -6.868 -4.980*** -8.194 0.459 2.535
(0.625) (7.118) (1.593) (9.958) (0.690) (3.204)
Likelihood -955 -852.4 -304.3 -285.8 -613 -551.3
Likelihood C -1036.2 -1036.2 -344.5 -344.5 -676.9 -676.9
Pseudo-R2 0.078 0.177 0.116 0.171 0.094 0.186
Chi2 151.9 370.7 81.5 107.4 114.7 279.4
P-value 3.02e-25 3.61e-57 5.80e-12 1.39e-13 2.20e-18 2.67e-44
N 949 949 401 401 548 548
1 SME is the share of small and medium enterprises within population (firms with 2-49 employees and firms with 50-249 employees);
2 MES is the share of firms with multiple establishments in the country;
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: Dependent variable is the share of integrationg firms in an industry. Coefficients, rather than
marginal effects are presented
1 SME is the share of small and medium enterprises within population (firms with 2-49 employees and
firms with 50-249 employees);
1 MES is the share of firms with multiple establishments in an industry;
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table B.7: Robustness check. Capital-intensity through investments including Ireland and
Spain
All EU non-EU
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Integration incidence
Capital-intensity (investments) 0.312*** 0.106** 0.215** 0.170** 0.255*** 0.079
(0.051) (0.047) (0.088) (0.082) (0.063) (0.056)
Trust -0.512*** -0.764*** -0.727** -0.904** -0.644*** -0.815***
(0.187) (0.184) (0.351) (0.351) (0.219) (0.214)
Export 0.591*** 0.336* 0.771** 0.614** 0.325 0.065
(0.188) (0.179) (0.340) (0.305) (0.218) (0.216)
EU -0.239 -4.228*
(0.159) (2.446)
Labour productivity (sd) 0.320** 0.238** 0.338 0.296 0.132 0.151
(0.144) (0.120) (0.213) (0.193) (0.200) (0.144)
GDP per capita -0.297*** 1.288 0.123 1.475 -0.412*** -0.569
(0.076) (0.949) (0.206) (1.015) (0.076) (0.430)
SME -0.508* -0.440* -0.764 -1.005** -0.383 -0.244
(0.293) (0.267) (0.470) (0.486) (0.347) (0.300)
MES 0.296 0.064 -0.166 -0.481 0.446 0.319
(0.226) (0.240) (0.357) (0.387) (0.285) (0.291)
Import competition 0.502** 0.378 -0.301 -0.243 0.850*** 0.764**
(0.237) (0.237) (0.382) (0.369) (0.271) (0.298)
High competition -0.707*** -0.707*** 0.477 0.471 -1.378*** -1.478***
(0.259) (0.250) (0.375) (0.339) (0.323) (0.321)
Without import competition -0.383 -0.318 -8.211* -9.267** 1.428 1.862
(1.814) (1.605) (4.470) (4.671) (1.902) (1.487)
Finance access difficulty (major) 0.483* 0.128 -0.236 -0.110 0.728** 0.101
(0.275) (0.288) (0.536) (0.524) (0.302) (0.336)
Borrowing from local banks 0.012*** 0.010** 0.016** 0.014** 0.002 0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
Borrowing from foreign banks -0.027* -0.014 0.043 0.034 -0.024 -0.014
(0.016) (0.013) (0.039) (0.030) (0.018) (0.015)
Country dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
Constant 0.334 -11.031 -3.559* -16.818* 1.353* 2.909
(0.695) (7.138) (1.854) (10.195) (0.741) (3.224)
Likelihood -928.5 -841.7 -302.9 -285 -589.5 -537.5
Likelihood C -1022.8 -1022.8 -343.7 -343.7 -664.6 -664.6
Pseudo-R2 0.092 0.177 0.119 0.170 0.113 0.191
Chi2 168.02 349.58 78.26 99.45 137 271.76
P-value 1.72e-28 5.09e-53 2.34e-11 3.62e-12 8.55e-23 8.83e-43
N 922 922 419 419 639 639
1 SME is the share of small and medium enterprises within population (firms with 2-49 employees and firms with 50-249 employees);
2 MES is the share of firms with multiple establishments in the country;
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: Dependent variable is the share of integrationg firms in an industry. Coefficients, rather than
marginal effects are presented
1 SME is the share of small and medium enterprises within population (firms with 2-49 employees and
firms with 50-249 employees);
1 MES is the share of firms with multiple establishments in an industry;
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Tables and figures
Table C.1: Average capital-intensity and labor productivity by country
Capital-intensity as investments Labour productivity
Country Mean Median Mean Median
Bulgaria 0.7 0.2 26.0 18.6
Albania 1.3 0.7 30.4 25.0
Croatia 2.9 1.3 97.4 66.5
Belarus 1.0 0.3 16.4 11.7
Georgia 0.4 0.0 20.6 9.3
Ukraine 0.7 0.5 18.9 13.2
Russia 0.5 0.3 17.2 11.7
Poland 0.8 0.3 45.7 33.0
Romania 0.7 0.4 23.8 15.2
Kazakhstan 0.4 0.1 9.3 6.1
Moldova 0.3 0.1 7.6 5.8
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1.2 0.4 44.5 33.1
FYR Macedonia 2.3 0.7 43.4 39.5
Armenia 1.0 0.4 14.2 9.8
Kyrgyz Republic 0.3 0.1 7.2 5.0
Estonia 1.1 0.9 64.1 48.4
Czech Republic 1.6 0.8 47.3 43.3
Hungary 2.5 1.1 69.3 52.0
Latvia 2.6 0.8 39.9 28.3
Lithuania 2.0 0.9 40.3 33.1
Slovak Republic 1.9 0.6 63.3 49.6
Slovenia 4.8 2.3 98.3 77.2
Spain 3.2 1.5 151.9 100.0
Ireland 9.8 1.9 1330.1 125.0
Serbia and Montenegro 0.8 0.4 42.8 29.9
Total 2.0 0.5 125.3 27.5
Source: Own calculations based on the BEEPS (2005)
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Table C.2: Average logged capital-intensity and labor productivity by country
Capital-intensity as investments (ln) Labour productivity (ln)
Country Mean Median Mean Median
Bulgaria -0.6 -0.6 2.9 2.9
Albania -0.3 -0.2 3.3 3.2
Croatia 0.5 0.6 4.3 4.2
Belarus -0.9 -1.0 2.5 2.5
Georgia -0.8 -0.7 2.4 2.2
Ukraine -0.7 -0.6 2.6 2.6
Russia -1.2 -1.1 2.6 2.5
Poland -0.4 -0.4 3.6 3.5
Romania -0.7 -0.5 2.8 2.7
Kazakhstan -1.3 -1.2 1.9 1.8
Moldova -1.6 -1.6 1.8 1.8
Bosnia and Herzegovina -0.5 -0.5 3.5 3.5
FYR Macedonia 0.1 0.1 3.6 3.7
Armenia -0.5 -0.6 2.4 2.3
Kyrgyz Republic -1.5 -1.5 1.7 1.6
Estonia -0.1 -0.0 3.9 3.9
Czech Republic 0.0 0.0 3.7 3.8
Hungary 0.3 0.3 4.0 4.0
Latvia 0.3 0.2 3.4 3.3
Lithuania 0.2 0.3 3.5 3.5
Slovak Republic 0.2 0.2 3.9 3.9
Slovenia 0.7 0.9 4.4 4.3
Spain 0.6 0.5 4.7 4.6
Ireland 1.0 1.0 4.9 4.8
Serbia and Montenegro -0.7 -0.6 3.5 3.4
Total -0.2 -0.2 3.3 3.3
Source: Own calculations based on the BEEPS (2005)
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Table C.3: Probit model of decision to integrate with Heckman selectionTable 1: Heckprobit selection procedure
Full sample EU countries Non-EU countries
Integr vs.
Other
Integr vs.
Outsourc
Integr vs.
Other
Integr vs.
Outsourc
Integr vs.
Other
Integr vs.
Outsourc
Integration
Capital-intensity (normalized) 0.072*** 0.025 0.042 -0.009 -0.020 -0.047
(0.027) (0.030) (0.140) (0.048) (0.112) (0.109)
Trust -0.199*** -0.118* -0.063 -0.049 0.413 0.411
(0.066) (0.071) (0.374) (0.124) (0.373) (0.483)
Export 0.255*** 0.211*** 0.053 0.115 -0.062 -0.018
(0.069) (0.075) (0.512) (0.125) (0.466) (0.507)
Labor productivity (normalized) 0.117*** 0.166*** 0.066 0.158* 0.174* 0.244**
(0.039) (0.043) (0.242) (0.093) (0.102) (0.098)
Ownership concentration -0.002* -0.002* 0.003 0.000 -0.002 -0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
Moderate import competition pressure 0.136 0.177* 0.221 0.062 -0.003 0.153
(0.088) (0.100) (0.358) (0.154) (0.299) (0.370)
High import competition pressure 0.252*** 0.329*** 0.309 0.094 -0.047 0.221
(0.090) (0.100) (0.510) (0.164) (0.498) (0.624)
Similar products can not be imported -0.064 0.065 -0.473 -0.242 -0.025 0.322
(0.202) (0.215) (1.152) (0.470) (0.457) (0.474)
Not elastic demand -0.084 -0.151 0.139 -0.327 -0.245 -0.305
(0.090) (0.100) (0.546) (0.217) (0.201) (0.199)
Moderately elastic demand -0.270*** -0.333*** -0.348 -0.199 -0.015 -0.129
(0.093) (0.103) (0.509) (0.164) (0.430) (0.494)
Highly elastic demand -0.259*** -0.307*** -0.264 -0.141 -0.261 -0.362
(0.084) (0.091) (0.468) (0.143) (0.354) (0.332)
Constant -1.307*** -1.489*** -0.547 -1.523*** 0.478 -0.146
(0.092) (0.103) (3.538) (0.174) (1.941) (2.394)
Selection: Change
Capital-intensity (normalized) 0.088*** 0.061** 0.077** 0.036 0.097*** 0.077**
(0.024) (0.024) (0.039) (0.041) (0.031) (0.032)
Trust -0.347*** -0.310*** -0.187** -0.125 -0.414*** -0.386***
(0.056) (0.059) (0.091) (0.096) (0.075) (0.078)
Export 0.288*** 0.261*** 0.253*** 0.219** 0.435*** 0.414***
(0.060) (0.062) (0.096) (0.101) (0.080) (0.083)
Labor productivity (normalized) 0.084** 0.107*** 0.130* 0.166** 0.018 0.036
(0.034) (0.035) (0.067) (0.072) (0.041) (0.042)
Ownership concentration -0.002** -0.002** -0.001 -0.001 -0.003** -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Moderate import competition pressure 0.128* 0.147* -0.019 -0.023 0.209** 0.246**
(0.075) (0.079) (0.120) (0.125) (0.096) (0.102)
High import competition pressure 0.244*** 0.274*** -0.070 -0.096 0.444*** 0.496***
(0.077) (0.081) (0.125) (0.133) (0.099) (0.104)
Similar products can not be imported 0.081 0.156 0.281 0.248 -0.072 0.055
(0.160) (0.164) (0.256) (0.269) (0.211) (0.213)
Not elastic demand -0.017 -0.048 -0.117 -0.268 -0.036 -0.035
(0.077) (0.081) (0.150) (0.167) (0.093) (0.097)
Moderately elastic demand -0.226*** -0.250*** 0.048 -0.008 -0.350*** -0.367***
(0.081) (0.084) (0.127) (0.134) (0.108) (0.114)
Highly elastic demand -0.147** -0.155** 0.077 0.046 -0.227** -0.217**
(0.072) (0.074) (0.113) (0.119) (0.099) (0.103)
Constant -0.952*** -1.051*** -1.138*** -1.184*** -0.904*** -1.032***
(0.077) (0.081) (0.134) (0.140) (0.095) (0.102)
athrho
Constant 2.972 2.934 0.506 8.088 -0.231 -0.008
(2.619) (2.801) (2.614) (138.442) (1.429) (1.533)
Ownership structure Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Likelihood -1669.63 -1495.71 -607.25 -537.85 -1026.69 -922.29
Pseudo-R2
p-value(Wald) 0.000 0.000 0.935 0.574 0.107 0.050
Rho(eq.depend) 0.995 0.994 0.467 1.000 -0.227 -0.008
N 3028 2954 1349 1323 1679 1631
Note: For all the specifications the coefficients rather than marginal effects are presented. The values
of ρ, not of regressors, is of higher interest here.
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Table C.4: The difference between integrating and non-integrating firms in two country groups
European countries Non-European countries
Diff (nonInt-Int) Diff (nonInt-Int)
% of the total profits in 2003 invested in the firm in 2004 -0.513 (-0.12) -9.025** (-2.78)
Operating profits 1131.4 (1.40) -74.69 (-0.53)
Operating profits (ln) 0.436 (1.92) -0.366* (-2.23)
Labour productivity 49.03 (1.13) -7.814 (-1.88)
Labour productivity 0.0529 (0.56) -0.339*** (-3.56)
Capital-Intensity 10.29 (0.87) -5.622* (-2.38)
Capital-intensity 0.0469 (0.32) -0.270 (-1.82)
Capital investments per worker -0.398 (-0.70) -0.439 (-1.88)
Capital-intensity as investments (ln) -0.106 (-0.62) -0.200 (-1.38)
Trust -0.00767 (-0.14) -0.135*** (-3.65)
Prepayment levels -0.0152 (-0.49) 0.0878** (2.92)
Current number of permanent, full-time employees 100.9* (2.44) 16.00 (0.36)
Size 0.325 (1.71) -0.0149 (-0.12)
Age 3.651 (1.79) 1.185 (0.73)
Export 0.0190 (0.36) 0.0295 (0.78)
% of sales exported directly 4.139 (1.39) 0.982 (0.49)
% of sales exported indirectly 2.617* (2.21) 0.495 (0.60)
Import (dum) 0.0160 (0.32) 0.0357 (0.98)
% of material inputs and supplies imported directly 4.987 (1.52) -1.127 (-0.42)
% of material inputs and supplies imported indirectly -2.093 (-0.67) 5.495* (2.32)
% owned by private domestic company/organisation -7.363 (-1.91) -2.036 (-0.68)
% owned by private foreign company/organisation 7.160* (2.24) 1.684 (0.74)
% owned by government/state 0.943 (0.42) 0.796 (0.37)
% of the firm owned by the largest shareholder(s) -2.306 (-0.73) -1.180 (-0.51)
Observations 356 676
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Appendix to Chapter 4
D.1 Survey questions
The information on the number of both directly reporting and directly managed employees
were obtained through direct questions to a representative of a firm, e.g. the questions of
the questionnaire with respect to the HQ top manager subordinates sounded as “Number of
employees that report directly to the Top Manager?” and “How many employees does the Top
Manager directly manage – i.e., how many does he directly meet and supervise on a daily or
weekly basis?”.
Figure D.1: Questions on the reporting relationships
In order to determine the number of layers the strategy of the interview consisted of iterative
questioning of an interviewee on reporting structure starting from who a typical production
employee report to, and going further to who his/her boss report to, till arriving to the national
HQ top manager. An example of the possible conversation is presented in the Figure D.2
In this way the interviewer was able to count the number of layers of interest, which was
further confirmed by an interviewee. In the case presented in the example the number of layers
was 1 between production employee and FM and 4 for the HQ top manager.
The information on the changes of the depth of control (CEO organizational distance) is
based on the answer to the following question of the survey.
A big share of firms have the same organizational distance from top managers and factory
managers to production employees 1. However, the information we possess on organizational
1More than 75% of firms in Bulgaria have the top manager and factory manager at the same level of
organizational hierarchy. The group of countries with big share of firms having top managers and factory
managers on the same organizational level also includes Kazakhstan (more than 85% of firms) and Romania
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Figure D.2: Question on the number of layers
Figure D.3: Question on the flattening
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hierarchy gives us no possibility to verify whether the factory manager and the national HQ
top manager is the same person or they have the same organizational distance from production
employees.
D.2 Tables and figures
Table D.1: Size of firms in the sample by country
Country Number of employees in the firm(establishment)
Min Max Mean Median
Belarus 50 4800 728.1 400.0
Ukraine 40 4000 293.0 140.0
Uzbekistan 40 1948 174.7 81.0
Russia 35 3000 222.5 120.0
Poland 50 4200 336.7 218.5
Romania 23 2330 183.2 100.0
Serbia 13 2500 170.9 100.0
Kazakhstan 50 1700 224.0 140.0
Lithuania 30 650 153.9 110.0
Bulgaria 45 700 142.5 94.0
Germany 16 2000 245.2 160.0
India 8 1200 191.2 145.0
Total 8 4800 238.7 120.0
Source: Own calculations based on the MOI survey
Table D.2: Main markets of firms
Markets
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Number of firms Column percentages Row percentages
Belarus 8 49 16 73 2.4 6.8 4.9 5.3 11.0 67.1 21.9 100.0
Ukraine 30 86 14 130 9.2 12.0 4.3 9.5 23.1 66.2 10.8 100.0
Uzbekistan 47 56 12 115 14.4 7.8 3.6 8.4 40.9 48.7 10.4 100.0
Russia 112 125 6 243 34.3 17.4 1.8 17.7 46.1 51.4 2.5 100.0
Poland 4 43 27 74 1.2 6.0 8.2 5.4 5.4 58.1 36.5 100.0
Romania 18 63 49 130 5.5 8.8 14.9 9.5 13.8 48.5 37.7 100.0
Serbia 17 65 22 104 5.2 9.1 6.7 7.6 16.3 62.5 21.2 100.0
Kazakhstan 41 52 8 101 12.5 7.2 2.4 7.4 40.6 51.5 7.9 100.0
Lithuania 9 36 43 88 2.8 5.0 13.1 6.4 10.2 40.9 48.9 100.0
Bulgaria 20 52 70 142 6.1 7.2 21.3 10.3 14.1 36.6 49.3 100.0
Germany 16 67 54 137 4.9 9.3 16.4 10.0 11.7 48.9 39.4 100.0
India 5 24 8 37 1.5 3.3 2.4 2.7 13.5 64.9 21.6 100.0
Total 327 718 329 1374 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 23.8 52.3 23.9 100.0
Source: Own calculations based on the MOI survey
(more than 80%).
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Table D.3: The span of control of the national HQ top manager
Country Number of employees reporting directly to the HQ top manager
Min Max Mean Median
Belarus 4 100 12.3 10.0
Ukraine 2 80 12.4 10.0
Uzbekistan 2 65 9.2 6.0
Russia 1 164 15.9 10.0
Poland 2 40 11.3 9.0
Romania 1 69 9.8 6.0
Serbia 1 100 16.4 7.0
Kazakhstan 2 35 8.6 7.0
Lithuania 1 200 9.9 5.0
Bulgaria 2 50 9.5 7.0
Germany 1 300 33.2 8.0
India 1 20 4.5 4.0
Total 1 300 13.9 7.0
Source: Own calculations based on the MOI survey
Table D.4: The span of control of the factory manager
Country Number of employees reporting directly to the factory manager
Min Max Mean Median
Belarus 2 62 10.1 8.0
Ukraine 2 100 10.9 7.0
Uzbekistan 1 65 7.2 4.0
Russia 1 500 23.1 10.0
Poland 2 100 32.3 10.0
Romania 1 100 10.4 5.0
Serbia 1 87 28.2 23.0
Kazakhstan 1 30 7.8 7.0
Lithuania 1 120 9.1 5.0
Bulgaria 1 50 8.6 6.0
Germany 2 800 60.4 19.0
India 1 20 5.3 4.0
Total 1 800 19.3 7.0
Source: Own calculations based on the MOI survey
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Table D.5: Number of workers national HQ top manager directly manage
Country Number of employees HQ top manager directly manage
Min Max Mean Median
Belarus 6 50 19.0 10.0
Ukraine 15 70 30.3 27.0
Uzbekistan 10 65 34.6 25.0
Russia 6 60 22.0 20.0
Poland 8 40 22.6 20.0
Romania 6 74 31.3 28.0
Serbia 2 62 17.6 10.0
Kazakhstan 10 15 12.5 12.5
Lithuania 14 200 55.0 17.5
Bulgaria 10 50 29.4 25.0
Germany 2 90 19.9 10.0
India
Total 2 200 24.4 20.0
Source: Own calculations based on the MOI survey
Table D.6: Number of workers factory manager directly manage
Country Number of employees factory manager directly manage
Min Max Mean Median
Belarus 6 50 18.6 12.0
Ukraine 15 60 30.6 27.0
Uzbekistan 15 65 36.3 29.5
Russia 1 230 31.7 30.0
Poland 3 100 16.7 7.0
Romania 23 64 42.4 43.0
Serbia 2 87 32.9 30.0
Kazakhstan 50 50 50.0 50.0
Lithuania 9 66 25.0 12.5
Bulgaria 15 50 32.1 25.0
Germany 2 590 51.7 29.5
India
Total 1 590 36.0 29.0
Source: Own calculations based on the MOI survey
169
APPENDIX D. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4
Table D.7: The depth of control of the national HQ top manager
Country Number of layers between the HQ top manager and production employees
Min Max Mean Median
Belarus 1 6 3.2 3.0
Ukraine 1 12 2.9 3.0
Uzbekistan 1 5 2.6 2.0
Russia 1 9 3.1 3.0
Poland 1 5 2.9 3.0
Romania 0 14 3.6 3.0
Serbia 1 5 2.5 2.0
Kazakhstan 1 11 3.3 3.0
Lithuania 0 6 2.5 2.0
Bulgaria 0 6 2.3 2.0
Germany 0 5 2.9 3.0
India 2 8 4.0 4.0
Total 0 14 2.9 3.0
Source: Own calculations based on the MOI survey
Table D.8: The depth of control of a factory manager
Country Number of layers between the factory manager and production employees
Min Max Mean Median
Belarus 0 5 2.4 2.0
Ukraine 0 7 2.4 2.0
Uzbekistan 0 4 0.9 1.0
Russia 0 8 2.4 2.0
Poland 0 4 1.7 2.0
Romania 0 10 3.3 3.0
Serbia 0 4 1.2 1.0
Kazakhstan 1 7 3.0 3.0
Lithuania 0 3 1.1 1.0
Bulgaria 0 6 2.0 2.0
Germany 0 5 2.2 2.0
India 1 5 2.5 2.0
Total 0 10 2.1 2.0
Source: Own calculations based on the MOI survey
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Table D.9: The change of the depth of control of the national HQ top manager in the three
years previous to the interview
Organizational distance in previous three years
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Number of firms Column percentages Row percentages
Belarus 1 4 53 58 1.3 3.6 4.6 4.3 1.7 6.9 91.4 100.0
Ukraine 7 12 111 130 9.3 10.9 9.7 9.7 5.4 9.2 85.4 100.0
Uzbekistan 6 12 96 114 8.0 10.9 8.4 8.5 5.3 10.5 84.2 100.0
Russia 19 11 213 243 25.3 10.0 18.5 18.2 7.8 4.5 87.7 100.0
Poland 5 8 58 71 6.7 7.3 5.0 5.3 7.0 11.3 81.7 100.0
Romania 7 6 105 118 9.3 5.5 9.1 8.8 5.9 5.1 89.0 100.0
Serbia 6 16 83 105 8.0 14.5 7.2 7.9 5.7 15.2 79.0 100.0
Kazakhstan 3 9 87 99 4.0 8.2 7.6 7.4 3.0 9.1 87.9 100.0
Lithuania 7 6 74 87 9.3 5.5 6.4 6.5 8.0 6.9 85.1 100.0
Bulgaria 5 5 126 136 6.7 4.5 11.0 10.2 3.7 3.7 92.6 100.0
Germany 9 19 108 136 12.0 17.3 9.4 10.2 6.6 14.0 79.4 100.0
India 0 2 35 37 0.0 1.8 3.0 2.8 0.0 5.4 94.6 100.0
Total 75 110 1149 1334 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 5.6 8.2 86.1 100.0
Source: Own calculations based on the MOI survey
Table D.10: The connection between trade liberalization and profit margins
Profit margin OLS OLSpos
Import penetration change (3years) -0.034** -0.043*
(0.015) (0.022)
Import penetration 4 years ago 0.045** 0.063**
(0.022) (0.032)
Profit margin 4 years ago -0.030 -0.340***
(0.044) (0.069)
Constant 0.280 2.701*
(1.045) (1.512)
R2 0.020 0.100
P-value .008194 6.16e-07
N 589 304
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
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Figure D.4: The changes of import penetration rate in manufacturing
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Table D.11: The connection between trade liberalization and labor productivityTable 1: The connection between trade liberalization and labour productivity
Labour Productivity+ Labour Productivity+
Import penetration change (3years)1 -0.120*** -0.106***
(0.024) (0.026)
Labour productivity 4 years ago 2 0.673*** 0.657***
(0.028) (0.029)
Import penetration level 4 years ago 3 -0.077*** -0.079***
(0.024) (0.024)
No single ownership 0.048
(0.100)
Foreign family/private ownership -0.024
(0.149)
Foreign firm ownership 0.110
(0.161)
Foreign state ownership -0.029
(0.512)
Domestic family ownership 0.380***
(0.145)
Domestic State ownership -0.192
(0.126)
Other ownership -0.054
(0.183)
Year 2009 0.022
(0.082)
Year 2010 0.000
(.)
Constant -0.036 -0.069
(0.037) (0.058)
R2 0.617 0.628
P-value 1.07e-83 1.68e-77
N 407 406
Effect of import penetration
change being 10 % higher than mean -.068 -.061
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
+ Standardized logarithm of sales per employee
1 Standardized logarithm of 4MP3zjct
2 Standardized logarithm of sales per employee 4 years ago
3 Standardized logarithm of 4MP3zjct 4 years ago
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Appendix to Chapter 5
E.1 Management Quality: Questions and Scores
The following details on the survey questions and management practice scoring is based on
the questionnaire of the BEEPS innovation manufacturing module:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R. MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
 
INTERVIEWER: ASK IF 20+ EMPLOYEES (L.1 IN THE MAIN QUESTIONNAIRE IS AT 
LEAST 20). IF L.1 IS LESS THAN 20, GO TO QUESTION A.15 
 
(INTERVIEWER: PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING TO THE RESPONDENT 
BEFORE PROCEEDING:) 
And now I would like to ask you about management practices in this establishment. 
 
Management Area: OPERATIONS 
 
R.1 Over the last complete fiscal year [insert last complete fiscal year], what best describes 
what happened at this establishment when a problem in the production process arose? 
 (INTERVIEWER: CODE “DOES NOT APPLY” (-7) IF THERE WERE NO PROBLEMS IN THE 
PRODUCTION PROCESS IN THE LAST COMPLETE FISCAL YEAR) 
 
 Score in 
Questionnaire 
Management 
Score 
DON’T KNOW (SPONTANEOUS) -9 . 
DOES NOT APPLY (SPONTANEOUS) -7 . 
We fixed it but did not take further action 1 2 
We fixed it and took action to make sure it did not happen again 2 3 
We fixed it and took action to make sure that it did not happen 
again, and had a continuous improvement process to anticipate 
problems like these in advance 
3 4 
No action was taken 4 1 
 
Management Area: MONITORING 
 
R.2 Over the last complete fiscal year [insert last complete fiscal year], how many 
production performance indicators were monitored at this establishment? 
 
 Score in 
Questionnaire 
Management 
Score 
DON’T KNOW (SPONTANEOUS) -9 . 
1-2 production performance indicators 1 2 
3-9 production performance indicators 2 3 
10 or more production performance indicators 3 4 
No production performance indicators 4 1 
174
 Management Area: INCENTIVES 
 
R.11 Over the last complete fiscal year [insert last complete fiscal year], what were 
managers' performance bonuses usually based on? 
 (INTERVIEWER: ANY TYPE OF TARGETS: TARGETS BASED ON PRODUCTION, SALES, 
FIRM'S STOCK PRICE, ETC. USE "DOES NOT APPLY" (-7) ONLY IF FIRM HAS NO 
TARGETS) 
 
 Score in 
Questionnaire 
Management 
Score 
DON’T KNOW (SPONTANEOUS) -9 . 
DOES NOT APPLY (SPONTANEOUS) -7 . 
Their own performance as measured by targets 1 5 
Their team or shift performance as measured by targets 2 4 
Their establishment’s performance as measured by targets 3 3 
Their company’s performance as measured by targets 4 2 
No performance bonuses 5 1 
 
R.13 Over the last complete fiscal year [insert last complete fiscal year], what was the 
primary way non-managers were promoted at this establishment? 
 (INTERVIEWER: CODE DOES NOT APPLY (-7) IF NO PROMOTIONS OF NONMANAGERS 
IN THE LAST COMPLETE FISCAL YEAR) 
 
 Score in 
Questionnaire 
Management 
Score 
DON’T KNOW (SPONTANEOUS) -9 . 
DOES NOT APPLY (SPONTANEOUS) -7 . 
Promotions were based solely on performance and ability 1 4 
Promotions were based partly on performance and ability, and partly on 
other factors (for example, tenure or family connections) 
2 
 
3 
Promotions were based mainly on factors other than performance and 
ability (for example, tenure or family connections) 
3 2 
Non-managers are normally not promoted 4 1 
 
R.15 Over the last complete fiscal year [insert last complete fiscal year], when was an 
underperforming non-manager reassigned or dismissed? 
 (INTERVIEWER: CODE DOES NOT APPLY (-7) IF NO UNDER-PERFORMING 
NON-MANAGERS IN THE LAST COMPLETE FISCAL YEAR) 
 
 Score in 
Questionnaire 
Management 
Score 
DON’T KNOW (SPONTANEOUS) -9 . 
DOES NOT APPLY (SPONTANEOUS) -7 . 
Within 6 months of identifying non-manager under-performance 1 3 
After 6 months of identifying non-manager under-performance 2 2 
Rarely or never 3 1 
 
 
 
Management Area: TARGETS 
 
R.6 Over the last complete fiscal year [insert last complete fiscal year], what best describes 
the time frame of production targets at this establishment? Examples of production targets 
are: production, quality, efficiency, waste, on-time delivery. 
 
 Score in 
Questionnaire 
Management 
Score 
DON’T KNOW (SPONTANEOUS) -9 . 
Main focus was on short-term (less than one year) production targets 1 
 
2 
Main focus was on long-term (more than one year) production targets 2 3 
Combination of short term and long term production targets 3 4 
No production targets  
GO TO R.11 
4 1 
 
R.7 Over the last complete fiscal year [insert last complete fiscal year], how easy or 
difficult was it for this establishment to achieve its production targets? 
 
 Score in 
Questionnaire 
Management 
Score 
DON’T KNOW (SPONTANEOUS) -9 . 
Possible to achieve without much effort 1 1 
Possible to achieve with some effort 2 2 
Possible to achieve with normal amount of effort 3 3 
Possible to achieve with more than normal effort 4 4 
Only possible to achieve with extraordinary effort 5 5 
 
R.8 Over the last complete fiscal year [insert last complete fiscal year], who was aware of 
the production targets at this establishment? 
 
 Score in 
Questionnaire 
Management 
Score 
DON’T KNOW (SPONTANEOUS) -9 . 
Only senior managers 1 1 
Most managers and some production workers 2 2 
Most managers and most production workers 3 3 
All managers and most production workers 4 4 
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E.2 Tables and figures
Figure E.1: Management quality across practices and countries (MOI)
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Figure E.2: Management practices across countries (BEEPS V)
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Figure E.3: Management quality across practices and country groups (BEEPS V)
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Note: Country groups: Central Europe and Baltic States (CEB), Eastern Europe and the Caucasus (EEC),
Central Asia, South Eastern Europe (SEE). Western Balkans include Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo,
Albania, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro.
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Figure E.4: Management quality across practices and countries (BEEPS V)
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Table E.1: Main Variables
Endogenous variable
Management Quality MQijc =
1
4
∑1
n=4(
1
N
∑1
p=N
(Yijc−Y¯ )
sd(Y )
)
, where Yijc is the performance of a firm i in terms of a
particular management practiceY in sector j in country c; p -
number of practices per area of management, n=4 are four
areas of management: targets, incentives, monitoring and
operations
Exogenous variables
Administrative corruption Corrijc =
(Xijc−X¯)
sd(X)
, where Xijc is the frequency of corruption reported by a firm i
to be characteristic for firms similar to itself in sector j in
country c. The level varies between 1 (Never) to 6 (Always).
Types of administrative
corruption Corr
tax
ijc =
(Xtijc−X¯t)
sd(Xt)
, where Xtijc is the frequency of corruption in dealing with
taxes and tax collection reported by a firm i to be
characteristic for firms similar to itself in sector j in country c
in dealing with taxes and tax collection
Corrcourtsijc =
(Xcijc−X¯c)
sd(Xc)
, where Xcijc is the frequency of corruption in dealing with
courts reported by a firm i to be characteristic for firms similar
to itself in sector j in country c in dealing with taxes and tax
collection
Corrcustomsijc =
(Xuijc−X¯u)
sd(Xu)
, where Xuijc is the frequency of corruption in dealing with
customs and/or imports reported by a firm i to be
characteristic for firms similar to itself in sector j in country c
in dealing with taxes and tax collection
Corruption as an obstacle CorrObst1ijc = 1 if corruption is not an obstacle for a respondent’s firm,
CorrObst1ijc = 0 otherwise.
CorrObst2ijc = 1 if corruption is a minor obstacle for a respondent’s firm,
CorrObst2ijc = 0 otherwise.
CorrObst3ijc = 1 if corruption is a moderate obstacle for a respondent’s firm,
CorrObst3ijc = 0 otherwise.
CorrObst4ijc = 1 if corruption is a major obstacle for a respondent’s firm,
CorrObst4ijc = 0 otherwise.
CorrObst5ijc = 1 if corruption is a very obstacle for a respondent’s firm,
CorrObst5ijc = 0 otherwise.
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Figure E.5: Administrative Corruption by types and Management Quality (BEEPS V)
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Source: Own calculations based on the BEEPS V
Note: Country groups: Central Europe and Baltic States (CEB), Eastern Europe and the Caucasus (EEC),
Central Asia, South Eastern Europe (SEE). Western Balkans include Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo,
Albania, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro.
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Figure E.6: Administrative Corruption by types and Management Quality (BEEPS V)
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Note: Country groups: Central Europe and Baltic States (CEB), Eastern Europe and the Caucasus (EEC),
Central Asia, South Eastern Europe (SEE). Western Balkans include Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo,
Albania, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro.
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